Offences Against Women & Children — Dowry Death, Cruelty, Bigamy (BNS) — Criminal Law I Notes

Criminal force and assault against women

The BNS gathers into ss.74–79 a cluster of offences protecting a woman’s dignity and bodily autonomy short of rape:

s.74 — assault or criminal force to outrage modesty. Using assault or criminal force to a woman intending to outrage, or knowing it likely to outrage, her modesty; imprisonment of one to five years and fine.
s.75 — sexual harassment. Physical contact and advances involving unwelcome sexual overtures; a demand for sexual favours; showing pornography against a woman’s will; or sexually coloured remarks — graded punishments.
s.76 — assault or criminal force with intent to disrobe a woman.
s.77 — voyeurism. Watching or capturing the image of a woman engaging in a private act where she expects privacy.
s.78 — stalking. Following a woman, or contacting/monitoring her (including online) despite her clear disinterest.
s.79 — word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman.

The common thread. Each protects modesty and privacy, and each turns on intention or knowledge — the act must be aimed at, or known to be likely to, outrage/insult the woman. “Modesty” is judged by the ordinary understanding of a woman’s dignity, not the accused’s view (State of Punjab v Major Singh).

🧩 Worked example. A man repeatedly follows a woman to her college and messages her daily despite her telling him to stop. This is stalking under s.78. If he also secretly films her in a changing room, that is voyeurism under s.77. If he gropes her, that is outraging modesty under s.74. The chapter lets each distinct wrong be charged as its own offence.

s.74, BNS: “Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment… not less than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

In Simple Terms: a woman’s modesty and privacy are protected by a ladder of offences — from an insulting gesture, up through stalking and voyeurism, to a groping assault — each punishable in its own right.

flowchart TD
    W["ASSAULT/FORCE AGAINST WOMEN ss.74–79"] --> A["s.74 Outraging modesty"]
    W --> B["s.75 Sexual harassment"]
    W --> C["s.76 Intent to disrobe"]
    W --> D["s.77 Voyeurism"]
    W --> E["s.78 Stalking (incl. online)"]
    W --> F["s.79 Insulting modesty by word/gesture"]

Case Laws

State of Punjab v Major Singh (1967) — “modesty” belongs to the woman and is judged objectively; even a young child has modesty capable of being outraged.
Rupan Deol Bajaj v K.P.S. Gill (1995) — slapping a senior woman officer on the back was held to outrage her modesty.

Offences relating to marriage — the scheme

Marriage is meant to be a place of trust — which is exactly why the law punishes those who abuse it: the man who marries a second time while hiding a living wife, the husband and in-laws who torture a bride for dowry, the trickster who goes through a sham ceremony to obtain sex. The BNS collects these betrayals of the marital relationship into one scheme (ss.80–87).

The offences relating to marriage (ss.80–87, BNS [old ss.493–498A IPC]) protect the institution of marriage and the woman within it. The scheme:

s.80 — Dowry death. Where a woman dies of burns, injury or unnatural causes within seven years of marriage, and was subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death, her husband/relative is deemed to have caused the dowry death (Topic 10).
s.81 — Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage. A man who deceives a woman into believing she is lawfully married to him and cohabits with her.
s.82 — Bigamy (marrying again during the life of a spouse) and its aggravated form where the first marriage is concealed (Topic 8).
s.83 — Marriage ceremony fraudulently gone through without lawful marriage.
s.84 — Enticing or taking away or detaining a married woman with criminal intent.
ss.85–86 — Cruelty by husband or relatives (Topic 11).
s.87 — Kidnapping or abducting a woman to compel her marriage or force illicit intercourse (Topic 12).

The unifying idea. Every offence in this scheme punishes a betrayal of the trust the marital relationship carries — whether by a bigamous husband, a deceitful “spouse”, a dowry-greedy family, or an abductor. The chapter should be learned as a map (this topic) with the heavily-tested members — bigamy, dowry death, cruelty — studied in full in Topics 8, 10 and 11.

