10 Solved Problems (IRAC Method) — Constitutional Law II

These ten problems are worked in the IRAC method — Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion — the way a KSLU answer sheet expects; the full Question Bank has 40+ more.

Problem 1 — A State Resolution Against a Central Law (Unit I)

Problem: A State Government passes a resolution on the floor of its House opposing the Centre’s Citizenship (Amendment) Bill. Is the act of the State against the “Unity and Integrity of India”? Analyse and decide.

I — Issue. Whether a State Legislature’s resolution opposing a Union Bill on citizenship (a Union-List subject) is unconstitutional as being against the unity and integrity of India.

R — Rule. 1. Citizenship is a Union subject (Entry 17, List I), so only Parliament can legislate on it and a State cannot enact a law on it. But passing a resolution is not legislation — it is an expression of the opinion of the House and binds no one. 2. Under the federal scheme the States are not sovereign (State of West Bengal v Union of India, 1963), yet they have an independent constitutional existence (S.R. Bommai, 1994), and their legislatures may debate and record their views on matters of national concern as part of the democratic process.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the emotive charge that the resolution is “against the unity and integrity of India.” A resolution does not enact anything, does not bind the Centre and does not encroach on the Union’s exclusive power to legislate on citizenship; it is protected political expression within the House. 2. The State neither legislated on a Union subject nor obstructed the operation of the Union law; it merely recorded its disagreement — which a federal, democratic Constitution permits and even expects as a channel of dissent.

C — Conclusion. The resolution is constitutionally valid. It is a legitimate expression of the House’s opinion, not legislation on a Union subject, and it is not against the unity and integrity of India; the Centre remains entirely free to enact and enforce the Bill.

Problem 2 — A Central NEET Board Challenged by a State (Unit I)

Problem: A National Medical Board (NEET) is set up by the Centre; a State challenges it on the federal principle as an encroachment on State powers. Decide.

I — Issue. Whether a central law setting up a common medical-entrance test and board (NEET) unconstitutionally encroaches on the State’s power over education and public health.

R — Rule. 1. Legislative competence is decided by the doctrine of pith and substance — the true nature and character of the law, not its incidental effects. The coordination and determination of standards in higher and technical education fall within Union competence (Entry 66, List I), while education generally is a Concurrent subject. 2. Where a law’s core lies within a Union entry, it is valid though it incidentally touches a State field (State of Bombay v F.N. Balsara, 1951), and on a Concurrent subject the Central law prevails on any clash (Article 254).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the State’s appeal to “the federal principle” as though any central role in education were an encroachment. A single national medical-entrance standard is, in pith and substance, about the coordination of standards — a Union field — not about the day-to-day running of State colleges. 2. Any incidental effect on the State’s administration of education does not invalidate a law whose true nature lies in the Union or Concurrent domain, and a common standard actually serves the national interest in uniform, merit-based admissions.

C — Conclusion. The central NEET/medical-board law is valid. In pith and substance it concerns the coordination of educational standards within Union competence, and the State’s challenge based on federal encroachment fails.

Problem 3 — A Municipal Octroi on the Entry of Goods (Unit I)

Problem: A Municipality levies octroi duty on the entry of goods into its local areas. ‘X’, a trader, challenges the octroi as violating Article 301. Decide.

I — Issue. Whether an octroi duty on the entry of goods into a municipal area violates the freedom of trade guaranteed by Article 301.

R — Rule. 1. Article 301 guarantees free inter-State trade, but a levy that is non-discriminatory and merely regulatory or compensatory does not offend it (Automobile Transport v State of Rajasthan, 1962; and, on the modern test, Jindal Stainless Ltd. v State of Haryana, 2016, focusing on discrimination under Article 304(a)). 2. Only a tax that directly and immediately restricts the movement of goods, or that discriminates against goods from other States, is bad (Atiabari Tea Co. v State of Assam, 1961).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the assumption that any tax on the entry of goods automatically breaches Article 301. Octroi is a long-recognised compensatory levy charged for the use of municipal services, roads and facilities. 2. If the octroi applies equally to local goods and to goods brought from outside, and is a reasonable charge for the facilities the trader uses, it neither discriminates nor blocks trade and is therefore valid; it would be bad only if it were shown to discriminate against outside goods or to be a mere barrier to entry.

C — Conclusion. The octroi is valid if it is non-discriminatory and a reasonable, compensatory charge; it does not violate Article 301. X’s challenge fails unless he can show that the octroi in fact discriminates against goods coming from other States.

