10 Solved Problems (IRAC Method) — Administrative Law

These ten problems are worked in the IRAC method — Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion — the way a KSLU answer sheet expects; the full Question Bank has 40+ more.

Problem 1 — A statute prohibits the advertisement of drugs suggesting… (Unit 2)

Problem: A statute prohibits the advertisement of drugs suggesting their use in the cure or treatment of “venereal diseases”, and delegates to the Central Government the power to extend the Act to “any other disease or diseases”. Decide the validity of the delegation.

I — Issue. Is the power to extend the Act to “any other disease” a valid delegation, or is it void for excessive delegation?

R — Rule. 1. The legislature may delegate detail but must retain its essential function — laying down the policy and standard (In re Delhi Laws Act, 1951). A delegation with no guiding standard is excessive and void. 2. Power to add to a list of prohibited matters is a power to create new prohibitions — delegated legislation, not mere conditional legislation, and it needs a policy to channel it (Hamdard Dawakhana v Union of India, 1960).

A — Analysis. 1. The Act itself names a genus — objectionable advertisements about certain diseases — but the extending power is worded as “any other disease or diseases” with no criterion limiting the Government’s choice. 2. The tempting decoy is to call this “conditional legislation” — the Government merely switching the Act on for a new disease. That is wrong: adding a disease expands the offence, which is law-making. As in Hamdard Dawakhana, the power is uncanalised and uncontrolled. 3. Because no standard tells the Government which diseases may be added, the delegate is left to legislate at large — the very vice the doctrine forbids.

C — Conclusion. The delegation is void for excessive delegation. Had the Act supplied a guiding policy (e.g. “any other disease of a like objectionable character”), the extending power would have survived; as worded, it is bad.

Problem 2 — A parent Act empowered the municipality to impose a tax on… (Unit 2)

Problem: A parent Act empowered the municipality to impose a tax on foreign liquor. The municipality failed to levy it, so the State Government itself imposed the tax for the municipality; the collections were to be used for the purposes of the Act. The levy was challenged as excessive delegation. Decide.

I — Issue. Is the tax valid where the Act named the municipality as the taxing authority but the State Government levied it, and is the delegation excessive?

R — Rule. 1. A taxing power is not excessive delegation where the Act itself fixes the subject, rate and purpose of the tax — the legislature has then supplied the policy (In re Delhi Laws Act, 1951; Vasantlal Maganbhai, 1961). 2. A statutory power must be exercised by the authority on which it is conferred; another authority may act only if the Act so authorises.

A — Analysis. 1. On excessive delegation the levy is safe: the Act itself lays down what is taxed (foreign liquor), fixes the rate, and earmarks the proceeds “for the purposes of the Act” — a clear policy, not a blank cheque. The decoy label “excessive delegation” therefore fails. 2. The real question is who may levy. The Act named the municipality. The State Government could step in only if the Act empowered it to act on the municipality’s default; where it did, the levy is intra vires; where it did not, the Government acted without authority. 3. On the facts, the statutory scheme allowing the Government to enforce the levy on default supports the tax.

C — Conclusion. The delegation is not excessive — the Act supplies the policy — and the levy is valid provided the Act authorised the Government to impose it on the municipality’s default. Absent such authority, only the excess of power (not excessive delegation) would invalidate it.

Problem 3 — A Municipal Corporation Act empowered the municipality to… (Unit 2)

Problem: A Municipal Corporation Act empowered the municipality to impose a tax on “land and buildings”. Exercising this power the authorities imposed the tax on machinery installed in the building. The owner challenged the levy. Decide its validity.

I — Issue. Does a power to tax “land and buildings” authorise a tax on machinery installed inside a building?

R — Rule. 1. A delegate has only the power the parent Act confers; a levy on a subject outside the words of the Act is substantively ultra vires and void (State of U.P. v Renusagar Power Co., 1988). 2. Taxing statutes are construed strictly; the taxing power cannot be stretched beyond the objects the legislature named.

A — Analysis. 1. The Act authorised a tax on land and buildings — immovable property. Machinery, though installed in a building, is a distinct object; it is neither land nor a building. 2. The decoy is to argue that machinery is “part of” the building because it is fixed there. But the power is defined by the words the legislature chose; extending “buildings” to cover the plant inside it rewrites the Act. 3. By taxing machinery the authority taxed a subject the Act never gave it — exactly the excess the ultra vires doctrine strikes.

C — Conclusion. The levy on machinery is ultra vires and void. The municipality may tax the land and the building, but not the machinery within it, unless the Act is amended to include it.

Problem 4 — An Act to control the transport of goods and passengers by… (Unit 2)

Problem: An Act to control the transport of goods and passengers by ferries authorised the Commissioner to make rules for the safety of passengers and property. The Commissioner instead framed a rule forbidding the establishment of any private ferry within two miles of another ferry. Is the rule valid?

