10 Solved Problems (IRAC Method) — BSA (Law of Evidence)

These ten problems are worked in the IRAC method — Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion — the way a KSLU answer sheet expects; the full Question Bank has 40+ more.

Problem 1 — A is tried for the murder of B by poison (Unit 1)

Problem: A is tried for the murder of B by poison. Before B’s death, A procured poison similar to that administered to B. Explain the relevancy of this fact.

I — Issue. Is the fact that A, before B’s death, procured poison similar to that administered to B, a relevant fact?

R — Rule. 1. Under s. 6 BSA [IEA s. 8], facts showing preparation for a fact in issue are relevant. Preparation is what the accused does to get ready to commit the act. 2. Such preparation is relevant even though, by itself, it does not prove the killing; it forms one link in the chain of circumstances (Anant Chintaman Lagu vs State of Bombay, 1960).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy. Students label the poison purchase “motive”. That is wrong — motive is the reason (greed, revenge) for the crime, not the getting-ready for it. Buying the poison is an act of preparation by the accused. 2. Applying the rule. A’s procuring of poison of the very kind that killed B is a step taken to prepare the offence, and is therefore relevant under s. 6. It is not conclusive — A may explain the purchase (say, for rat control) — but its relevance is not defeated by that possibility; weight is a separate question from relevancy.

C — Conclusion. The fact that A procured similar poison before B’s death is relevant as preparation under s. 6, admissible as a circumstance against A, though not by itself proof of the murder.

Problem 2 — The question is whether a horse sold by A to B is sound (Unit 1)

Problem: The question is whether a horse sold by A to B is sound. A tells B, “Go and ask C, C knows all about it.” When asked, C says the horse is not sound. Is C’s statement admissible against A?

I — Issue. Is C’s statement that the horse is unsound admissible against A, when A expressly referred B to C for information about the horse?

R — Rule. 1. Under s. 18 BSA [IEA s. 20], when a party expressly refers the other side to a third person for information on a disputed matter, the statement of that third person is an admission binding the referring party. 2. An admission is relevant against its maker but is not conclusive (s. 25); it may be explained.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy. C is a stranger to the sale, so his statement looks like irrelevant hearsay. That would be true had A not referred B to him. 2. Applying the rule. A expressly referred B to C (“go and ask C”) for the very fact in dispute — the horse’s soundness. By that reference A adopted C as his source, so C’s statement becomes A’s admission under s. 18. It is therefore admissible against A, though A may still lead evidence to explain or rebut it.

C — Conclusion. C’s statement that the horse is unsound is admissible against A as an admission under s. 18, being the statement of a person A expressly referred B to — but it is not conclusive.

Problem 3 — A, in police custody, states where he hid a weapon / stolen… (Unit 2)

Problem: A, in police custody, states where he hid a weapon / stolen goods, and the police recover it in consequence. What is the evidentiary value of his statement?

I — Issue. Where A, in police custody, gives information that leads the police to recover a weapon or stolen goods, how much of that statement may be proved against him?

R — Rule. 1. A confession to a police officer is barred by s. 23(1) and a confession in custody by s. 23(2) BSA [IEA ss. 25–26]. 2. By the proviso to s. 23(2) [IEA s. 27], when a fact is discovered in consequence of information from an accused in custody, only so much of the information as distinctly relates to the fact discovered may be proved (Pulukuri Kottaya vs King-Emperor, 1947).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy. Because the weapon or goods were found, students admit the whole statement, including “I killed B” or “I stole them”. That is wrong — the find validates only the location sliver, not the confession. 2. Applying the rule. The recovered article is the fact discovered. The words that led to it — “I hid it in the tank / in the roof” — distinctly relate to the discovery and are admissible; the accompanying confession of guilt led to nothing being found and stays barred. The recovery is what makes the sliver reliable, which is why the proviso trusts it.

C — Conclusion. Only the part of A’s information that distinctly relates to the fact discovered (the hiding place) is admissible under the proviso to s. 23(2); the surrounding confession of guilt remains inadmissible.

Problem 4 — The police had already recovered the stolen articles (Unit 2)

Problem: The police had already recovered the stolen articles; only afterwards, on inquiry, A confessed that he had stolen them. Is the confession relevant?