🧩 Worked example. A man, already married, conceals that fact and goes through a marriage ceremony with an unsuspecting woman. He has committed (i) bigamy aggravated by concealment (s.82), and (ii) if he induced her by deceit into cohabiting believing herself lawfully wed, an offence under s.81 as well. If he later harasses her for dowry and she dies within seven years, the scheme reaches him under s.80 too. The chapter’s offences frequently stack on one set of facts.

s.84, BNS: “Whoever takes or entices away any woman who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of any other man, from that man… with intent that she may have illicit intercourse with any person… shall be punished…”

In Simple Terms: the marriage chapter is a set of shields around the marital relationship — punishing the man who marries twice, the fraud who fakes a marriage, the family that tortures a bride, and the outsider who lures away another’s wife.

flowchart TD
    M["OFFENCES RELATING TO MARRIAGE ss.80–87"] --> A["s.80 Dowry death"]
    M --> B["s.81 Deceitful cohabitation as 'spouse'"]
    M --> C["s.82 Bigamy (+ concealment)"]
    M --> D["s.83 Fraudulent marriage ceremony"]
    M --> E["s.84 Enticing away a married woman"]
    M --> F["ss.85–86 Cruelty by husband/relatives"]
    M --> G["s.87 Abduction to compel marriage"]

Case Laws

Sarla Mudgal v Union of India (1995) — a Hindu husband who converts to Islam and marries again commits bigamy; the second marriage is void.
Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v State of Maharashtra (1965) — for bigamy, the second “marriage” must be a valid marriage by the required ceremonies; an invalid ceremony is not bigamy.

Bigamy and fraudulent marriage ceremonies

Bigamy — s.82, BNS [old s.494 IPC]. Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries again — the second marriage being void by reason of the first — commits bigamy; punishment up to seven years and fine. The aggravated form (s.82(2)) applies where the offender conceals the first marriage from the person he marries — punishment up to ten years.

Essentials:

A valid first marriage subsisting;
The spouse of the first marriage living;
A second marriage during the subsistence of the first; and
The second marriage void by reason of the first.

The valid-ceremony requirement. The second “marriage” must be a valid marriage — gone through with the essential ceremonies required for that form of marriage. If the second ceremony was itself invalid (ceremonies not performed), there is no bigamy — because there was no “marriage” at all (Bhaurao Lokhande; Kanwal Ram).

The seven-year exception (Exception to s.82). The offence does not apply where the first spouse has been continually absent for seven years and not heard of as being alive, provided this fact is disclosed to the person marrying. This is the “presumption of death” exception.

🧩 Worked example. A’s husband disappeared and was not heard of for ten years; believing him dead and after disclosing the facts, A marries B. Her husband then reappears. Is A guilty of bigamy? No — the seven-year exception applies: the first spouse was continually absent and unheard of for more than seven years and the fact was disclosed, so the second marriage does not attract s.82. Contrast: had the husband been absent only two years, or had A concealed his existence, she would be guilty (and, on concealment, of the aggravated form).

s.82(1), BNS: “Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment… which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

In Simple Terms: you cannot marry again while your first spouse is alive and the marriage stands — and if you hide the first marriage from your new partner, the punishment is harsher. The one escape is where your first spouse has been missing, unheard-of, for seven years, and you say so.

flowchart TD
    B["BIGAMY s.82"] --> E1["Valid 1st marriage subsisting"]
    B --> E2["1st spouse LIVING"]
    B --> E3["2nd marriage valid ceremonies but VOID"]
    B --> AGG["Concealment → aggravated s.82(2), up to 10 yrs"]
    B --> EXC["Exception: 7 yrs absent + unheard-of + disclosed"]

Case Laws

Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v State of Maharashtra (1965) — no bigamy unless the second marriage was performed with the essential ceremonies.
Sarla Mudgal v Union of India (1995) — conversion to escape monogamy does not dissolve the first marriage; the second marriage is bigamous.
Gopal Lal v State of Rajasthan (1979) — concealment of the first marriage attracts the aggravated offence.

Adultery

⚠️ This is now legal history — answer it as such. Adultery was old s.497 IPC: it punished a man who had sexual intercourse with the wife of another man without that husband’s consent, and it did not punish the woman, treating her as the husband’s property incapable of consenting.

