10 Solved Problems (IRAC Method) — BNS

These ten problems are worked in the IRAC method — Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion — the way an exam answer sheet expects. They span all five units; the full Question Bank has 40+ more.

Problem 1 — The Officer Who Arrested the Wrong Man (Unit I)

Problem: ‘A’, an officer of the court ordered to arrest Y, after due enquiry believes Z to be Y and arrests Z. Has A committed an offence?

I — Issue. Is a public officer liable for wrongly arresting an innocent person whom he honestly and reasonably believed to be the person named in the warrant?

R — Rule. Under s.14 [old s.76 IPC], nothing is an offence done by a person who, by reason of a mistake of fact and in good faith, believes himself bound by law to do it. “Good faith” (s.2(11)) requires due care and attention, not mere honesty. If the facts had been as the officer believed, the arrest would have been lawful.

A — Analysis. A was ordered by the court to arrest Y and, after due enquiry, believed Z to be Y. His belief was a mistake of fact (as to Z’s identity), reached in good faith with the due care the section requires, and had Z actually been Y the arrest would have been perfectly lawful. The decoy is that Z was innocent and was wrongly seized — which invites the answer that a wrongful arrest must be an offence. But the law asks not whether the arrest turned out wrong, but whether A acted in good faith under a mistake of fact believing himself bound by law.

C — Conclusion. A has committed no offence — he is protected by s.14. This is the illustration to the section itself. Had A arrested Z without due enquiry, or knowing he was not Y, the protection would fall away, because the belief would not be in good faith.

Problem 2 — Firing at the Tiger (Unit I)

Problem: ‘A’ is carried off by a tiger. ‘B’ fires at the tiger, knowing the shot may kill ‘A’, and the bullet kills ‘A’. Is B guilty?

I — Issue. Is a person guilty of an offence who, to save another from certain death, does an act he knows is likely to kill that other, and death results?

R — Rule. Under s.19 [old s.81 IPC], nothing is an offence merely because it is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it is done without any criminal intention to cause harm and in good faith to prevent or avoid other, greater harm to person or property. The harm avoided must outweigh the harm risked.

A — Analysis. A was certain to be killed by the tiger. B fired in good faith, intending to save A, not to kill him, choosing the lesser risk (a chance of the bullet killing A) over the certainty of the tiger doing so. B had no criminal intention — his aim was A’s benefit. The decoy is that B knew the shot might kill A, which looks like the knowledge required for culpable homicide. But s.19 expressly excuses an act done with that very knowledge, where it is done in good faith to avoid a greater harm.

C — Conclusion. B is not guilty of any offence — he is protected by necessity under s.19. This is the illustration to the section. The result would differ only if B had fired recklessly or with some intent to harm A, rather than in good faith to save him.

Problem 3 — The Chain of Instigation (Unit II)

Problem: ‘A’ instigates ‘B’ to instigate ‘C’ to commit a murder; C commits it. Decide the liability of A, B and C.

I — Issue. Are the instigators in a chain liable for a murder committed by the person at the end of it?

R — Rule. Under s.45 a person abets who instigates another to commit an offence. The BNS also treats the abetment of an abetment as abetment — a person who abets an abettor is himself an abettor of the ultimate offence. Where the act abetted is committed, the abettor is punished with the punishment for the offence (s.49). Intention to instigate is essential (Kartar Singh); mere words without that intention are not abetment (Sanju v State of M.P.).

A — Analysis. C actually committed the murder — he is guilty of murder (s.103). B instigated C to commit it — B is an abettor of the murder (s.45), and because the murder was committed, B is liable to the punishment for murder (s.49). A instigated B to instigate C — A has abetted the abetment, which the law treats as abetment of the murder itself; A too is liable for abetment of murder. The decoy is that A and B never touched the victim and are one and two steps removed — but abetment punishes the instigator as though he had a hand in the crime, and it expressly reaches the abetment of an abetment.

C — Conclusion. C is guilty of murder; B and A are both guilty of abetment of murder (s.45 read with s.49), and each is liable to the punishment for murder — the chain of instigation does not dilute liability, it extends it.

Problem: ‘Z’ has sexual intercourse with ‘Y’, a girl below eighteen years of age, with her consent. Has Z committed an offence?

I — Issue. Is intercourse with a girl below eighteen an offence where she apparently consented?

R — Rule. Under s.63 [old s.375 IPC], a man commits rape if he has sexual intercourse with a woman under eighteen years of age, with or without her consent. For a girl under 18, consent is legally irrelevant — this is statutory rape, and no plea of agreement can save the accused. (The only exception in the section, marital intercourse with a wife not under 18, does not apply to an unmarried minor.)