Problem 4 — The President Dissolves the Assemblies (Unit II)

Problem: The President issues a proclamation dissolving the Legislative Assemblies in certain States and orders re-election. Citizens challenge it, contending that only the respective Governors can dissolve the State assemblies. Decide.

I — Issue. Whether the President can dissolve a State Legislative Assembly and order fresh elections, or whether that power belongs exclusively to the Governor of the State.

R — Rule. 1. In normal times, a State Assembly is summoned, prorogued and dissolved by the Governor under Article 174, on the advice of the State Council of Ministers. 2. But once President’s Rule under Article 356 is validly proclaimed in a State, the powers of the State Legislature are exercised by or under the authority of Parliament, and the President is expressly empowered to dissolve or keep in suspended animation that Assembly.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the citizens’ assumption that dissolution of a State Assembly is always the Governor’s function. That is true only outside Article 356. 2. If the President’s proclamation rests on a validly proclaimed Article 356 (a failure of the constitutional machinery in those States), then his power to dissolve the Assemblies flows from Article 356 itself, and the ordinary Article 174 route through the Governor stands displaced for the duration of President’s Rule.

C — Conclusion. The President’s order is valid if it rests on a valid Article 356 Proclamation; the contention that “only the Governor can dissolve” is therefore wrong once President’s Rule is in force. Only if there were no valid Article 356 Proclamation would dissolution remain the Governor’s function and the President’s order be bad.

Problem 5 — The Governor Dismisses a Coalition Government (Unit II)

Problem: The Governor of a State dismisses a coalition/State government without giving it an opportunity to prove its majority on the floor of the House. Is the Governor’s action valid? Decide.

I — Issue. Whether a Governor may validly dismiss a government on his own opinion that it has lost its majority, without allowing it to prove its majority on the floor of the House.

R — Rule. 1. A government’s majority is to be tested only by a vote of confidence on the floor of the House, and not by the Governor’s subjective satisfaction (S.R. Bommai v Union of India, 1994). 2. The Governor’s discretion under Article 163 is limited; he cannot decide the question of majority in his own mind, and the floor test is the constitutional method (Nabam Rebia v Deputy Speaker, 2016).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the Governor’s claim that he was bona fide satisfied that the government had lost support. Such personal satisfaction is not the constitutional means of testing majority and cannot substitute for a floor test. 2. Because the government was dismissed without ever being allowed a floor test, the action rests on the Governor’s opinion alone — precisely the defect the Supreme Court condemned in Bommai, which stressed that majority is a matter to be objectively demonstrated in the House.

C — Conclusion. The Governor’s action is invalid. A floor test was mandatory before dismissing the government; dismissing it without one violates the constitutional scheme, and the dismissal is liable to be set aside and the ministry restored.

Problem 6 — The Governor’s Pardon for Murder (Unit II)

Problem: The Governor of a State grants pardon to a person convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Examine the validity of the Governor’s action under Article 161.

I — Issue. Whether the Governor’s grant of pardon to a person convicted of murder and sentenced to death is a valid exercise of the power under Article 161.

R — Rule. 1. Article 161 empowers the Governor to grant pardons, reprieves, respites and remissions, and to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of an offence against a law relating to a matter to which the State’s executive power extends. 2. The power extends to death sentences, and it is exercised on the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers, remaining subject to judicial review only for arbitrariness, mala fides or non-application of mind (Maru Ram v Union of India, 1981; Epuru Sudhakar v Govt of A.P., 2006).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the assumption that a death sentence lies beyond the Governor’s reach. It does not — the gravity of the crime does not oust Article 161, provided the offence is one against a State law within the State’s executive power. 2. The pardon is valid if it was granted on the advice of the Council of Ministers and is not shown to be arbitrary or mala fide; it remains open to judicial review, but is not void merely because the crime was murder punishable with death.

C — Conclusion. The Governor’s pardon is valid if it was exercised on ministerial advice and not arbitrarily; the death sentence is no bar to Article 161. The order can be judicially reviewed for arbitrariness or non-application of mind, but is otherwise a lawful exercise of the pardoning power.

Problem 7 — The Central Administrative Tribunal’s Jurisdiction (Unit IV)

Problem: Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the claim of a temporary employee whose services were terminated? Decide.

I — Issue. Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) has jurisdiction to decide the claim of a temporary Central Government employee whose services were terminated.

