Classification of Administrative Functions — Administrative Law Notes

Classification of Administrative Functions

For decades a citizen’s rights turned on a single, slippery question: was the officer who hit him acting “quasi-judicially” (in which case he had to give a fair hearing) or merely “administratively” (in which case, said the old law, he did not)? Courts tied themselves in knots drawing the line — until A.K. Kraipak (1969) cut the knot and said fairness applies to both. But the classification still matters, and you must be able to draw it.

Why classify, and what are the categories?

The administration does not do just one kind of thing. Classifying its action matters because different legal controls attach to each class — the duty of natural justice, the availability of certiorari, the standard of review all depend on which box the action falls in. There are three classes:

Legislative (rule-making) function. Making general rules for the future, applicable to a class of persons — i.e. delegated legislation. It looks at the future and at people in general. Example: a Government notification fixing minimum wages for an industry. Control: it must be intra vires the parent Act; natural justice normally does not apply.
Judicial / quasi-judicial function. Deciding a dispute about existing rights between parties, on evidence, by applying law to facts. A judicial function is one performed by a court; a quasi-judicial function is a court-like decision made by an administrative authority — it has some, but not all, trappings of a court. Example: a rent-control authority deciding fair rent; a disciplinary authority dismissing a servant. Control: natural justice applies, and the decision is subject to certiorari/prohibition.
Purely administrative (executive) function. Everything else — implementing policy, running the day-to-day machinery, taking action not amounting to rule-making or dispute-deciding. Example: granting or refusing a licence on policy grounds, requisitioning property. Control: increasingly, a duty to act fairly applies here too (post-Kraipak).

A. Distinguishing quasi-judicial from purely administrative action

The classic tests for a quasi-judicial function:

there is a lis [dispute] or a proposal opposed by someone, i.e. two rival contentions;
the authority is under a duty to act judicially — to hear both sides and decide on evidence, not on mere policy or whim;
the decision affects the rights of a person and is based on objective facts, not subjective satisfaction.

A purely administrative function, by contrast, usually involves no lis, is guided by policy and expediency, and rests on the authority’s subjective satisfaction.

🔑 The dividing line is thin, and after A.K. Kraipak (1969) it matters far less than it once did: the Supreme Court held that the requirement of acting fairly (natural justice) applies to administrative action too, not only quasi-judicial action. So today the practical question is not “which label?” but “did the authority act fairly?”

💡 EXAM TIP — Don’t get trapped by the label

The trap. Weaker candidates spend the whole answer agonising over whether an act is “quasi-judicial” or “administrative”, as if everything turns on the label, and then forget to say what follows.

What to write. Give the three-fold classification, the tests to tell quasi-judicial from administrative, and then the pay-off sentence: “After A.K. Kraipak (1969), the duty to act fairly applies to administrative action as well, so the classification matters mainly for the availability of certiorari, not for whether a hearing is due.”

Why it scores. It shows the examiner you know both the old learning (the tests) and the modern position (fairness for all) — the very point the question is probing.

On the blurred line (from A.K. Kraipak): “The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated… the aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or, to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice.”

In Simple Terms: Administrative action comes in three kinds — making rules (legislative), deciding disputes (quasi-judicial), and doing the rest (administrative). The label used to decide whether a fair hearing was owed. Since Kraipak, fairness is owed across the board, so the label now mainly decides which writ lies.

flowchart TD
    ROOT["Functions of the Administration"]:::root
    ROOT --> L["Legislative<br/>general rules, future<br/>-> delegated legislation"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> Q["Quasi-judicial<br/>decides a dispute (lis)<br/>duty to act judicially -> natural justice + certiorari"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> A["Administrative<br/>policy & execution<br/>subjective satisfaction -> duty to act fairly"]:::leaf
    Q --> K["A.K. Kraipak (1969):<br/>line is thin; fairness applies to BOTH Q and A"]:::mid
    A --> K
    classDef root fill:#FFF8DC,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px,color:#000;
    classDef leaf fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
    classDef mid fill:#FDECC8,stroke:#8a5a00,color:#000;
    linkStyle default stroke:#888,stroke-width:1px;

🧩 WORKED EXAMPLE — Classify the function

Facts. A selection board recommends candidates for promotion. One member of the board is himself a candidate. A rejected officer challenges the selection.

Rule. Selection was once treated as a purely administrative function needing no hearing. A.K. Kraipak (1969) held that even such a selection must be free from bias and conform to natural justice.

Apply. Whether we call the board’s task “administrative” or “quasi-judicial”, the member-candidate’s presence made the process unfair. The classification does not save it; the fairness rule applies either way.

Conclusion. The selection is vitiated by bias. Kraipak is the authority — the modern rule is fairness for administrative action too, so the old label is not decisive.

Case Laws

A.K. Kraipak v Union of India (1969) — line between administrative and quasi-judicial is thin; natural justice applies to administrative action as well.
Province of Bombay v Kushaldas S. Advani (1950) — early test: a duty to act judicially arises where there is a lis and a legal obligation to decide judicially.
Ridge v Baldwin (1964) — dismissed the artificial “quasi-judicial only” limit on natural justice.
Indian National Congress v Institute of Social Welfare (2002) — restated the tests distinguishing quasi-judicial from administrative action.

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