10 Solved Problems (IRAC Method) — CPC & Limitation Act

These ten problems are worked in the IRAC method — Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion — the way a KSLU answer sheet expects; the full Question Bank has 40+ more.

Problem 1 — X, a resident of place-1, beats Y at place-2 (Unit 1)

Problem: X, a resident of place-1, beats Y at place-2. Y wants to file a suit against X. Where can Y sue? Advise. (Decoy: sue only where the defendant resides.)

I — Issue. Where may Y institute a suit for compensation for the assault — only at the place where X resides, or does Y have a choice of forum?

R — Rule. 1. Section 19 governs a suit for compensation for a wrong done to the person (assault falls squarely here). It gives the plaintiff an option: he may sue either where the wrong was done, or where the defendant resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain. 2. This is read with s.15, which requires the suit to be filed in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it in the chosen place.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is that Y may sue only where X resides (place-1). That is wrong — it ignores the express option in s.19, which additionally allows suit at the place where the wrong occurred. 2. Applying s.19: the assault (the wrong to the person) was committed at place-2, giving Y a cause of action there; and X resides at place-1. Both limbs of s.19 are satisfied, and the choice between them belongs to the plaintiff, not the defendant.

C — Conclusion. Y may sue X at his option in either place-1 (where X resides) or place-2 (where the assault was committed), in the lowest-grade competent civil court there. The relief sought is compensation (damages) for the assault.

Problem 2 — A, residing at place-1, publishes at place-2 statements… (Unit 1)

Problem: A, residing at place-1, publishes at place-2 statements defamatory of B; the newspaper is circulated in places 3, 4 and 5. B wants to sue A. Where can B sue? Advise. (Decoy: only the place of printing.)

I — Issue. For a defamatory newspaper item, may B sue only where the paper was printed, or at every place where it was circulated and read?

R — Rule. 1. Section 19 gives a plaintiff wronged in his person (defamation injures reputation, a wrong to the person) the option to sue where the wrong was done or where the defendant resides or works. 2. A defamation is “published” — and the wrong is complete — wherever the defamatory matter is read. Under s.20(c), a cause of action arises, wholly or in part, at every such place of circulation. Read with s.19, each place of publication is therefore a place of suing.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is that B may sue only where the paper was printed (place-2). That is wrong: printing is not the gist of defamation — communication to a third person is, and that occurs at every place the paper is read. 2. Applying the rule: the paper was circulated and read at places 3, 4 and 5, so a fresh cause of action arises at each. A also resides at place-1 and printed at place-2. Every one of these is a competent forum.

C — Conclusion. B may sue A at any of the places of circulation (places 3, 4 and 5), and also at place-1 (where A resides) or place-2 (where it was printed/published), in the lowest-grade competent court, claiming damages for defamation.

Problem 3 — P instituted a suit against A for recovery of a loan,… (Unit 2)

Problem: P instituted a suit against A for recovery of a loan, claiming only the principal amount and omitting the interest by oversight. P has now obtained a decree and wishes to recover the interest in a fresh suit. Advise.

I — Issue. Can P, having sued only for the principal and omitted the interest arising from the same loan, recover that interest by instituting a fresh suit?

R — Rule. 1. Order 2 rule 2 commands that every suit include the whole of the claim arising from one cause of action; where a plaintiff omits or intentionally relinquishes any portion of the claim, they shall not afterwards sue for the portion so omitted. A person entitled to more than one relief on the same cause of action who omits (without leave) to sue for one loses it. 2. Gurbux Singh v Bhooralal (1964) — a second suit is barred where it is founded on the same cause of action as the first and the plaintiff, entitled to more, omitted without leave to claim the rest.

A — Analysis. 1. The interest and the principal both arise from the same cause of action — the loan and its default. This is a frame-of-suit / Order 2 rule 2 problem, not an amendment problem. The decoy — “a fresh suit can recover the balance” — is wrong: rule 2 bars exactly a second suit for the omitted slice. 2. By suing for the principal alone, P omitted the interest and is deemed to have relinquished it. The omission being from the same cause of action, the fresh suit for interest is barred, and the earlier decree cannot be reopened to add it.

C — Conclusion. P cannot recover the interest in a fresh suit; it is barred by Order 2 rule 2. P’s only chance was to amend the original plaint under Order 6 rule 17 to add the interest before the suit was decided — an opportunity now lost. The advice is that the interest is irrecoverable.

Problem 4 — P instituted a suit against Q seeking possession of a house… (Unit 2)

Problem: P instituted a suit against Q seeking possession of a house on the ground that he had purchased it from Q. P now applies to amend the plaint to claim on a wholly different footing, changing the frame of the suit. Should the amendment be allowed?

I — Issue. Should the court allow P to amend the plaint under Order 6 rule 17 where the amendment changes the very frame and foundation of the suit?

R — Rule. 1. Order 6 rule 17 lets the court allow amendment at any stage, in a just manner, to decide the real questions in controversy; the proviso bars amendment after trial has commenced unless, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter earlier. Amendment is refused where it (a) causes injustice not curable by costs, (b) introduces a totally new or inconsistent case changing the nature of the suit, or (c) defeats a right accrued by limitation. 2. Ganesh Trading Co. v Moji Ram (1978) — amendments are allowed liberally to decide the real controversy, but not to set up a wholly new case; Revajeetu Builders & Developers v Narayanaswamy & Sons (2009) lists these factors.