R — Rule. 1. Under Article 323-A and the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the CAT has jurisdiction over disputes and complaints with respect to the “recruitment and conditions of service” of persons appointed to public services and posts under the Union. The test of jurisdiction is whether the dispute is a service matter. 2. A tribunal’s decision is not final and remains subject to the judicial review of the High Court under Articles 226/227 (L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India, 1997).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the employer’s argument that a temporary employee falls outside the CAT’s jurisdiction. The temporary character of the appointment affects the merits — a temporary or probationary servant enjoys fewer protections — but not the CAT’s jurisdiction to entertain the claim. 2. A grievance about the termination of service is squarely a dispute about a “condition of service,” so it falls within the CAT’s jurisdiction, whatever the eventual outcome on the merits.

C — Conclusion. The CAT has jurisdiction to decide the terminated temporary employee’s claim; his temporary status goes only to the merits, not to jurisdiction. The CAT’s order will itself remain open to review by the High Court.

Problem 8 — The Job Secured by a False Certificate (Unit IV)

Problem: ‘A’ secured a job under the Central Government by producing a false certificate and was dismissed from service. Is he protected under the Constitution? Decide.

I — Issue. Whether a person who obtained a government job by producing a false certificate is protected by Article 311 against his dismissal.

R — Rule. 1. Article 311(2) protects a civil servant against dismissal, removal or reduction in rank by way of punishment except after a fair inquiry — but the protection presupposes a valid appointment to a civil post. 2. An appointment obtained by fraud or a false certificate is void from the very beginning; there is no valid service in the eye of law, and hence no Article 311 protection (R. Vishwanatha Pillai v State of Kerala, 2004).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the plea that even a wrongly appointed servant is entitled to the safeguard of an inquiry. But a job secured by a false certificate is a fraud that vitiates the appointment itself. 2. Since the appointment never validly existed, ‘A’ cannot invoke the constitutional safeguard of Article 311 to protect a status he obtained by deceit; the State is entitled to treat the appointment as a nullity.

C — Conclusion. A’s dismissal is valid, and he is not protected by Article 311, because a fraudulently obtained appointment is void from the outset and attracts no constitutional safeguard.

Problem 9 — Reversion of an Officiating Appointment (Unit IV)

Problem: ‘A’ was appointed in an officiating capacity to a higher post. After two years, he was reverted to his original post on the ground of unsatisfactory work. Is the reversion valid?

I — Issue. Whether reverting an officiating employee to his substantive post for unsatisfactory work is valid, or whether it attracts the Article 311 safeguards.

R — Rule. 1. An officiating or temporary servant has no right to hold the higher post permanently; a bona fide reversion to his substantive post is an ordinary administrative act, not “punishment”, and therefore does not attract Article 311. 2. Article 311 applies only where the action is really punitive or casts a stigma on the servant (Shyam Lal v State of U.P., 1954; and the principle in Moti Ram Deka v General Manager, N.E.F. Railway, 1964).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the phrase “unsatisfactory work,” which sounds like a finding of misconduct. But reverting an officiating employee because he is found unsuitable for the higher post, without attaching any stigma, is not a penalty. 2. If the reversion is genuinely administrative and casts no stigma, no inquiry under Article 311 is required; it would be invalid only if it were in truth punitive or stigmatic, in which case the safeguards would apply.

C — Conclusion. The reversion is valid if it is bona fide and non-stigmatic; the officiating servant had no vested right to the higher post, and a simple reversion for unsuitability does not attract Article 311.

Problem 10 — President’s Rule for a Communal Disturbance (Unit V)

Problem: In a part of India there arises a communal disturbance. Can the President proclaim a National Emergency? Discuss.

I — Issue. Whether the President can proclaim a National Emergency on the ground of a communal disturbance in a part of India.

R — Rule. 1. After the 44th Amendment (1978), a National Emergency under Article 352 may be proclaimed only on the ground of war, external aggression or armed rebellion; the earlier ground of “internal disturbance” was deliberately deleted to prevent misuse. 2. The Proclamation also requires the written recommendation of the Cabinet and approval by both Houses within one month.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is that a communal disturbance may appear grave enough to be treated as an emergency. But a communal disturbance is a law-and-order or internal-disturbance problem, not “armed rebellion,” unless it escalates into an armed uprising against the authority of the State. 2. The appropriate response to a communal disturbance is the exercise of the State’s ordinary police powers and, if the constitutional machinery of the State actually fails, the imposition of President’s Rule under Article 356 — not a National Emergency under Article 352.

C — Conclusion. The President cannot proclaim a National Emergency merely on the ground of a communal disturbance, because it does not meet the Article 352 threshold of “armed rebellion.” The correct constitutional response lies in ordinary law and order, or, in case of a genuine failure of machinery, in Article 356.

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