10 Solved Problems (IRAC Method) — Human Rights Law

These ten problems are worked in the IRAC method — Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion — the way a KSLU answer sheet expects; the full Question Bank has 40+ more.

Problem 1 — X is detained by a European State on terrorism charges and… (Unit 3)

Problem: X is detained by a European State on terrorism charges and held five to six months without trial. X challenges the detention under Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR. Advise.

I — Issue. Whether a European State violates the ECHR by detaining X on terrorism charges for five to six months without trial, and whether the gravity of the terrorism allegation can justify the detention.

R — Rule. 1. Article 5 guarantees the right to liberty and security and requires that a detained person be brought promptly before a judge and tried within a reasonable time or released. 2. Article 6 guarantees a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent tribunal — a guarantee that applies to everyone, whatever the charge. 3. Article 15 permits a State to derogate from some rights in a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, but only if the emergency is genuine, the derogation is formally declared, and the measures are strictly required. Lawless v Ireland (1961) is the governing authority on such derogations.

A — Analysis. 1. Holding X for five to six months without trial and without prompt judicial control is prima facie a breach of Article 5, and the long untried delay strains the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6. 2. The decoy is the seriousness of the “terrorism” label. The gravity of an allegation does not switch off the guarantees of liberty and fair trial — Article 6 protects everyone, including those accused of the worst offences. The State cannot rely on the label alone. 3. The only lawful route is Article 15. If, and only if, the State has formally declared a qualifying public emergency and the detention is strictly required by it — the Lawless test — the measures may stand. Absent such a valid derogation, the detention has no defence.

C — Conclusion. Unless the State has a valid Article 15 derogation, the detention of X for five to six months without trial violates Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR. The terrorism charge, however grave, is no answer; X is entitled to prompt judicial control and a trial within a reasonable time, and to release or a remedy if these are denied.

Problem 2 — H publishes a book already published across Europe (Unit 3)

Problem: H publishes a book already published across Europe; the UK seizes it under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and convicts H. H argues that prior publication elsewhere in Europe protects him. Advise.

I — Issue. Whether the seizure and conviction of H breach freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR, and whether prior publication of the book elsewhere in Europe binds the UK.

R — Rule. 1. Article 10 protects freedom of expression, including ideas that “offend, shock or disturb,” but permits restrictions “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic society” for legitimate aims, including the protection of morals. 2. Under the margin of appreciation doctrine, national authorities — being closer to local conditions — enjoy a measured discretion in judging what the protection of morals requires, subject to the Court’s supervision and the test of proportionality. 3. Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) is the governing authority: the conviction of the publisher of the same book was upheld on exactly this reasoning.

A — Analysis. 1. The seizure and conviction are a restriction on expression, so they must be justified under Article 10(2). They were “prescribed by law” (the Obscene Publications Act 1959) and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting morals. 2. The decoy is H’s argument that prior publication elsewhere in Europe binds the UK. It does not: morals vary from country to country, so a book acceptable in one State may lawfully be restricted in another. Each State enjoys its margin of appreciation in drawing the line. 3. The restriction must still be proportionate to the aim. On the Handyside facts the Court found it was, holding there was no violation of Article 10.

C — Conclusion. The conviction can stand within the margin of appreciation, provided the restriction is proportionate to the aim of protecting morals. H’s reliance on publication elsewhere in Europe fails — following Handyside v United Kingdom (1976), there is no violation of Article 10, because morals are a matter on which each State enjoys a margin of discretion. — ## UNIT 4 — Protection of Human Rights at the National Level (India)

Problem 3 — A (an injured worker) is taken to government hospitals but… (Unit 4)

Problem: A (an injured worker) is taken to government hospitals but denied admission and treatment for want of beds and facilities, and is treated privately at his own cost. He claims the amount from the State. Advise.

I — Issue. Whether the refusal of emergency medical treatment by government hospitals, on the ground that no beds or facilities were available, violates A’s right to life under Article 21, and whether A can recover the cost of private treatment from the State.

R — Rule. 1. Article 21 guarantees the right to life, which the courts have held to include the right to health and emergency medical care. 2. In Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v State of West Bengal (1996), the Supreme Court held that a government hospital cannot refuse emergency treatment for want of facilities; failure to provide it violates Article 21, and the State is liable to compensate and to improve its emergency services. 3. Constitutional compensation is available as a public-law remedy for such a violation.

