Continuous Running of Time; Effect of Subsequent Disability (s.9) — CPC & Limitation Act Notes

Continuous Running of Time; Effect of Subsequent Disability (s.9)

There is a famous image lawyers use for limitation: it is like a river that, once it starts flowing, does not stop for anyone. A person who was perfectly able to sue when his right arose cannot later freeze the clock by falling ill, going abroad or losing his mind. Section 9 captures this in one crisp sentence, and it is one of the most quotable lines in the whole Act.

What is “continuous running of time”?

Section 9 states the iron rule of continuity: “Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it.” Read it beside Topic 3 and the picture is complete:

• Sections 6–8 help you only if the disability existed at the moment the right accrued — the clock had not yet started, so it can wait.
• Section 9 governs the opposite situation: the clock has already started (you were able to sue when the right arose), and something disabling happens afterwards. Once running, it cannot be stopped.

Why the rule exists. If any later misfortune could pause limitation, deadlines would be endlessly elastic and no defendant would ever have peace. So the law draws a bright line at the starting moment: the only disability that counts is the one present when the cause of action accrues. Everything after that is the claimant’s own risk — he should have appointed an agent, guardian or representative to act for him.

“Disability” vs “inability”. The section bars both a legal disability (later insanity, etc.) and a mere inability (illness, absence from the country, poverty, imprisonment) from stopping the clock once it has begun. Neither is an excuse after time has started.

The one narrow exception in s.9 itself. The proviso carves out a single situation: where letters of administration to a creditor’s estate are granted to his debtor, the running of limitation for a suit to recover the debt is suspended while the administration continues. The reason is practical — the debtor would otherwise be suing himself, which is impossible; so the clock pauses. This is the only statutory pause inside s.9.

🧩 WORKED EXAMPLE — Sane when the right accrued, insane later

Facts. A right to recover money accrues to X on 1 January 2020, when X is fully sane and capable of suing. In 2021, before filing, X becomes insane. X’s representative later argues that limitation stopped when X lost his sanity.

Rule. Section 9: once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability (like later insanity) or inability stops it. The disability provisions (ss.6–8) apply only where the disability existed at accrual.

Apply. X was sane on 1 January 2020, so the clock started on that date. His insanity in 2021 is a subsequent disability — it arose after time had already begun. Section 9 forbids it from halting the running period.

Conclusion. Time keeps running from 1 January 2020 despite the later insanity; the suit must still be filed within the ordinary period. The representative’s argument fails.

Decoy. “The later insanity stops the clock” is the planted error — that would be true only if X had already been insane when the right accrued (ss.6–8), which he was not.

Section 9: “Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it: Provided that, where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues.”

In Simple Terms: The moment the clock validly starts, nothing that happens to you afterwards — insanity, illness, travel, jail — can pause it. The single exception is when a debtor is made administrator of his creditor’s estate, since he cannot sue himself.

flowchart TD
    A["Right accrues"]:::root
    A --> Q{"Was the person ABLE<br/>to sue at that moment?"}:::dec
    Q -->|"No — disability existed<br/>at accrual"| S6["ss.6-8 apply —<br/>clock waits"]:::leaf
    Q -->|"Yes — clock STARTS"| RUN["Time is running"]:::leaf
    RUN --> LATER{"Later insanity, illness,<br/>absence, poverty?"}:::dec
    LATER -->|"s.9"| NOSTOP["Clock does NOT stop<br/>(except debtor-administrator proviso)"]:::warn
    classDef root fill:#FFF8DC,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px,color:#000;
    classDef leaf fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
    classDef dec fill:#FFE8C2,stroke:#B45309,color:#000;
    classDef warn fill:#FDE2E2,stroke:#B91C1C,color:#000;
    linkStyle default stroke:#888,stroke-width:1px;

Case Laws

• Udhavji Anandji Ladha v Bapudas Ramdas Darbar (1949) — once time has begun to run it runs continuously; a suit was held barred because a subsequent inability could not stop the running of time under s.9.
• Punjab National Bank v Surendra Prasad Sinha (1992) — reaffirms the continuous, uninterrupted running of the limitation period once it has started.

Back to Top

📄 Full notes + Question Bank (₹199) — every topic in depth, model answers to all past KSLU questions, in one printable PDF. Get the bundle · 10 Solved Problems · All CPC & Limitation Act topics