I — Issue. Is a rule forbidding private ferries within two miles of another ferry within a rule-making power confined to “the safety of passengers and property”?

R — Rule. 1. A rule must serve the purpose for which the power was given; a rule that pursues a different object is substantively ultra vires (State of U.P. v Renusagar Power Co., 1988). 2. The scope of a delegated power is measured by the words and object of the enabling section.

A — Analysis. 1. The Commissioner’s power was to make rules for the safety of passengers and property. A rule about where ferries may be set up regulates competition and location, not safety. 2. The decoy is that fewer ferries may loosely be said to reduce collisions and so touch “safety”. But that connection is strained and remote; the true object of the two-mile bar is to shield existing operators from rivals — an object the Act never authorised. 3. The rule therefore travels outside the four corners of the safety power.

C — Conclusion. The rule is ultra vires the parent Act and void. It could be saved only if the Act had given a wider power (e.g. to regulate the establishment and licensing of ferries), which it did not.

Problem 5 — In contempt of court proceedings, the same judge who heard… (Unit 3)

Problem: In contempt of court proceedings, the same judge who heard and decided the case passed the order of punishment against a witness to the case for his scandalous remarks which brought the court to disrepute. Aggrieved by the order, he challenged the action. Will he succeed?

I — Issue. Is the punishment void for bias because the very judge whose court was scandalised sat in judgment over the contemner, or may he act despite the apparent interest?

R — Rule. 1. Nemo judex in causa sua forbids a person from deciding a cause in which he is interested; a real likelihood or reasonable apprehension of bias vitiates the decision (Manak Lal, 1957). 2. But where the interested authority is the only one competent to act, the doctrine of necessity permits it to decide — otherwise justice would fail altogether. Contempt jurisdiction inheres in the court whose authority is defied.

A — Analysis. 1. On the face of it the judge is a “party” — the scandalous remarks were aimed at his own court, so he appears to be judging his own cause. 2. But contempt that scandalises the court can, by its nature, be punished only by that court; there is no neutral outsider to whom the power belongs. The doctrine of necessity therefore displaces the bias rule. 3. Provided the judge gave the contemner notice and a hearing (audi), the mere fact that his own court was the object of the contempt does not disqualify him.

C — Conclusion. The challenge fails. The judge was not disqualified: the doctrine of necessity allows a court to punish a contempt committed against it, the bias rule yielding where the interested authority is the only competent one.

Problem 6 — A committee/assessment committee of the State (or University)… (Unit 3)

Problem: A committee/assessment committee of the State (or University) had to select and recommend books of various authors and publishers for school subjects. Some of the members of the committee were themselves authors whose books were among those considered; though they withdrew when their own books were discussed, the members’ books came to be approved. The selection was challenged. Decide.

I — Issue. Is the selection vitiated by bias where members were authors of books in the field, even though they abstained when their own books were taken up?

R — Rule. 1. A member with a pecuniary or personal interest in the outcome is disqualified; the test is a real likelihood or reasonable apprehension of bias, not proof of actual favouritism (Dimes, 1852; Manak Lal, 1957). 2. Mere abstention on one’s own item does not cure the interest, because the member can still influence the ranking and rejection of rival books — the whole selection is tainted (J. Mohapatra & Co. v State of Orissa, 1984).

A — Analysis. 1. Each author-member has a financial and personal interest in his own book being selected and in rivals being rejected. 2. Withdrawing when his own book is discussed is cosmetic: he remains on the committee to assess and downgrade competing books, so his presence contaminates the entire exercise. 3. That the members’ books were in fact approved confirms the reasonable apprehension a fair-minded observer would entertain.

C — Conclusion. The selection is vitiated by pecuniary/personal bias and must be set aside. The committee must be reconstituted without any member whose books are in the field; abstention on one’s own item is not enough (J. Mohapatra).

Problem 7 — A Commercial Tax Officer, while assessing the appellant, was… (Unit 4)

Problem: A Commercial Tax Officer, while assessing the appellant, was of the opinion that the assessee was not liable to pay the tax; still he referred the matter to his superior and, on the Assistant Commissioner’s instructions, imposed the tax. The petitioner challenged the imposition. Decide.

I — Issue. Is the assessment valid where the officer, though himself of the opinion that no tax was due, imposed it merely on his superior’s instructions?

R — Rule. 1. A statutory discretion or power of assessment must be exercised by the officer on whom it is conferred, applying his own mind; he cannot surrender his judgment to a superior. 2. Acting under dictation is a failure to exercise discretion at all, and the resulting order is void (Purtabpur Co. v Cane Commissioner, 1970).