Struck down — Joseph Shine v Union of India (2018). A five-judge Constitution Bench held s.497 unconstitutional and struck it down, on the grounds that it:

violated Article 14 (equality) — it was arbitrary and treated men and women unequally;
violated Article 15 — it discriminated on the ground of sex, punishing only the man and treating the woman as incapable of consent;
violated Article 21 (dignity and autonomy) — it treated the wife as her husband’s property and denied her sexual agency; and
rested on the archaic notion that a woman is a possession of her husband.

The Court held adultery may remain a civil wrong (a ground for divorce) but cannot be a crime.

Not re-enacted in the BNS. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 deliberately did not re-introduce adultery as an offence, following Joseph Shine. So there is no live BNS provision — adultery is not a crime in India today.

🧩 Worked example. If a past exam paper asks “Discuss adultery under the Indian Penal Code,” the correct modern answer states the old s.497, then explains that it was struck down in Joseph Shine (2018) as violating Articles 14, 15 and 21, and was not re-enacted in the BNS — so it is no longer an offence. An answer that treats adultery as live law is wrong.

Joseph Shine v Union of India (2018): “A woman is not a chattel… the husband is not the master of the wife. Adultery… cannot be treated as a criminal offence; it is left to be a ground for divorce.”

In Simple Terms: adultery used to be a crime that punished only the man and treated the wife as her husband’s property. The Supreme Court struck it down in 2018 as unconstitutional, and the new BNS did not bring it back — it is now, at most, a ground for divorce, never a crime.

flowchart TD
    AD["ADULTERY (old s.497 IPC)"] --> V["Struck down: Joseph Shine 2018"]
    V --> V1["Art. 14 — arbitrary/unequal"]
    V --> V2["Art. 15 — sex discrimination"]
    V --> V3["Art. 21 — dignity & autonomy"]
    AD --> NR["NOT re-enacted in BNS — no longer a crime (civil ground for divorce only)"]

Case Laws

Joseph Shine v Union of India (2018) — s.497 IPC struck down as unconstitutional; adultery decriminalised.
Sowmithri Vishnu v Union of India (1985) — an earlier decision upholding s.497, now overruled by Joseph Shine.

Dowry death

Dowry death — s.80, BNS [old s.304B IPC]. Where the death of a woman is caused by burns, bodily injury, or otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry, such death is a “dowry death”, and the husband/relative is deemed to have caused it. Punishment: imprisonment of not less than seven years, extendable to life.

The essentials (all must be shown):

Death of a woman by burns/injury/unnatural cause;
Within seven years of marriage;
Cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relatives;
That cruelty was for or in connection with a dowry demand; and
It occurred “soon before” her death (a proximate and live link, not a remote one).

The presumption — s.118, Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam [old s.113B Evidence Act]. Once the prosecution proves the woman was subjected to dowry-related cruelty soon before death, the court shall presume that the accused caused the dowry death. The burden shifts to the accused — a powerful tool for the prosecution.

🧩 Worked example. A bride dies of burns in her matrimonial home fourteen months after marriage; evidence shows her in-laws had been taunting and beating her for more dowry until days before her death. The elements of s.80 are met — unnatural death within seven years, dowry-related cruelty soon before death — and under s.118 BSA the court presumes the in-laws caused the dowry death, so they must now explain the death. Contrast: a natural death from illness, or a death eight years after marriage, would fall outside s.80.

s.80(1), BNS: “Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative… for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.”

In Simple Terms: if a bride dies an unnatural death within seven years of marriage and had been tormented for dowry just before, the law treats her husband and in-laws as her killers — and it is for them to prove otherwise.

flowchart TD
    DD["DOWRY DEATH s.80"] --> E1["Unnatural death (burns/injury)"]
    DD --> E2["Within 7 years of marriage"]
    DD --> E3["Cruelty/harassment SOON BEFORE death"]
    DD --> E4["FOR a dowry demand"]
    DD --> PR["s.118 BSA — court PRESUMES accused caused it"]

Case Laws

Kans Raj v State of Punjab (2000) — “soon before death” requires a proximate and live link between the cruelty and the death.
Shanti v State of Haryana (1991) — explained the interplay of s.304B and s.498A; both can apply.