A — Analysis. 1. Changing the claim from one footing (purchaser) to a different, inconsistent foundation is not correcting a slip — it alters the entire frame and cause of action of the suit. The decoy — “any amendment is allowed as of right” — is wrong: rule 17 is discretionary and bounded by the proviso and the three limits. 2. The amendment would prejudice Q, who prepared to meet a purchaser’s claim, and cannot simply be compensated by costs; it changes the nature of the suit and, if late, offends the due-diligence proviso.

C — Conclusion. The amendment should be refused. Rule 17 permits curing genuine drafting errors, not converting the suit into a new and inconsistent case to Q’s prejudice. The court should reject the application.

Problem 5 — A institutes a suit against B for recovery of a loan (Unit 3)

Problem: A institutes a suit against B for recovery of a loan. B appears in the suit but does not file any written statement within the time fixed. B contends that because no written statement is filed the court can pass no decree, while A argues the suit stands automatically dismissed for want of pleadings. How should the court proceed?

I — Issue. Where a defendant appears but fails to file a written statement within the time fixed, is the suit automatically dismissed, and how should the court proceed?

R — Rule. 1. Under O.8 r.10, where a party from whom a written statement is required fails to present it within the time permitted, the court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. The power is thus available but framed in discretionary terms. 2. In Balraj Taneja v Sunil Madan (1999) the Supreme Court held that judgment under O.8 r.10 is discretionary, not automatic; where the claim needs proof or the facts are not clearly admitted, the court must still require the plaintiff to prove the case, and any judgment must be a reasoned, self-contained document.

A — Analysis. 1. Kill the decoy first. A’s argument that the suit “stands automatically dismissed for want of pleadings” is wrong — non-filing of a written statement is a defendant’s default; it never results in dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit. Equally, B’s contention that “no decree can be passed” is wrong: O.8 r.10 expressly empowers the court to pronounce judgment against the defaulting defendant. 2. But the power is not mechanical. Because this is a money claim on an alleged loan, the court, following Balraj Taneja, is not bound to decree the suit merely because no written statement is filed. Failure to deny may amount to an implied admission of the plaint’s averments, yet the court may still call on A to prove the advancing of the loan where the facts are not clearly admitted.

C — Conclusion. The suit is not dismissed. The court may proceed under O.8 r.10 and either pronounce judgment against B or, in its discretion, require A to lead evidence proving the loan before decreeing the claim. B is wrong that no decree can follow; A is wrong that the suit is dismissed.

Problem 6 — A suit filed by X is posted for cross-examination of the… (Unit 3)

Problem: A suit filed by X is posted for cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witness. On that date the defendant files an application for adjournment on the ground that his counsel is unwell. It is the defendant’s second adjournment and the witness has travelled a long distance. The defendant claims adjournments may be sought without limit. How should the court respond?

I — Issue. On the date fixed for cross-examination, should the court grant an adjournment because the defendant’s counsel is unwell, and is there any limit on such requests?

R — Rule. 1. Under O.17 r.1 the court may, if sufficient cause is shown, adjourn the hearing for reasons recorded in writing — but by the proviso, no party may be granted more than three adjournments, and time is granted only on terms as to costs. A pleader’s illness is not by itself sufficient cause unless the party could not reasonably have engaged another pleader in time. 2. In Shiv Cotex v Tirgun Auto Plast (2011) the Supreme Court held that no party has an unlimited right to adjournments; the court may close evidence and decide the suit where time is repeatedly sought — a discipline affirmed in Salem Advocate Bar Association v Union of India (2005).

A — Analysis. 1. Kill the decoy: the defendant’s claim that adjournments may be sought without limit is plainly wrong after the 1999–2002 amendment — the cap is three, and every grant is discretionary and priced with costs. 2. Apply the rule and meet the defence. Genuine illness of counsel, supported by proof, can be sufficient cause, and this is only the second adjournment, so it is within the cap. But the plaintiff’s witness has travelled a long way and the opposite side has been put to trouble; the court must protect that party by imposing costs for the wasted attendance.

C — Conclusion. The court may grant a short adjournment on payment of costs to the plaintiff, provided the illness is genuinely proved. Had this been a repeated, unproven, or fourth request, the court could refuse and, under O.17 rr.2–3, proceed with the hearing or decide the suit forthwith.

Problem 7 — In a partition suit, the court passes a **preliminary… (Unit 4)

Problem: In a partition suit, the court passes a preliminary decree and later a final decree. The losing party, aggrieved, files an appeal against the final decree and, in that appeal, seeks to challenge the correctness of the preliminary decree — against which he had filed no appeal within time. Is the challenge maintainable?

I — Issue. Whether, in an appeal against the final decree in a partition suit, a party may dispute the correctness of the preliminary decree that he did not appeal against in time.