A — Analysis. 1. A, an injured worker in need of emergency care, was turned away by government hospitals and forced to pay for private treatment. This is precisely the situation Paschim Banga condemns. 2. The decoy is the plea of “no beds / no facilities available.” The Court has squarely held that this is no excuse for denying emergency care — the State’s duty to preserve life does not yield to administrative shortage; if anything, it obliges the State to make timely arrangements. 3. Because the denial violated A’s Article 21 right, the State is liable to reimburse the cost he was forced to incur and may be directed to upgrade emergency services so the failure is not repeated.

C — Conclusion. The denial of emergency medical aid violates Article 21. Following Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v State of West Bengal (1996), A is entitled to recover the amount spent on private treatment as constitutional compensation, and the State may be directed to improve its emergency medical facilities. The “no beds” defence fails.

Problem 4 — A State permits a factory near a village (Unit 4)

Problem: A State permits a factory near a village; about two years later it discharges polluted waste into the village lakes, harming health and the environment. The villagers seek protection. Advise.

I — Issue. Whether the factory’s discharge of polluted waste into the village lakes violates the villagers’ right to a wholesome environment under Article 21, and whether the State’s earlier permission to the factory legalises the pollution.

R — Rule. 1. Article 21 includes the right to enjoyment of pollution-free water and air, as held in Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar (1991). 2. A citizen may invoke Article 32 (or Article 226) by way of Public Interest Litigation to protect this right, on behalf of an affected community. 3. A licence or permission to operate does not authorise a proprietor to violate the fundamental rights of others by polluting.

A — Analysis. 1. The discharge of polluted waste into the lakes on which the villagers depend directly harms their health and environment, engaging the Article 21 right recognised in Subhash Kumar. 2. The decoy is the State’s earlier “permission” to the factory. Prior permission to set up an industry does not legalise the subsequent pollution; the right to a clean environment cannot be signed away by an administrative sanction, and the factory remains bound to prevent harm. 3. The villagers (or a public-spirited person on their behalf) may bring a PIL; the court can restrain the discharge, direct pollution-control measures or closure, and award compensation for the harm caused, applying the constitutional right to a pollution-free environment.

C — Conclusion. The pollution violates Article 21. Following Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar (1991), the villagers are entitled to relief through PIL — the court may restrain the discharge, order remedial measures, and grant compensation. The State’s prior permission is no defence; it does not legalise the pollution.

Problem 5 — X plans to travel abroad (Unit 4)

Problem: X plans to travel abroad. The Government, fearing X will make allegations against it, impounds the passport without a hearing. X challenges. Advise.

I — Issue. Whether impounding X’s passport without a hearing, on the ground that the Government fears X will criticise it, violates the right to personal liberty under Article 21 (and the freedoms under Article 19).

R — Rule. 1. The right to travel abroad is part of personal liberty under Article 21, and any procedure depriving a person of liberty must be fair, just and reasonable — not arbitrary — as held in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978). 2. Articles 14, 19 and 21 form a golden triangle and are read together, so the action must also satisfy the reasonableness and free-speech tests of Articles 14 and 19. 3. The audi alteram partem rule ordinarily requires a hearing before such an order.

A — Analysis. 1. The passport was impounded without giving X any hearing, offending the fair-procedure requirement of Maneka Gandhi. 2. The decoy is the Government’s ground — a mere “suspicion of future criticism.” This is not a fair, just or reasonable ground; indeed, penalising a person for anticipated criticism strikes directly at the free-speech value protected by Article 19(1)(a). The order is arbitrary and violates Article 14 as well. 3. Because the action fails the Article 21 procedural test and rests on a constitutionally impermissible purpose, it cannot stand, whatever the label of “public interest” attached to it.

C — Conclusion. The impounding of X’s passport is unconstitutional. Following Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978), it violates Article 21 (no fair procedure, no hearing) and offends Articles 14 and 19; the order is liable to be quashed and X is entitled to relief. Fear of future criticism is no valid ground.

Problem 6 — A poor accused cannot afford a lawyer, and the trial is… (Unit 4)

Problem: A poor accused cannot afford a lawyer, and the trial is delayed for months while he remains in custody. What is the State’s duty? Advise.