I — Issue. Where the goods were already recovered and A only afterwards confessed that he stole them, is his confession relevant?

R — Rule. 1. A confession to a police officer / in custody is barred by s. 23(1)/(2). 2. The proviso to s. 23(2) saves information only where a fact is discovered in consequence of that information; if the thing is already found, nothing is discovered in consequence.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy. Because there was a recovery, the answer looks like the Pulukuri Kottaya discovery case. But the sequence is reversed. 2. Applying the rule. The articles were recovered before A spoke; his statement discovered nothing. It is a bare confession made in custody, with no discovery for the proviso to operate on. The proviso therefore has nothing to save, and s. 23(1)/(2) bars the confession outright. The lesson is one of sequence: the proviso rewards information that produces a find, not a confession volunteered once the find has already been made. Because the recovery here preceded — and did not flow from — A’s words, the reliability that a genuine discovery would have lent the statement is simply absent, and the policy bar against custodial confessions applies in full force.

C — Conclusion. The confession is inadmissible: nothing was discovered in consequence of it, so the proviso to s. 23(2) cannot apply and the police-confession bar stands.

Problem 5 — The accused, charged with rape, seeks to prove the victim’s… (Unit 3)

Problem: The accused, charged with rape, seeks to prove the victim’s character / previous sexual experience to suggest she consented. Is it admissible?

I — Issue. May the accused, in a rape prosecution, lead evidence of the victim’s “loose character” and previous sexual experience to suggest that she consented?

R — Rule. Under s. 48 BSA [IEA s. 53A], in a prosecution for rape or a sexual offence where consent is in issue, evidence of the character of the victim or of her previous sexual experience with any person is not relevant on the issue of consent or its quality.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy. The defence dresses it up as “character is relevant in criminal cases” — invoking s. 47. 2. Applying the rule. Section 47 concerns the accused’s good character, not the victim’s. The evidence here goes only to consent, and it does so precisely through the victim’s character and sexual history — the two things s. 48 declares irrelevant for that purpose. A woman’s past is not a licence: that she may have consented to others before says nothing about consent to this accused now (Sidheswar Ganguly). The court must refuse it.

C — Conclusion. The evidence is not admissible: s. 48 bars the victim’s character and previous sexual experience on the issue of consent, and s. 47 (the accused’s good character) does not help the defence.

Problem 6 — A wants to prove a will, but both attesting witnesses are dead (Unit 3)

Problem: A wants to prove a will, but both attesting witnesses are dead. Advise him.

I — Issue. Can A prove a will when both attesting witnesses are dead?

R — Rule. Under s. 68 BSA [IEA s. 69], where no attesting witness is available (all dead, untraceable or incapable), the will may be proved by showing (i) that the attestation of at least one attesting witness is in his handwriting, and (ii) that the signature of the executant (testator) is in his handwriting.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy. With both attesting witnesses dead, the will looks unprovable — the general rule (s. 67) requires an attesting witness. 2. Applying the rule. Section 67’s requirement to call an attesting witness applies only where one is alive and available. Where none is, s. 68 supplies the fallback: A must prove, by persons acquainted with their handwriting (or by comparison, s. 72), that the attestation of one attesting witness is in that witness’s hand and that the testator’s signature is genuine. The will is not lost merely because the witnesses have died (Janki Narayan Bhoir).

C — Conclusion. A can prove the will under s. 68: by proving the handwriting of one attesting witness’s attestation and the executant’s signature, despite both attesting witnesses being dead.

Problem 7 — A sues B on a bond (Unit 4)

Problem: A sues B on a bond; B admits execution but pleads it was obtained by fraud, which A denies. On whom does the burden of proof lie (and who succeeds if no evidence is led)?

I — Issue. Once B admits executing the bond but pleads fraud, on whom lies the burden of proving the fraud — and who succeeds if neither side leads any evidence?

R — Rule. 1. Under s. 105 BSA [IEA s. 102], the burden lies on the party who would fail if no evidence were given on either side. 2. Under s. 106 [IEA s. 103], the burden of proving a particular fact lies on the party who asserts it; fraud is B’s plea, so B must prove it (Anil Rishi vs Gurbaksh Singh).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy. “A must prove his own case, so A proves everything” — even the absence of fraud. 2. Applying the rule. B has admitted execution, so the bond stands proved without A leading anything. The only live fact is the fraud, which B asserts; s. 106 puts the onus of proving it squarely on B. If both stay silent, B — who raised fraud but proved nothing — loses, so A succeeds on the admitted bond. A need not disprove fraud at all.

