The Speaker & Parliamentary Privileges — Constitutional Law II Notes

The Speaker — Powers and Functions

In 1925, Vithalbhai Patel became the first Indian elected to preside over the Central Legislative Assembly — and promptly ruled against the British government on the floor. That was the point: the presiding officer answers to the House, not the government. Today’s Speaker of the Lok Sabha inherits that role — the impartial referee who keeps the game fair.

The presiding officer of the House

Think of the Speaker as the umpire of a match: he does not play for either side, but every decision on the field is his, and the game cannot go on without him. The Speaker is the presiding officer of the Lok Sabha (each State Assembly has its own Speaker), elected by the House from among its own members (Article 93).

Why the office exists. A debating chamber of hundreds needs one authority to keep order, decide who speaks, interpret the rules, and settle disputes on the spot — impartially. The Speaker supplies that authority and symbolises the dignity and independence of the House.

Powers and functions.

Conducting business. He presides over sittings, maintains order, permits questions and motions, and adjourns the House.
Interpreting the rules. He decides all points of order, and his interpretation of the rules of procedure is final within the House.
The casting vote (Article 100). He does not vote in the first instance, but in a tie he exercises a casting vote — preserving neutrality until it is needed.
Certifying Money Bills (Article 110(3)). He decides whether a Bill is a Money Bill, and his certificate is final (linking back to Unit II).
Deciding disqualification for defection (Tenth Schedule). He adjudicates whether a member has incurred disqualification by defection — acting, here, as a tribunal whose decision is subject to judicial review (Kihoto Hollohan).
Other roles. He presides over joint sittings (Article 108), appoints chairpersons of committees, and represents the House.

Independence and removal. To keep him impartial, his salary is charged on the Consolidated Fund, and he can be removed only by a resolution passed by a majority of all the then members of the House after 14 days’ notice (Article 94).

Article 93: “The House of the People shall, as soon as may be, choose two members of the House to be respectively Speaker and Deputy Speaker thereof and, so often as the office of Speaker or Deputy Speaker becomes vacant, the House shall choose another member to be Speaker or Deputy Speaker, as the case may be.”

In Simple Terms: The Speaker is the head referee of the Lok Sabha, chosen by the members themselves. He runs the debates, decides the rules, breaks a tie with a casting vote, certifies Money Bills, and rules on defection cases — always as a neutral umpire, not a party player.

🧩 WORKED EXAMPLE — the Speaker and a defection petition

Facts. A member of the ruling party votes against a government motion in defiance of the party whip. A petition is filed before the Speaker to disqualify him for defection.

Rule. Under the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker decides disqualification for defection, acting as a tribunal; his decision is subject to judicial review on grounds of mala fides, perversity or violation of natural justice (Kihoto Hollohan).

Apply. Voting against the party whip is a ground of defection, so the Speaker has jurisdiction. He must give the member a hearing and decide judicially; he cannot simply oblige the party leadership.

Conclusion. The Speaker may disqualify the member if defection is made out — but only after a fair hearing, and his order can be tested in the High Court/Supreme Court for perversity or bias.

flowchart TD
    ROOT["Speaker of the Lok Sabha<br/>(Arts 93-96, 100)"]:::root
    ROOT --> C["Conducts business; keeps order"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> P["Decides points of order (final)"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> V["Casting vote in a tie (Art 100)"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> M["Certifies Money Bills (Art 110(3))"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> D["Decides defection (10th Schedule)<br/>= tribunal, reviewable"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> I["Independence: removal by majority (Art 94)"]:::leaf
    classDef root fill:#FFF8DC,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px,color:#000;
    classDef leaf fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
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Case Laws

[C-8] Kihoto Hollohan v Zachillhu (1992) — the Speaker deciding a defection case acts as a tribunal; the Tenth Schedule was upheld, but the clause barring judicial review of the Speaker’s decision was struck down (review lies, though not at an interim stage).