Cruelty by a husband or his relatives

Cruelty — ss.85–86, BNS [old s.498A IPC]. s.85 punishes a husband or his relative who subjects a woman to cruelty — imprisonment up to three years and fine. s.86 defines “cruelty”:

Any wilful conduct likely to drive the woman to suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (mental or physical); or
Harassment of the woman to coerce her or a related person to meet an unlawful demand for property or valuable security (i.e. dowry harassment), or on failure to meet it.

Relationship with dowry death. s.85/86 (cruelty) and s.80 (dowry death) often go together — cruelty is the conduct, dowry death is the result. A woman who is harassed but does not die is protected by s.85; if she dies unnaturally within seven years, s.80 also applies.

Caution against misuse. The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned that s.498A/s.85 must not be misused to implicate the whole family without specific allegations (Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar, 2014, laid down safeguards against automatic arrest).

🧩 Worked example. A husband and mother-in-law repeatedly taunt and beat a bride to force her family to give a car. She does not die but suffers depression and injury. This is cruelty under s.85, the harassment being to coerce an unlawful dowry demand (s.86(b)). Had the same treatment driven her to suicide, s.86(a) (conduct likely to drive her to suicide) would apply, and abetment of suicide (Unit 3) might too.

s.86, BNS: “For the purposes of section 85, ‘cruelty’ means — (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)…; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security…”

In Simple Terms: “cruelty” here has two branches — driving a woman towards suicide or grave harm, or harassing her to squeeze dowry out of her family. Either one is a crime.

flowchart TD
    CR["CRUELTY ss.85–86"] --> A["s.86(a): conduct likely to drive to SUICIDE / grave injury"]
    CR --> B["s.86(b): harassment to coerce an unlawful DOWRY demand"]
    CR --> P["s.85: punishment up to 3 years + fine"]
    CR --> M["Caution: no automatic arrest (Arnesh Kumar)"]

Case Laws

Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar (2014) — safeguards against automatic arrest under s.498A; police must justify the necessity of arrest.
Kaliyaperumal v State of Tamil Nadu (2004) — cruelty under s.498A is a distinct offence; it may exist without a dowry death.

Kidnapping or abducting a woman to compel marriage

s.87, BNS [old s.366 IPC]. Whoever kidnaps or abducts a woman with intent that she may be compelled to marry any person against her will, or forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or who by criminal intimidation induces her to go from any place with such intent, is punished with imprisonment up to ten years and fine.

The key element — specific intent. Plain kidnapping/abduction is dealt with in Unit 3 (ss.137–140). What makes s.87 a distinct, graver offence is the intent behind it: to force marriage or illicit intercourse. Without that intent, the act may be simple kidnapping; with it, s.87 applies.

Kidnapping v abduction (from Unit 3, applied here). Kidnapping from lawful guardianship (s.137) is about taking a minor (or person of unsound mind) out of a guardian’s keeping — consent of the minor is irrelevant. Abduction (s.138) is compelling any person by force or deceit to go from a place — it is not itself an offence unless done with one of the aggravating intents, of which s.87 (to compel marriage) is one.

🧩 Worked example. A forcibly takes B, an adult woman, away intending to compel her to marry his brother against her will. Because the taking was by force and with the intent to compel marriage, it is an offence under s.87 (abduction to compel marriage), punishable up to ten years — graver than a simple abduction, precisely because of that intent.

s.87, BNS: “Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse… shall be punished with imprisonment… which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

In Simple Terms: taking a woman away in order to force her into marriage or sex is a serious offence in its own right — the wrong is not just the taking, but the coercive purpose behind it.

flowchart TD
    K["s.87 — ABDUCT WOMAN TO COMPEL MARRIAGE"] --> I1["Kidnap/abduct a woman"]
    K --> I2["INTENT: compel marriage against her will…"]
    K --> I3["…or force/seduce to illicit intercourse"]
    K --> P["Up to 10 years + fine"]

Case Laws

Thakorlal D. Vadgama v State of Gujarat (1973) — “abduction” and the role of inducement/allurement in taking a girl away.

Causing miscarriage and injury to an unborn child

Causing miscarriage — s.88, BNS [old s.312 IPC]. Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry is punished — up to three years (or, if the woman is quick with child, up to seven years) — unless the miscarriage is caused in good faith to save the woman’s life. That saving clause is what makes a lawful medical termination (under the MTP Act) no offence.