I — Issue. Whether the State is under a duty to provide free legal aid and a speedy trial to a poor accused who cannot afford a lawyer, and whether his prolonged pre-trial custody violates Article 21.

R — Rule. 1. A speedy trial is an integral part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, as held in Hussainara Khatoon v State of Bihar (1979). 2. The State must provide free legal aid to an indigent accused, read with Article 39A (Directive Principle), as held in Hussainara Khatoon and M.H. Hoskot (1978); a trial without counsel for a poor accused is unfair. 3. Prolonged detention of undertrials without trial offends Article 21.

A — Analysis. 1. The accused is too poor to engage a lawyer, so the State’s duty to provide free legal aid is squarely engaged; a trial in which he is undefended would be unfair and void. 2. The decoy is the suggestion that his poverty or the minor nature of the offence justifies proceeding without counsel, or that delay is acceptable. This reverses the duty: poverty is the very reason the State must supply a lawyer, and delay in custody aggravates, not excuses, the violation. 3. His prolonged custody while awaiting trial independently breaches the Article 21 right to a speedy trial, entitling him to be brought to trial promptly or released.

C — Conclusion. The State is bound to provide the accused with free legal aid and a speedy trial. Following Hussainara Khatoon v State of Bihar (1979) and M.H. Hoskot (1978), the court will direct the appointment of counsel at State expense and an expeditious trial, and may order his release if the delay is unjustified. Poverty is no ground to deny counsel.

Problem 7 — X (aged about 22) is detained by a Sub-Inspector on a theft… (Unit 4)

Problem: X (aged about 22) is detained by a Sub-Inspector on a theft charge and is later found dead with wounds near a railway track. His kin file a writ for monetary compensation. Advise.

I — Issue. Whether the State is liable to pay monetary compensation for the custodial death of X, who died after being taken into police custody, and whether such compensation can be granted in a writ petition under Article 32/226.

R — Rule. 1. Article 21 protects the right to life, which extends to a person in custody; the State is responsible for the safety of anyone it detains. 2. In Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa (1993), the Supreme Court held that compensation for a custodial death is an enforceable public-law remedy under Article 32/226, distinct from a private tort claim, for which the State is directly liable. 3. D.K. Basu v State of West Bengal (1997) laid down binding arrest and custody safeguards and reaffirmed compensation for custodial violence.

A — Analysis. 1. X was alive and healthy when taken into custody by the Sub-Inspector and was later found dead with wounds. The unexplained death of a person in police custody raises a strong inference of custodial violence, for which the State must answer. 2. The decoy is the theft accusation (or the absence of any FIR-conviction). The nature of the allegation against X is irrelevant to the State’s liability — a detainee, however accused, retains the Article 21 right to life, and the State cannot escape liability by pointing to the charge. 3. The kin may therefore seek constitutional compensation by writ, and the court, applying Nilabati Behera, may award it without relegating them to a civil suit.

C — Conclusion. The State is liable for the custodial death of X. Following Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa (1993) and D.K. Basu v State of West Bengal (1997), the kin are entitled to monetary compensation as a public-law remedy through the writ petition. The theft charge is no defence to the State’s responsibility for a life lost in its custody.

Problem 8 — X, an undertrial, is routinely handcuffed while being… (Unit 4)

Problem: X, an undertrial, is routinely handcuffed while being escorted between jail and court. He writes to the Chief Justice alleging a violation of his rights. Advise.

I — Issue. Whether the routine handcuffing of X, an undertrial, during transit between jail and court, without justification, violates his right to live with dignity under Article 21, and whether his letter can be entertained as a petition.

R — Rule. 1. Article 21 protects human dignity, which extends to undertrials and prisoners. 2. In Prem Shankar Shukla v Delhi Administration (1980), the Supreme Court held that handcuffing is prima facie inhuman and unreasonable, and may be used only where clearly necessary and justified on record; routine handcuffing violates Articles 14, 19 and 21. 3. Under the court’s epistolary jurisdiction, even a letter may be treated as a writ petition.

A — Analysis. 1. X is being handcuffed as a matter of routine, not on any recorded finding that he is dangerous or likely to escape. This is exactly what Prem Shankar Shukla forbids. 2. The decoy is the seriousness of the charge (for example, murder). Gravity of the accusation does not by itself justify handcuffing; the authorities must show, on record, a real and present necessity in the individual case. 3. His letter to the Chief Justice is a valid means of approaching the court, which may treat it as a petition and issue directions restraining the practice.

