10 Solved Problems (IRAC Method) — Hindu Law

These ten problems are worked in the IRAC method — Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion — the way a KSLU answer sheet expects. They span all five units; the full Question Bank has 40+ more.

Problem 1 — The Convert’s Change of Faith (Unit I)

Problem: A is born to a Hindu father and a Christian mother and is brought up as a Hindu. He marries under the Hindu Marriage Act. Later he converts to Islam. Is he governed by Hindu law, and what is the effect of his conversion?

I — Issue. Is A governed by Hindu law given his mixed parentage and upbringing, and what is the effect of his later conversion to Islam?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.2 HMA, Hindu law applies to a person one of whose parents is a Hindu and who is brought up as a member of that Hindu family — such a person is a Hindu by birth. The negative test also excludes only Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews. 2. On conversion, Perumal Nadar v Ponnuswami (1971) and the scheme of the Act treat religion at the relevant time as decisive: a genuine convert into Hinduism is a Hindu, and a Hindu who genuinely converts away ceases to be governed by Hindu law for most purposes.

A — Analysis. 1. The tempting decoy is the Christian mother — one might think mixed parentage keeps A out of Hindu law. It does not: s.2 requires only one Hindu parent plus upbringing as a Hindu, both of which A satisfies. So at the time of his marriage A was a Hindu, and his marriage under the HMA was valid. 2. His later conversion to Islam changes his personal law prospectively: from conversion he ceases to be governed by Hindu law for most purposes and is subject to Muslim law, and he may lose certain Hindu-law rights (e.g. some successions). It does not retroactively invalidate the earlier Hindu marriage, which is governed by the HMA and can be dissolved only under it (conversion being itself a ground of divorce for the other spouse).

C — Conclusion. A was a Hindu by birth (one Hindu parent and raised as a Hindu) and validly married under the HMA; on converting to Islam he ceases to be governed by Hindu law going forward, though his prior Hindu marriage remains a matter for the HMA.

Problem 2 — The Second Marriage While the First Subsists (Unit II)

Problem: H, whose first wife W1 is alive and undivorced, marries W2 with full ceremonies. W2, unaware of W1, later discovers the truth and seeks relief. Advise W2 on the validity of her marriage and H’s liability.

I — Issue. Is W2’s marriage valid where H had a living, undivorced first wife, and what is H’s liability?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.5(i) monogamy is a condition of a valid marriage; a marriage where either party has a spouse living contravenes it and is void under s.11. The husband is also guilty of bigamy under s.17. 2. Lily Thomas v Union of India (2000) and Bhaurao Lokhande (1965) confirm that a second marriage during the subsistence of the first is void, and that bigamy requires the second marriage to have been performed with the essential ceremonies.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is that the second marriage was celebrated with full ceremonies and that W2 was innocent of W1’s existence — one might think a properly solemnised, good-faith marriage must be valid. It is not: the ceremonies only complete a marriage; they cannot cure the breach of the monogamy condition. Because W1 was living and undivorced, s.5(i) is violated and s.11 makes W2’s marriage void ab initio. 2. W2’s innocence does not validate the marriage, but it is relevant to bigamy: the presence of the ceremonies means H’s second “marriage” was duly solemnized, completing the actus reus of s.17. Any children of the union are nonetheless legitimate under s.16.

C — Conclusion. W2’s marriage is void; she is not a legally wedded wife. H is liable for bigamy under s.17, and any children of the marriage are legitimate under s.16.

Problem 3 — Cruelty vs Restitution of Conjugal Rights (Unit II)

Problem: W leaves the matrimonial home alleging H’s persistent cruelty. H petitions for restitution of conjugal rights; W resists and later seeks divorce. Decide.

I — Issue. Is H entitled to restitution of conjugal rights, or does W’s allegation of cruelty defeat his petition and entitle her to divorce?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.9, restitution is granted only where the withdrawal is without reasonable excuse; once withdrawal is shown, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove a reasonable excuse. 2. Cruelty is both a reasonable excuse to withdraw and a ground for divorce under s.13(1)(ia); the test (N.G. Dastane, 1975) is a reasonable apprehension that it is harmful to live with the other.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is that W physically left the home, which looks like withdrawal entitling H to restitution. But s.9 turns on reasonable excuse: if W proves H’s persistent cruelty, her withdrawal was justified, the burden that shifted to her is discharged, and H’s petition fails. 2. The same proved cruelty independently founds W’s own divorce under s.13(1)(ia), provided it meets the Dastane standard. If, however, W cannot prove the cruelty, her withdrawal is without reasonable excuse and a restitution decree would issue against her.

C — Conclusion. If W proves H’s cruelty, H’s restitution petition fails and W is entitled to divorce under s.13(1)(ia). If she does not, H obtains a restitution decree, and its non-compliance for a year would later ground divorce under s.13(1A)(ii).