The scheme (ss.88–92):

s.88 — voluntarily causing miscarriage (the base offence, with the life-saving exception).
s.89 — causing miscarriage without the woman’s consent, punishable up to life.
s.90 — death caused by an act done to cause miscarriage.
s.91 — an act done with intent to prevent a child being born alive or to cause it to die after birth.
s.92 — causing the death of a quick unborn child by an act amounting to culpable homicide.

“Quick with child.” A woman is “quick with child” when the movements of the foetus can be felt (quickening) — a later stage of pregnancy. Causing miscarriage at that stage is punished more severely, because the foetus is more developed.

Consent and good faith. The base offence assumes the woman’s consent; miscarriage caused without consent (s.89) is far graver. And a miscarriage caused in good faith to save the mother’s life is no offence — the legal foundation of therapeutic abortion.

🧩 Worked example. A doctor, honestly and in good faith, terminates a pregnancy to save the life of the mother who would otherwise die. This is no offence — the life-saving exception to s.88 applies (and the MTP Act authorises it). But a man who, without the woman’s consent, beats her to cause a miscarriage commits the grave offence under s.89, punishable up to life.

s.88, BNS: “Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry, shall, if such miscarriage be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, be punished with imprisonment… and, if the woman be quick with child, [with] imprisonment… which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

In Simple Terms: causing a woman to lose her pregnancy is a crime — more serious the further along she is — unless it is done in good faith to save her life, which is what makes lawful medical abortion possible.

flowchart TD
    MC["CAUSING MISCARRIAGE ss.88–92"] --> B["s.88 base — up to 3 yrs (7 if quick with child)"]
    B --> EX["EXCEPTION: good faith to save mother's life — NO offence"]
    MC --> NC["s.89 without consent — up to life"]
    MC --> D["s.90 death from such act"]
    MC --> PB["s.91 prevent child born alive"]
    MC --> QC["s.92 death of quick unborn child"]

Case Laws

Murari v State (on the good-faith/consent line) — miscarriage without consent is a distinct, graver offence; consent and good faith are the dividing lines.

Offences against a child

The BNS protects children through ss.93–99 [old ss.317, 361–369, 372–373 IPC]:

s.93 — Exposure and abandonment of a child under twelve by a parent or person having its care, in circumstances likely to cause its death.
s.94 — Concealment of birth by secretly disposing of a dead body.
s.95 — Hiring, employing or engaging a child to commit an offence.
s.96 — Procuration of a child (inducing a girl/boy to go with intent that the child be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse).
s.97 — Kidnapping or abducting a child under ten to steal from it.
s.98 — Selling a child for prostitution; s.99 — buying a child for prostitution.

The unifying idea. Children cannot protect themselves, so the law imposes special duties on those who have their care and punishes those who exploit their helplessness — by abandonment, trafficking, or use for crime or prostitution. Many overlap with the POCSO Act, 2012 (sexual offences against children), which continues to apply alongside the BNS.

🧩 Worked example. A mother, wishing to be rid of her infant, leaves it exposed in a deserted place in the cold, intending it to die. If the child dies, she is guilty of murder (or culpable homicide); the act of exposure itself is an offence under s.93 (exposure/abandonment of a child under twelve likely to cause death), and if she did it intending death, the graver homicide offence applies. The exposure section catches the abandonment even where death does not follow.

s.93, BNS: “Whoever being the father or mother of a child under the age of twelve years, or having the care of such child, shall expose or leave such child in any place with the intention of wholly abandoning such child, shall be punished with imprisonment… which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”

In Simple Terms: those who are meant to care for a small child — above all its parents — commit a crime if they abandon it to danger; and the law separately punishes selling, buying, or using children for crime or prostitution.

flowchart TD
    CH["OFFENCES AGAINST A CHILD ss.93–99"] --> A["s.93 Exposure/abandonment (<12)"]
    CH --> B["s.94 Concealment of birth"]
    CH --> C["s.95 Employing a child for crime"]
    CH --> D["s.96 Procuration of a child"]
    CH --> E["s.98–99 Sale/purchase for prostitution"]
    CH --> P["POCSO Act 2012 applies alongside"]

Case Laws

State v (child-exposure line) — abandonment with intent to cause death shades into culpable homicide; the exposure sections punish the abandonment itself.

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