R — Rule. 1. Under s.97, where a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it, he is precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal preferred against the final decree. A preliminary decree that is not appealed within the limitation period becomes final and binding on the parties. 2. The scheme of preliminary and final decrees (O.20 r.18 for partition) treats the preliminary decree as conclusively settling the shares; the final decree only works them out.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the assumption that because a partition suit ends only with the final decree, the whole matter — including the shares fixed by the preliminary decree — is open in an appeal against the final decree. Section 97 squarely defeats this. 2. Here the party let the limitation for appealing the preliminary decree lapse. That decree therefore became final. In the appeal against the final decree he can question only the working out of the shares (the allotment, valuation, equalisation), not the shares themselves as fixed by the preliminary decree.

C — Conclusion. The challenge to the preliminary decree is not maintainable. By s.97, the un-appealed preliminary decree is binding, and the appellant is confined to errors in the final decree alone.

Problem 8 — A, a 16-year-old, lends ₹50,000 to Y (Unit 4)

Problem: A, a 16-year-old, lends ₹50,000 to Y. On Y’s failure to repay, A wishes to file a suit to recover the loan. Advise A on how the suit is to be instituted.

I — Issue. Whether a minor can institute a suit to recover a debt, and if so, the manner in which it must be instituted.

R — Rule. 1. Under Order 32 rule 1, every suit by a minor must be instituted in his name by his next friend — an adult of sound mind having no interest adverse to the minor. The minor is the plaintiff; the next friend merely conducts the litigation and is answerable for costs. 2. A minor’s disability is one of procedure, not of substantive right: the money lent is recoverable, but the minor cannot personally conduct the suit.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the belief that a minor “cannot sue” because he lacks capacity. That is wrong — a minor’s right to recover his money is intact; only the mode of enforcing it is regulated. (Whether the minor’s own contract is enforceable is a matter of substantive law, but recovering money actually advanced is not barred here.) 2. Applying O.32 r.1, A’s suit must be filed in A’s name by a next friend (for instance, A’s father or another responsible adult with no adverse interest). If A sues without a next friend, the plaint is liable to be taken off the file under r.2, but the defect is curable by adding one.

C — Conclusion. A can sue to recover the ₹50,000, but the suit must be instituted in A’s name through a next friend under Order 32 rule 1. Advise A to have a suitable adult act as next friend when the plaint is filed. — ## UNIT 5 — The Limitation Act, 1963

Problem 9 — Ramesh took a loan of ₹50,000 from Ashok on 20-10-2010 and… (Unit 5)

Problem: Ramesh took a loan of ₹50,000 from Ashok on 20-10-2010 and has not repaid it. Ashok now sues for recovery. Advise. (Decoy: a debt never dies, so a suit lies any time.)

I — Issue. Is Ashok’s suit, filed years after the 2010 loan with no acknowledgment or part-payment in between, within time — and if not, what survives?

R — Rule. A suit for recovery of a simple money debt carries a three-year period under the Schedule, running from when the loan fell due. By s.3 a suit filed after the prescribed period “shall be dismissed” — the court must do so suo motu, even if the defendant does not plead limitation. But limitation bars the remedy, not the right (Punjab National Bank v Surendra Prasad Sinha, 1992).

A — Analysis. The loan was made on 20-10-2010; the three-year period expired around 2013. Nothing in the facts extends or restarts it — no acknowledgment before expiry (s.18), no part-payment (s.19), no disability, no fraud. A suit filed “today,” well beyond 2013, is far outside the period. The decoy — “a debt never dies” — confuses right with remedy: the debt still exists, but the remedy of suing is barred. If Ashok holds security he may still adjust it, and a fresh written promise by Ramesh would revive it under s.25(3) of the Contract Act.

C — Conclusion. Ashok’s suit is time-barred and must be dismissed under s.3. His right subsists but is unenforceable by suit; he can recover only from security in hand or on a fresh promise.

Problem 10 — Mohan seeks condonation of delay for not preferring his… (Unit 5)

Problem: Mohan seeks condonation of delay for not preferring his appeal within the period of limitation, explaining that he was busy with his own marriage. Is it condonable? Advise. (Decoy: any personal reason is sufficient cause.)

I — Issue. Is being “busy with one’s own marriage” a “sufficient cause” under s.5 to condone delay in filing an appeal?

R — Rule. Under s.5, an appeal may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant satisfies the court of sufficient cause for the delay, shown for its whole period. Sufficient cause is read liberally to advance substantial justice (Katiji, 1987), but it must be proved, not presumed, and cannot rescue negligence or mala fides (Basawaraj, 2013); the reason must be a bona fide, unavoidable obstacle.

A — Analysis. A wedding is a planned, foreseeable personal engagement, not an obstacle beyond Mohan’s control — he could have instructed counsel to file in time. His preoccupation shows a lack of diligence, not an unavoidable cause. The decoy that “any personal reason is sufficient cause” is wrong: routine personal business is the classic insufficient cause. Note that s.5 at least applies here, because it is an appeal; had this been a late suit, condonation would be impossible altogether.

C — Conclusion. The delay is not condonable; Mohan’s appeal is barred. Being busy with one’s marriage is not sufficient cause under s.5.

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