Problem 4 — The Kartha’s Sale of Ancestral Land (Unit III)

Problem: A, the Kartha of a joint family, sells ancestral land to pay for the marriage of a family daughter and to clear an antecedent family debt. His son S, then a minor, challenges the sale on attaining majority. Decide.

I — Issue. Is the Kartha’s sale of ancestral land, made for a family marriage and an antecedent debt, binding on the son who was a minor at the time?

R — Rule. 1. A Kartha may alienate joint family property binding on all coparceners, including minors, for legal necessity, benefit of the estate, or indispensable religious duty — Hunooman Persaud Panday v Mussumat Babooee (1856). The marriage of a family member and the discharge of an antecedent family debt are classic instances of legal necessity. 2. A coparcener cannot injunct a Kartha’s alienation and can only challenge it afterwards (Sunil Kumar v Ram Prakash, 1988); the burden then is to show the transaction was not for necessity or benefit.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is S’s minority — a minor coparcener cannot bind himself, so it looks as though a sale affecting his interest must fail. But the Kartha’s power is precisely to bind minors where the purpose is legal necessity; minority is therefore no answer if the necessity is made out. 2. Here the purposes — a family daughter’s marriage and the payment of an antecedent debt — are both legal necessity. Provided the buyer made bona fide enquiry and the sale consideration was applied to those purposes, the alienation binds the whole family, minor son included.

C — Conclusion. The sale is valid and binding on S. His challenge fails, because the Kartha alienated for legal necessity (marriage and antecedent debt), which binds even a minor coparcener.

Problem: A Hindu male governed by Mitakshara law dies, leaving ancestral property, his widow, two sons and a daughter. The daughter claims an equal share by partition; the sons resist. Assign the shares.

I — Issue. Is the daughter entitled to an equal coparcenary share, and how does the ancestral property devolve among the widow, two sons and the daughter?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.6 HSA (2005) a daughter is a coparcener by birth, equal to a son, with the same right to demand partition — Vineeta Sharma (2020). On the death of a coparcener his interest devolves under the amended s.6 by succession, computed after a notional partition immediately before death (Gurupad Magdum, 1978). 2. On the notional partition, a share is allotted to each coparcener and also to the widow, who takes a share equal to a son on a partition between the husband and his children (though she cannot herself demand partition, she is entitled to a share when one takes place). The deceased’s resulting share then passes to his Class I heirs — widow, sons and daughter — each taking one share.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the sons’ resistance based on the old rule that only males were coparceners. Post-2005 that is wrong: the daughter is a coparcener equal to the sons and can demand partition. 2. On a notional partition the shares are taken by the father, the two sons, the daughter and the widow — five equal shares of 1/5 each (the widow taking a share equal to a son). The father’s 1/5 then devolves on his Class I heirs — the widow, two sons and daughter, one share each — i.e. 1/20 each. Adding these: the widow = 1/5 + 1/20 = 1/4; each son = 1/5 + 1/20 = 1/4; the daughter = 1/5 + 1/20 = 1/4. (Total 1/4 × 4 = 1.)

C — Conclusion. The daughter takes an equal coparcenary share. On the figures — applying the Gurupad notional-partition method, in which the widow too takes a share equal to a son — the widow, each son and the daughter take 1/4 each of the ancestral property. The sons’ resistance fails.

Problem 6 — A Male Hindu Dies Intestate (Unit IV)

Problem: A male Hindu dies intestate leaving his widow W, his mother M, two sons S1 and S2, and two children, C1 and C2, of a predeceased son PS. Assign the shares.

I — Issue. How does the property of the deceased male devolve among his widow, mother, two sons and the two children of a predeceased son?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.8 the property goes first to the Class I heirs, who take simultaneously. Widow, mother, sons, and the children of a predeceased son are all Class I heirs. 2. Distribution is governed by s.10: the widow takes one share (Rule 1); each son, daughter and the mother takes one share per capita (Rule 2); and the heirs of a predeceased son take between them the one share he would have taken, per stirpes (Rules 3–4).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the two grandchildren C1 and C2 — a candidate may be tempted to give them a full share each. But per stirpes they step into PS’s shoes and share one share between them. 2. Counting shares: W = 1 (Rule 1); M = 1, S1 = 1, S2 = 1 (Rule 2, per capita); C1 and C2 together take the 1 share PS would have had (Rule 3), i.e. one-half each. Total = 5 shares. 3. Therefore W, M, S1 and S2 each take 1/5, and C1 and C2 each take 1/10.

C — Conclusion. The property divides into five shares: the widow, mother and each son take 1/5, and the two grandchildren of the predeceased son take 1/10 each (sharing their father’s single share per stirpes).

Problem 7 — A Female Hindu Dies Intestate (Section 15) (Unit IV)

Problem: W, a Hindu woman, dies intestate leaving no children. She owns (i) a house she had inherited from her father, and (ii) land she had inherited from her husband. Her father’s heirs and her husband’s heirs both claim. Decide.

I — Issue. To whom do the two properties devolve — the house inherited from the father and the land inherited from the husband — where the woman dies intestate leaving no son or daughter?