Parliamentary Privileges (Arts 105, 194)

In 1964, the U.P. Assembly ordered a judge of the Allahabad High Court to appear before it for “breach of privilege” after he entertained a petition from a man the House had jailed. Court and House squared off. The President referred the clash to the Supreme Court — the famous Keshav Singh case — which had to map exactly where a House’s privileges end and a court’s power begins.

Special rights that let the House work

Why they exist. For Parliament to debate freely and control the executive, its members must be able to speak without fear of being sued, and the House must be able to run its own affairs without outside interference. Parliamentary privileges are the special rights and immunities that make this possible — a shield for the functioning of the House, not personal perks.

The two Articles. Article 105 confers privileges on Parliament and its members; Article 194 does the same for State Legislatures. The privileges fall into two groups:

Freedom of speech in the House (Article 105(1)–(2)). A member cannot be made liable in any court for anything he says or any vote he gives in the House or its committees. This freedom is inside the House; it is wider than the ordinary Article 19(1)(a) freedom but is subject to the rules and to Article 121 (restraint on discussing a judge’s conduct).
Other privileges (Article 105(3)). Until defined by law, these are the privileges the House of Commons had — for example, the right to publish its proceedings, to exclude strangers, to punish members and outsiders for contempt/breach of privilege, to regulate its internal proceedings, and freedom from arrest of members in civil cases during and around a session.

Can an MP discuss a judge’s conduct? Generally no — Article 121 bars any discussion in Parliament on the conduct of a Supreme Court or High Court judge except on a motion for the judge’s removal (address to the President). So a member may criticise a judgment in general terms, but cannot debate a named judge’s conduct unless a removal motion is before the House.

The limit. Privileges are not above the fundamental rights of a citizen’s life and liberty: in Keshav Singh the Court held the House cannot, by claiming privilege, defeat a person’s right to approach the courts. Privileges are a functional shield, not a power to imprison at will beyond judicial reach.

Article 105(2): “No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication … of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.”

In Simple Terms: Members can speak and vote freely in the House without being taken to court for it, and the House can run its own affairs and punish contempt. But a member cannot debate a particular judge’s conduct unless a motion to remove that judge is on the table, and the House’s privileges cannot be used to override a citizen’s basic right to go to court.

🧩 WORKED EXAMPLE — a member attacks a named judge

Facts. During a debate, a Member of Parliament seeks to discuss the personal conduct of a sitting High Court judge, alleging bias, though no removal motion is pending.

Rule. Article 105 protects free speech in the House, but Article 121 bars discussion on the conduct of a judge except on a motion for his removal.

Apply. No removal motion is before the House, so the member’s attempt to debate the judge’s conduct falls squarely within the Article 121 bar.

Conclusion. The member cannot raise a discussion on that judge’s conduct. He may criticise the reasoning of a judgment in general, but a personal discussion of the judge is barred unless a removal motion is moved.

flowchart TD
    ROOT["Parliamentary Privileges<br/>(Arts 105 · 194)"]:::root
    ROOT --> A["Freedom of speech in House (105(1)-(2))"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> B["Other privileges (105(3))"]:::leaf
    B --> B1["Publish proceedings; exclude strangers"]:::leaf
    B --> B2["Punish contempt / breach of privilege"]:::leaf
    B --> B3["Freedom from civil arrest (session)"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> L["Limits: Art 121 (judge's conduct); citizen's liberty (Keshav Singh)"]:::leaf
    classDef root fill:#FFF8DC,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px,color:#000;
    classDef leaf fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
    linkStyle default stroke:#888,stroke-width:1px;

Case Laws

In re Keshav Singh / Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures (1965) — mapped the boundary between a House’s privileges and the courts; privileges cannot defeat a citizen’s right to move the court for his liberty.
P.V. Narasimha Rao v State (1998) — the immunity for “anything said or any vote given” covers a member who took a bribe and then voted (later reconsidered).
Sita Soren v Union of India (2024) — a seven-judge Bench overruled Narasimha Rao: privilege does not shield a legislator from prosecution for taking a bribe, as bribery is not essential to legislative functioning.

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