C — Conclusion. The burden of proving the fraud lies on B, who pleaded it; if no evidence is led, A succeeds on the admitted bond, because execution is proved and B’s unproved plea of fraud fails.

Problem 8 — A is charged with travelling in a railway without a ticket (Unit 4)

Problem: A is charged with travelling in a railway without a ticket. A denies the charge. On whom does the burden of proof lie?

I — Issue. On whom lies the burden of proving whether A held a ticket, when he is charged with ticketless travel and denies it?

R — Rule. Under s. 109 BSA [IEA s. 106], when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is on him. The Act’s own illustration is the ticketless traveller.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy. The general rule (ss. 104–105) says the prosecution must prove its case — so, seemingly, the railway must prove he had no ticket. 2. Applying the rule. Whether A bought a ticket is a fact locked inside his own knowledge and pocket; it would be absurd to make the railway trace every ticket window at every station to prove a negative. Section 109 therefore throws the burden of proving the ticket onto A. This does not relieve the railway of proving that A was travelling — only the ticket, a fact he alone can establish, is thrown onto him (Shambhu Nath Mehra).

C — Conclusion. The burden of proving that he held a ticket lies on A under s. 109, because it is a fact especially within his own knowledge; the railway need only prove that he was travelling.

Problem 9 — A client tells his advocate “I have committed murder /… (Unit 5)

Problem: A client tells his advocate “I have committed murder / forgery (or had a past relationship) and wish you to defend me.” Can the advocate disclose it?

I — Issue. May an advocate disclose his client’s statement that he has committed murder or forgery (or had a past relationship) and wishes the advocate to defend him?

R — Rule. Under s. 132 BSA [IEA s. 126], an advocate may not, without the client’s express consent, disclose a communication made to him for the purpose of his professional service — save (proviso a) one made in furtherance of an illegal purpose, or (proviso b) a crime or fraud committed since the retainer.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy. The gravity of the crime tempts the answer “of course he must disclose it — it’s murder/forgery.” 2. Applying the rule. The client is confessing a past offence to obtain a defence — a lawful purpose, not a communication in furtherance of a future illegal purpose. Defending a guilty man is not a criminal purpose, so no proviso applies. The statutory illustration confirms it: “I have committed forgery and wish you to defend me” is protected. The privilege being the client’s, only he can waive it by express consent.

C — Conclusion. The communication is protected under s. 132; the advocate cannot disclose it without the client’s express consent, because it confesses a past crime for the purpose of a defence, engaging no proviso.

Problem 10 — A client tells his advocate “I wish to murder C / obtain… (Unit 5)

Problem: A client tells his advocate “I wish to murder C / obtain property by a forged document, and wish you to defend me.” Is it protected from disclosure?

I — Issue. Is the client’s statement that he wishes to murder C, or to obtain property by a forged document, and wishes the advocate to defend him, protected from disclosure?

R — Rule. Under proviso (a) to s. 132 BSA [IEA s. 126], the privilege does not protect a communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy. “All communications between client and advocate are privileged” — reacting to the relationship rather than the content. 2. Applying the rule. The client is not confessing a past crime for a defence; he is disclosing a future crime — an intention to commit murder or a forgery-based fraud — and seeking the lawyer’s help around it. That is a communication in furtherance of an illegal purpose, so proviso (a) strips the privilege away. The statutory illustration is directly in point: “I wish to obtain possession of property by a forged deed, and wish you to defend me” is not protected. It is immaterial whether the advocate knew of the illegal purpose (P.R. Ramakrishnan).

C — Conclusion. The communication is not protected: it is made in furtherance of a future illegal purpose, so proviso (a) to s. 132 removes the privilege and the advocate is not barred from disclosing it.

📄 Full BSA (Law of Evidence) notes + Question Bank (₹199) — the complete study notes plus 40+ more solved problems and 16-mark essay blueprints. Get the bundle · All BSA (Law of Evidence) topics · Past Questions