A — Analysis. Y is below eighteen. Because the law makes the consent of a girl under 18 irrelevant, Z’s intercourse with her is rape under s.63, whatever Y said or did. The decoy is precisely that Y consented — which invites the answer that consent is a defence. It is not: the section removes the capacity of a girl under 18 to give a consent the law will recognise, because the young are protected absolutely.

C — Conclusion. Z has committed rape under s.63, and cannot plead Y’s consent. Depending on Y’s exact age, the aggravated provisions may apply — s.65 enhances the punishment where the girl is under 16 or under 12, up to the death penalty. Had Y been eighteen or over and freely consenting, no offence would arise.

Problem 5 — The Bullet That Missed (Unit III)

Problem: ‘A’, intending to kill ‘B’, shoots at him; the bullet misses B and kills ‘C’, a bystander. Of what offence is A guilty?

I — Issue. Is a person who, intending to kill one person, kills another by mistake, guilty of the murder of the person actually killed?

R — Rule. Under the doctrine of transferred malice — s.102 [old s.301 IPC] — where a person causes the death of a person whom he neither intended nor knew himself likely to kill, his intention is transferred from the intended victim to the actual victim, and the offence is the same as if he had killed the person he intended. The malice “follows the blow” (Shankarlal Kacharabhai v State of Gujarat, 1965).

A — Analysis. A intended to kill B — the intention required for murder was present. The shot missed B and killed C, a bystander A neither intended nor expected to hit. By s.102, A’s murderous intention against B is transferred to C, so A is guilty of the murder of C exactly as if he had meant to kill him. The decoy is that A never intended to kill C and did not even know C was at risk — which invites the answer that there was no mens rea as to C. The doctrine answers precisely this: the guilty intention and the actual death are joined, though they concern different victims.

C — Conclusion. A is guilty of the murder of C under s.101 read with the transferred-malice principle in s.102. It is no defence that C was not the intended target; the malice aimed at B is treated as malice against the person actually killed.

Problem 6 — The Shaken Fist (Unit III)

Problem: ‘A’ shakes his fist at ‘B’ intending to cause B to believe that A is about to strike him. Has A committed any offence?

I — Issue. Does making a threatening gesture, without any physical contact, amount to an offence?

R — Rule. Assault — s.130 [old s.351 IPC] — is committed by making a gesture or preparation intending or knowing it likely to cause a person present to apprehend that criminal force is about to be used on him. No contact is needed — the offence is the apprehension of imminent force. Mere words are not assault, but a gesture, or words plus a gesture, may be (Stephens v Myers; contrast Tuberville v Savage).

A — Analysis. A shook his fist at B — a gesture — intending that B should believe A was about to strike him. This is exactly the mental element s.130 requires: the intention to cause B to apprehend the imminent use of criminal force. That B was in fact caused to apprehend a blow completes the offence. The decoy is that no contact was made — A never actually hit B — which invites the answer that, without a blow, there is no offence. But assault is the crime of the threat, not the contact; had A struck B, that further act would be criminal force (s.129), a separate matter.

C — Conclusion. A has committed assault (s.130) — the threatening gesture, made with the intention that B apprehend imminent force, is the offence, and no contact is required. This is the illustration to the section itself. Had B, seeing the fist, apprehended nothing (for instance because A was too far off to strike), there would be no assault, for the apprehension of imminent force would be missing.

Problem 7 — The Blow That Disabled the Victim (Unit III)

Problem: ‘A’ strikes ‘B’ a blow which causes B severe bodily pain and keeps him unable to follow his ordinary pursuits for twenty-five days, but leaves no permanent injury. Has A caused grievous hurt?

I — Issue. Is a hurt that causes long incapacity but no permanent injury nonetheless grievous hurt?

R — Rule. Grievous hurt — s.116 [old s.320 IPC] — lists eight kinds of hurt designated grievous. The first seven are permanent or specific (emasculation, loss of sight/hearing, loss of a limb, permanent disfiguration, fracture or dislocation). But the eighth item is different: any hurt which endangers life, or which causes the sufferer to be, for the space of twenty days, in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. A hurt need not be permanent to be grievous — the twenty-day incapacity is itself enough.

A — Analysis. The blow left no permanent injury, so items one to seven of s.116 are not engaged. But it caused B severe bodily pain and inability to follow his ordinary pursuits for twenty-five days — more than the twenty days the eighth item requires. That item is squarely satisfied, so the hurt is grievous. The decoy is precisely the absence of any permanent injury — which invites the answer that, without lasting damage, it is only simple hurt. The twenty-day limb of s.116 answers it: prolonged incapacity, even if temporary, makes the hurt grievous.

