Facts Showing State of Mind or Body; Accidental or Intentional Acts (ss. 12–13) — BSA (Law of Evidence) Notes

Facts Showing State of Mind or Body; Accidental or Intentional Acts (ss. 12–13)

One house burns down and the owner collects the insurance — bad luck, perhaps. But when the same man’s fourth house burns down, and he has collected on all four, “accident” stops being believable. In Makin’s case (1894) a couple who took in babies “for adoption” were tried for murder when one infant’s body was dug up in their garden — and then twelve more were found buried at houses they had lived in. That deadly series is the heart of ss. 12–13.

These two sections deal with the mind behind the act and with using a pattern to tell an accident from a design.

A. State of mind or body (s. 12)

Section 12 [IEA s. 14] makes relevant facts showing the existence of any state of mind — such as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or goodwill towards a particular person — or any state of body or bodily feeling, when the existence of that state of mind or body is itself in issue or relevant.

The vital limit: the state of mind must exist in reference to the particular matter in question, not as a general disposition. Evidence that a man is generally dishonest is not relevant; evidence that he had a guilty knowledge about this particular transaction is. So the section lets in specific facts (a previous threat against this victim, a refusal to sell stolen goods below market value to negative this guilty knowledge), never bare propensity.

B. Accidental or intentional acts (s. 13)

Section 13 [IEA s. 15] deals with the recurring defence “it was an accident”. When the question is whether an act was accidental or intentional (or done with a particular knowledge or intention), the fact that the act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of which the accused was involved, is relevant — because one accident is credible, but a series of identical “accidents”, all benefiting the accused, is not. This is the similar-facts principle (Makin): the repetition negatives accident and shows design.

C. The boundary you must state — propensity is NOT relevant

Here is the line that decides the trickier problem. Sections 12–13 let in specific facts tied to this matter or a genuine series; they do not let in bare propensity — “he is the kind of person who kills”. Proof that the accused murdered someone else years ago, offered merely to show he is a killer, is inadmissible: it is previous bad character, barred by s. 49 BSA [IEA s. 54]. A past crime becomes relevant only if it forms part of a true similar-fact series (s. 13) or bears on a specific state of mind in this case (s. 12).

🧩 WORKED EXAMPLE — the series vs the smear

Facts. (1) A and his wife are charged with murdering a baby given to them to nurse; several other babies entrusted to them vanished and infant bodies were found near their home. (2) In a separate trial, the prosecution wants to prove A murdered his wife two years ago, to show he “had the mens rea” to murder P.

Rule. Section 13 admits a series of similar occurrences to negative accident; but bare propensity (s. 49 bars previous bad character) is not relevant under ss. 12–13.

Apply. In (1) the repeated disappearances form a genuine series — admissible under s. 13 to show the deaths were not accidental (the Makin principle). In (2) the earlier murder is offered only to suggest A is a killer — pure propensity, with no series and no specific link to P’s death.

Conclusion. (1) is relevant and admissible under s. 13; (2) is irrelevant and inadmissible — s. 49 shuts out previous bad character used as propensity.

Decoy. “He killed before, so he had mens rea now” is the bait; disposition alone is never proof of the present crime.

Section 13, BSA 2023: “When there is a question whether an act was accidental or intentional, or done with a particular knowledge or intention, the fact that such act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant.”

In Simple Terms: One suspicious event might be an accident; the same event repeating, always with the accused involved and always to his benefit, is not. The pattern itself is evidence that the act was deliberate.

flowchart TD
    ROOT["Facts showing mind / pattern"]:::root
    ROOT --> A["s. 12 — state of mind/body<br/>intention, knowledge, good faith"]:::leaf
    A --> A1["Only 'in reference to the<br/>particular matter in question'"]:::diamond
    ROOT --> B["s. 13 — accidental or intentional<br/>SERIES of similar occurrences"]:::leaf
    B --> B1["Series negatives accident<br/>(Makin principle)"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> C["BUT bare propensity NOT relevant<br/>s. 49 bars previous bad character"]:::diamond
    classDef root fill:#FFF8DC,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px,color:#000;
    classDef leaf fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
    classDef diamond fill:#FDECEA,stroke:#B22222,color:#000;
    linkStyle default stroke:#888,stroke-width:1px;

Case Laws

Makin vs Attorney-General for New South Wales (1894) — the “baby-farming” case: a series of similar deaths of infants entrusted to the accused was admissible to rebut the defence of accident, though mere disposition would not be.
Amrita Lal Hazra vs Emperor (1915) — similar-fact evidence is admissible only where it shows a genuine system or negatives accident, not merely to prove the accused’s general bad character.

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