C — Conclusion. The routine handcuffing of X is unconstitutional. Following Prem Shankar Shukla v Delhi Administration (1980), it violates his dignity under Article 21; the court, entertaining his letter, will direct that he not be handcuffed absent a recorded justification. The seriousness of the charge is no answer.

Problem 9 — A service rule forces a woman employee to retire the moment… (Unit 5)

Problem: A service rule forces a woman employee to retire the moment she becomes pregnant. She challenges the rule. Advise.

I — Issue. Whether a service rule that compels a woman employee to retire on becoming pregnant is valid, or whether it violates her right to equality.

R — Rule. 1. Article 14 forbids arbitrary State action; a classification or condition of service that is manifestly unreasonable is void. 2. A rule terminating employment on pregnancy is arbitrary and void under Article 14, as held in Air India v Nergesh Meerza (1981); CEDAW Article 11(2)(a) independently bars dismissal on the ground of pregnancy or maternity. 3. Importantly, Nergesh Meerza rejected the plea that a different retirement age was discrimination “on sex only” under Articles 15/16 and upheld the retirement age and the marriage bar — so the winning ground is Article 14 arbitrariness, not Articles 15/16.

A — Analysis. 1. The rule ends a woman’s career on the occurrence of a natural and dignified event — pregnancy — and serves no rational purpose connected to her fitness to work. It is therefore manifestly arbitrary and falls squarely within the Nergesh Meerza ratio striking down the pregnancy limb. 2. The decoy is that the rule is dressed up as a neutral “service condition.” A neutral label cannot save an arbitrary effect: the substance of the rule, not its form, decides its validity, and its substance is to penalise pregnancy. 3. The claim should be argued on Article 14 arbitrariness (and reinforced by CEDAW Art 11(2)(a)); a challenge resting on Articles 15/16 “sex discrimination” is the trap the Court did not accept.

C — Conclusion. The pregnancy-retirement rule is void. Following Air India v Nergesh Meerza (1981), it is manifestly arbitrary under Article 14, and CEDAW Article 11(2)(a) reinforces the bar on dismissal for pregnancy. The woman is entitled to relief; the “neutral service condition” label is no defence.

Problem 10 — Thirty-five women are employed at a workplace (Unit 5)

Problem: Thirty-five women are employed at a workplace. The manager refuses to provide a creche because only four of them have children under five. Advise.

I — Issue. Whether the employer is bound to provide a creche where 35 women are employed, and whether the obligation depends on the number of women (or workers) employed or on the number of children they have.

R — Rule. 1. CEDAW Article 11 requires the elimination of discrimination against women in employment and the provision of maternity support and supporting social services (including childcare) to enable women to combine work and family without disadvantage. 2. Article 42 of the Constitution (a Directive Principle) directs the State to secure just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief, and Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women — together the constitutional basis for childcare support at the workplace. 3. Labour-welfare law makes a creche a mandatory facility once a specified number of women (or workers) is employed — the trigger is the size of the female (or the) workforce, not the number of children at any given moment.

A — Analysis. 1. With 35 women employed, the workforce threshold that mandates a creche is met, and the maternity-support obligation under CEDAW Art 11 and Art 42 is engaged. 2. The decoy is the manager’s reliance on the “only 4 children under five” headcount. That is legally irrelevant: the entitlement is triggered by the number of women/workers employed, not the current number of eligible children, because the facility must exist for whenever it is needed and the number of children fluctuates. 3. Refusing the creche on the children-headcount ground therefore misreads the trigger and denies the women a facility to which the size of the workforce entitles them.

C — Conclusion. The employer must provide the creche. The obligation is triggered by the number of women/workers employed (here 35), not by the number of children, and rests on CEDAW Article 11 read with Articles 42 and 15(3). The “only four children” argument fails. (Notes gap: the precise statutory creche provision — Factories Act 1948, s.48, and, since its repeal, the OSH Code 2020 / Code on Social Security 2020 — is not taught in the notes; the answer is built on the in-notes CEDAW Art 11 / Art 42 / Art 15(3) framework.)

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