C — Conclusion. A has caused grievous hurt (s.116) — the twenty-five-day incapacity satisfies the eighth item, and permanence is not required. A is liable for voluntarily causing grievous hurt (s.117), punishable up to seven years. Had the incapacity lasted only a few days, it would have been simple hurt (s.114/s.115) only.

Problem 8 — Withholding the Document from Court (Unit IV)

Problem: ‘A’, legally bound to produce a document before a Court, intentionally omits to produce it. What offence, if any, has A committed?

I — Issue. Is a person who intentionally fails to produce a document he is legally bound to produce before a court guilty of an offence?

R — Rule. The BNS punishes contempt of the lawful authority of public servants — obstructing the working of public authority. Where a person legally bound to produce a document before a court or public servant intentionally omits to produce it, he commits an offence against public justice (in the scheme of ss.206–226 [old ss.172–190 IPC]) — the administration of justice is obstructed by the very refusal to produce.

A — Analysis. A was legally bound to produce the document before the Court and intentionally omitted to do so. The wrong is not that he did some positive act, but that he failed in a legal duty owed to the court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice. The decoy is precisely that this is an omission, not a positive act — which invites the answer that “he did nothing, so committed no offence.” But where the law imposes a duty to produce, the intentional failure to perform that duty is itself the offence; the omission is the actus reus.

C — Conclusion. A is guilty of an offence of contempt of the lawful authority of a public servant — intentionally omitting to produce a document he was legally bound to produce (in the ss.206–226 scheme). The intentional breach of the legal duty to produce, obstructing the court, is the wrong; that it took the form of an omission is no defence.

Problem 9 — The Found Ring, Later Sold (Unit V)

Problem: ‘A’ finds a valuable ring lying on the road, not knowing whose it is, and later sells it knowing the owner could be traced. What offence has A committed?

I — Issue. Is a person who finds property and later dishonestly keeps or sells it guilty of an offence, and which one?

R — Rule. Criminal misappropriation — s.314 [old s.403 IPC] — is dishonestly misappropriating or converting to one’s own use any movable property. The offence has an innocent start and a dishonest turn: the property comes to the offender by chance (a finder), and the crime is the later dishonest decision to keep it. An Explanation protects the honest finder who takes property to return it; but a finder who, knowing or having the means to discover the owner, appropriates it to his own use commits misappropriation. It is not theft, because there was no “moving out of the possession of another” (Ramaswamy Nadar v State of Madras, 1958).

A — Analysis. When A first picked up the ring, not knowing the owner, he committed no offence — the ring was out of anyone’s possession and he had not yet formed a dishonest intent. But he then sold it, knowing the owner could be traced — a dishonest conversion to his own use of property he was bound to try to return. That later dishonest turn is criminal misappropriation (s.314). The decoy is that A found the ring honestly, which invites the answer that an honest finder commits no crime — true at the moment of finding, but not once he dishonestly keeps or sells it able to trace the owner.

C — Conclusion. A is guilty of criminal misappropriation (s.314) — not theft, because he never took the ring out of another’s possession. Had A instead taken the ring from the owner’s pocket or house, it would have been theft; the absence of any “taking out of possession” is what makes this misappropriation.

Problem 10 — The Exam Impersonator (Unit V)

Problem: ‘A’ falsely represents himself to be ‘B’ and, in B’s name, sits and writes a university examination. What offence has A committed?

I — Issue. Is impersonating another person to sit an examination in his name an offence, where no property changes hands?

R — Rule. Cheating by personation — s.319 [old s.416 IPC] — a person cheats by personation if he cheats by pretending to be some other person, or knowingly substituting one person for another, or representing that he is a person he is not. It builds on cheating (s.318), whose harm limb covers deception that intentionally induces a person to do or omit an act which he would not do if undeceived, and which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property — not only the delivery of property.

A — Analysis. A falsely represented himself to be B and, in B’s name, wrote the examination — a clear personation. By this deception he induced the university to do something it would not otherwise do (admit “B” to the examination, and prospectively confer a result on B’s record), causing or likely to cause harm to the integrity of the examination and to third parties. The decoy is that no property was taken or delivered — which invites the answer that, without property, there is no cheating. But cheating has a second limb: deception inducing a harmful act or omission is cheating even where no property passes, and personation is expressly an offence in its own right under s.319.

C — Conclusion. A is guilty of cheating by personation (s.319) — pretending to be B to sit the examination is the offence, and the absence of any property transfer is no defence, because the deception induced a harmful act. Impersonation to draw another’s pension or to withdraw his money from a bank falls under the same section.

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