A — Analysis. 1. The assessing power is vested in the Commercial Tax Officer, who formed the opinion that the assessee was not liable. 2. He nevertheless imposed the tax purely “on the instructions” of the Assistant Commissioner — abandoning his own conclusion and obeying an order instead of deciding for himself. 3. The vice is not that the tax may or may not be due on the merits, but that the officer never brought his own quasi-judicial mind to bear; the superior’s advice cannot substitute for the statutory officer’s own satisfaction.

C — Conclusion. The assessment is void for acting under dictation. The officer must decide the assessment himself on his own opinion of the assessee’s liability; the imposition on his superior’s instructions cannot stand (Purtabpur, 1970).

Problem 8 — ‘A’, a government officer vested with discretion to grant… (Unit 4)

Problem: ‘A’, a government officer vested with discretion to grant permission for the transplantation of a kidney, announced a policy to be applied by him to all cases coming before him for decision. ‘P’, an applicant refused permission, challenges the decision. Decide.

I — Issue. Is the refusal valid where the officer applied a pre-announced policy to all cases, or did he unlawfully fetter his discretion by that rigid rule?

R — Rule. 1. An authority may lawfully adopt a general policy to guide the exercise of a discretion, for the sake of consistency. 2. But it must not fetter its discretion by applying the policy mechanically and shutting its ears to the special features of an individual case; it must be willing to make an exception where the case warrants (the anti-fettering rule).

A — Analysis. 1. Announcing a policy for kidney-transplant permissions is, in itself, unobjectionable and even desirable. 2. The vice arises only if ‘A’ treated the policy as inflexible, refusing to consider P’s individual circumstances and applying the rule automatically. 3. If P was refused without any genuine consideration of his own case, the discretion was fettered and the refusal is bad; if A considered P’s case on its merits and the policy was only a guide, the refusal stands.

C — Conclusion. The refusal is void if A applied the policy rigidly, fettering his discretion and ignoring P’s individual case; it is valid if A kept an open mind and considered P’s case on its facts. A rule of policy must guide, not replace, the exercise of discretion.

Problem 9 — The Central Government appointed a Commission of Inquiry to… (Unit 5)

Problem: The Central Government appointed a Commission of Inquiry to enquire into the conduct of a Minister of a State. Is the action of the Central Government valid? Decide.

I — Issue. Is the Central Government competent to appoint a Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of a Minister of a State, or is the appropriate authority the State Government?

R — Rule. 1. Under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, a government may appoint a commission only on a definite matter of public importance within its own legislative competence — the Central Government on matters in the Union or Concurrent List, a State Government on matters in the State or Concurrent List. 2. A commission cannot be appointed to inquire into a subject outside the appointing government’s legislative field (State of Karnataka v Union of India, 1977).

A — Analysis. 1. The conduct of a State Minister in the discharge of State functions ordinarily relates to a State-List subject, which falls to the State Government to inquire into. 2. If the alleged conduct relates instead to a Union or Concurrent subject, the Central Government is competent to appoint the commission. 3. The validity of the Centre’s action therefore turns entirely on the subject-matter of the alleged conduct, not on the office of the Minister as such.

C — Conclusion. The Central Government’s commission is valid only if the matter falls within the Union or Concurrent List; on a purely State subject it is beyond the Centre’s competence and bad, the appropriate authority being the State Government (State of Karnataka v Union of India, 1977).

Problem 10 — The CBI invited applications for 200 posts of constables… (Unit 5)

Problem: The CBI invited applications for 200 posts of constables through a written examination and interview. There were complaints of corruption and favouritism in the physical and written tests, and accordingly the entire selection process was cancelled; it was found that only in respect of 31 specific candidates were the complaints true. The cancellation order was challenged. Decide.

I — Issue. Is the cancellation of the entire selection valid where corruption/favouritism was established against only 31 candidates, or is a wholesale cancellation disproportionate to the wrong?

R — Rule. 1. Manipulation of a selection is maladministration (arbitrariness/favouritism) and, where for gain, corruption; the taint must be addressed, but the remedy must be proportionate and must not needlessly punish the innocent (Om Kumar v Union of India, 2001, on proportionality). 2. Where the tainted candidates are identifiable and severable, the proper course is to cancel their selection, not to scrap the whole process and penalise the untainted.

A — Analysis. 1. The complaints of corruption and favouritism were found true only against 31 specific candidates — a defined, severable group whose selections can be cancelled individually. 2. Cancelling the entire selection would visit the wrong of those 31 upon a large body of innocent, meritorious candidates, an excessive and disproportionate response to a localised taint. 3. If the malpractice had pervaded the whole examination so that the untainted could not be separated, wholesale cancellation might be justified; but that is not the case where only 31 are shown to be tainted.

C — Conclusion. The wholesale cancellation is disproportionate and liable to be set aside: as the taint is confined to 31 identifiable candidates, only their selections should be cancelled, the rest of the meritorious selections being preserved. The remedy must fit the extent of the maladministration (Om Kumar, 2001). —

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