R — Rule. 1. A female Hindu’s property normally devolves under s.15(1) on her children and husband first; but where she leaves no son or daughter, the source rule in s.15(2) applies. 2. Under s.15(2), property inherited from her father or mother goes to the heirs of the father, and property inherited from her husband or father-in-law goes to the heirs of the husband (Omprakash v Radhacharan, 2009, on the plain-words approach).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the competing claim of each set of heirs to the whole estate. The source rule prevents that: it splits the estate by origin. 2. The house inherited from the father devolves under s.15(2) on the father’s heirs. The land inherited from the husband devolves on the husband’s heirs. Because W left no children, s.15(1)(a) does not intervene, and the source rule governs each property separately.

C — Conclusion. The house passes to the father’s heirs and the land passes to the husband’s heirs under the s.15(2) source rule. Neither set of heirs takes the whole; each inherited property returns to the family from which it came.

Problem 8 — The Validity of the Will (Unit IV)

Problem: T, a Hindu of sound mind, executes a will signed before two attesting witnesses, leaving his self-acquired flat to a charity and his coparcenary interest to his daughter, and excluding his son. The son challenges the will as unnatural. Decide.

I — Issue. Is the will valid even though it disposes of the coparcenary interest and excludes the natural heir, and does the son’s plea of an “unnatural” disposition defeat it?

R — Rule. 1. Section 30 HSA allows a Hindu to will away any property capable of disposal, and its Explanation permits willing even his undivided coparcenary interest (a power conferred by the Act in 1956). A valid will requires capacity (major, sound mind, voluntary) and execution under s.63 ISA — signature plus attestation by two witnesses. 2. A disposition that excludes a natural heir is not void for that reason; but an unnatural disposition is a suspicious circumstance which the propounder must dispel (H. Venkatachala Iyengar v B.N. Thimmajamma, 1959).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the son’s “unnatural disposition” plea. Exclusion of an heir does not by itself invalidate a will; a testator may give his property to whom he pleases. 2. Here capacity (sound mind) and execution (signed before two attesting witnesses) are made out, and s.30 permits willing the coparcenary interest. The exclusion of the son is a suspicious circumstance to be explained, but on the facts there is no doubtful signature, no incapacity, and no active role of the beneficiary in procuring the will — so the suspicion is dispelled.

C — Conclusion. The will is valid. It satisfies s.30 and s.63, and the mere exclusion of the son — an “unnatural” disposition — does not defeat it once the suspicion is dispelled. The son’s challenge fails.

Problem 9 — The Guardian Who Sold Without Permission (Unit V)

Problem: A father, as natural guardian, sells his minor son’s immovable property without obtaining the court’s permission, to meet ordinary household expenses. On attaining majority, the son sues to set aside the sale. Decide.

I — Issue. Is the sale of the minor’s immovable property by the natural guardian, made without court permission, binding on the son, or can he set it aside on attaining majority?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.8 HMGA a natural guardian may act for the minor’s benefit, but cannot alienate the minor’s immovable property without the previous permission of the court; an alienation made without such permission is voidable at the instance of the minor (Manik Chand v Ram Chandra, 1981). 2. The remedy is the minor’s: he may, on attaining majority, sue to have the transfer set aside.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is that this is the father, the natural guardian, acting for the family — which may look like sufficient authority. But the father’s status does not dispense with the s.8 requirement of court permission for immovable property. 2. Here there was no court permission, and the purpose (ordinary household expenses) is not shown to be a pressing benefit to the minor’s estate. The sale is therefore voidable, and the son, now a major, is entitled to avoid it. (Contrast a de facto guardian’s sale, which would be void outright.)

C — Conclusion. The sale is voidable, not binding. The son may set it aside on attaining majority, because the natural guardian alienated his immovable property without the court’s permission required by s.8.

Problem 10 — Adoption Despite a Living Son (Unit V)

Problem: A married Hindu male, who already has a living son, adopts a boy of ten without obtaining his wife’s consent. The validity of the adoption is challenged. Decide.

I — Issue. Is the adoption valid where the adopter (a married male) already has a living son and adopts without his wife’s consent?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.7 HAMA, a male Hindu with a wife living must obtain her consent before adopting; the consent is mandatory, and without it the adoption is void (Ghisalal v Dhapubai, 2011). 2. Under s.11, a person adopting a son must not already have a Hindu son (or son’s son or son’s son’s son) living at the time of the adoption.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the boy’s suitable age (ten years, under 15) and an apparent giving and taking — features that make the adoption look regular on the surface. 2. But two essential requirements fail. First, the adopter took the child without his wife’s consent, contrary to s.7 (Ghisalal). Second, he already has a living son, so adopting another son offends s.11. Either defect alone is fatal; together they leave no doubt.

C — Conclusion. The adoption is void. It fails s.7 (no wife’s consent) and s.11 (an existing living son), and cannot be saved by the child’s eligibility or the giving and taking. The challenge succeeds.

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