Tenancy Estoppel and the Landlord's Estoppel by Acquiescence (ss. 122, 121) — BSA (Law of Evidence) Notes

Tenancy Estoppel and the Landlord’s Estoppel by Acquiescence (ss. 122, 121)

A tenant moves into a shop, pays rent for years, and then — when the landlord asks him to leave — turns around and says: “Prove you ever owned this place.” The law will not let him. Having taken possession as a tenant, he cannot bite the hand that let him in by challenging the landlord’s title at the start of the tenancy. This is tenancy estoppel — but watch the mirror image: the section that silences the tenant says nothing about the landlord, and that gap is where the exam problem hides.

This topic deliberately carries two sections, because the two most-asked questions here pull in opposite directions. Keep them apart.

A. Estoppel of the tenant — s. 122

Section 122 (old IEA s. 116): no tenant of immovable property (nor anyone claiming through him) shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord had a title to the property at the beginning of the tenancy. The same bar applies to a licensee of a person in possession — he may not deny that that person had a right to possession when the licence was given.

The rationale: a tenant who accepted possession from the landlord is not allowed to keep the property and dispute the very title under which he took it. Having enjoyed the benefit, he cannot deny its foundation.

Two limits — and both are exam points:

The estoppel fixes only the landlord’s title at the beginning of the tenancy. The tenant may show that the landlord’s title has since expired or been transferred — the bar is about the starting point, not about later events.
It lasts only “during the continuance of the tenancy”; once the tenant is evicted or surrenders and gives up possession, the estoppel ends and he may then challenge the title.

B. The landlord’s own estoppel by acquiescence — s. 121

Here is the trap. Section 122 estops the tenant. It says nothing about the landlord. So when the problem asks whether the landlord is barred — because he tolerated a breach for years — s. 122 cannot answer it. The answer is s. 121 (estoppel by conduct, Topic 6): a landlord who stands by and acquiesces in a breach, letting the tenant believe the breach is accepted and act on that belief, may be estopped from suddenly enforcing it, and may be taken to have waived it — at least until he puts the tenant on notice.

🔑 Read s. 122 for who is estopped (the tenant, from denying the landlord’s title) and s. 121 for what mere toleration does to the landlord who tolerates. The obvious section (s. 122) is the decoy in the landlord-acquiescence problem; the real answer is s. 121.

🧩 WORKED EXAMPLE — the tolerated breach

Facts. A landlord lets an outhouse to a tenant for residential purposes. The tenant uses it non-residentially (as a small workshop), and the landlord knows this and says nothing for seven years. The landlord now sues to evict on the ground of that very breach. Is he estopped?

Rule. Section 122 estops only the tenant from denying the landlord’s title; the landlord’s long, silent toleration of a breach is governed by estoppel by conduct and waiver under s. 121.

Apply. This is not a s. 122 situation at all — the tenant is not denying the landlord’s title. The question is whether the landlord is barred. His seven years’ silent acquiescence is an omission that led the tenant to believe the non-residential use was accepted, and the tenant acted on that belief (continued and perhaps invested in the workshop). Under s. 121 the landlord is estopped from enforcing that breach without first putting the tenant on notice; his toleration also amounts to a waiver of the breach.

Conclusion. The landlord cannot evict on the ground of a breach he tolerated for seven years, at least not without prior notice. The answer rests on s. 121, not s. 122.

Decoy. “Tenant used it for the wrong purpose → tenancy estoppel s. 122” is the plant. Section 122 binds the tenant’s denial of title, which is not in issue here.

Section 122, BSA 2023: “No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy or of any tenancy of which he came into possession under it, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given.”

In Simple Terms: A tenant cannot, while the tenancy runs, deny that his landlord had title when the tenancy began — he took possession on that footing and is bound by it (s. 122). But if it is the landlord who tolerated a breach for years, that is a different question answered by ordinary estoppel and waiver under s. 121, not s. 122.

flowchart TD
    ROOT["Who is being estopped?"]:::root
    ROOT --> T{"The TENANT<br/>denying landlord's title?"}
    T -->|"Yes"| S122["s. 122 — tenant/licensee may NOT<br/>deny landlord's title at the<br/>beginning of the tenancy"]:::leaf
    S122 --> LIM["but may show title expired SINCE,<br/>and estoppel ends on giving up possession"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> L{"The LANDLORD<br/>who tolerated a breach?"}
    L -->|"Yes"| S121["s. 121 — estoppel by conduct /<br/>waiver by acquiescence<br/>(NOT s. 122)"]:::diamond
    classDef root fill:#FFF8DC,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px,color:#000;
    classDef leaf fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
    classDef diamond fill:#FDECEA,stroke:#B22222,color:#000;
    linkStyle default stroke:#888,stroke-width:1px;

Case Laws

Kumar Krishna Prasad Lal Singha Deo vs Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd. (1937) — a tenant is estopped from denying the landlord’s title at the beginning of the tenancy, but may plead that the title has since determined.
S. Thangappan vs P. Padmavathy (1999) — the estoppel under s. 116 (now s. 122) is confined to the landlord’s title at the commencement of the tenancy; subsequent devolution of title may be pleaded.
Sri Ram Pasricha vs Jagannath (1976) — a tenant cannot question the landlord’s title in an eviction suit so long as he has not surrendered possession; tenancy estoppel bars the denial.
D. Satyanarayana vs P. Jagadish (1987) — where a landlord acquiesces in a state of affairs and induces the tenant to act on it, estoppel and waiver under s. 115 (now s. 121) may bar the landlord from enforcing the breach.

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