Administrative Adjudication, Tribunals & the Duty to Act Judicially — Administrative Law Notes

Administrative Adjudication, Tribunals & the Duty to Act Judicially

If a workman is sacked, he does not go to a civil court — he goes to a Labour Court. A tax dispute goes to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal; a service dispute to the Administrative Tribunal; a company matter to the NCLT. Over the 20th century a whole shadow judiciary grew up inside the administration, deciding millions of disputes the ordinary courts were too slow and too costly to handle. This is administrative adjudication — and because these bodies decide rights, the law makes them follow natural justice.

What is administrative adjudication?

Administrative adjudication is the determination of disputes and questions affecting the rights of citizens by administrative authorities or tribunals instead of the ordinary courts. When the administration decides a controversy — whether to grant a pension, dismiss an employee, assess a tax, cancel a permit — it is adjudicating: applying law to facts to decide a right. That is a quasi-judicial function (Unit 1, Topic 7).

A tribunal is a body, outside the ordinary court hierarchy, set up by statute to decide a particular class of disputes. It is neither a pure court nor a pure department — it is a hybrid: court-like in that it decides disputes on evidence, administrative in that it is staffed and run by the executive branch and often has expert (non-judicial) members.

Why tribunals grew — the reasons for administrative adjudication (link back to Unit 1 growth):

Speed — tribunals decide faster than congested civil courts.
Cheapness — proceedings are less costly; often no court fee, simpler procedure.
Expertise — technical disputes (tax, patents, environment) need expert members, not generalist judges.
Flexibility — tribunals are not bound by the strict rules of evidence and the rigid Civil Procedure Code.
Relief of court congestion — they take a huge case-load off the ordinary courts.
Preventive and policy-oriented justice — they can act with an eye to policy, which courts cannot.

Advantages: speed, cheapness, expertise, flexibility, informality, reduced burden on courts.

Disadvantages / problems of administrative adjudication (the examiner loves the criticism):

No uniform procedure — each tribunal has its own, causing uncertainty.
Risk to natural justice — informality can slide into unfairness; a tribunal may be a judge in its own cause.
Departmental bias — members drawn from the department may favour the administration.
Lack of independence — tribunals are under executive control (appointments, tenure), unlike an independent judiciary.
No obligation to give reasons historically (now corrected — a speaking order is required).
Limited appeal / expertise of members — non-legal members may misapply the law.

A. The duty to act judicially

An authority that adjudicates is under a duty to act judicially — to hear both sides, act on evidence, be free from bias and (today) give reasons. Formerly, natural justice applied only where a duty to act judicially could be spelt out from the statute. After A.K. Kraipak (1969) and Maneka Gandhi (1978), the duty to act fairly attaches to administrative action generally, so the old struggle to find an express “duty to act judicially” has lost much of its bite.

Constitutional recognition: Articles 323A and 323B (added in 1976) expressly authorise Parliament and State legislatures to set up administrative tribunals for service and other specified matters — a constitutional seal on administrative adjudication.

On the duty (from Province of Bombay v Kushaldas Advani, 1950): “If a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are no two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act, provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially.”

In Simple Terms: Administrative adjudication is the administration deciding disputes through tribunals instead of courts. Tribunals grew because they are faster, cheaper and expert; but they are criticised for no uniform procedure, departmental bias and lack of independence. Because they decide rights, they are under a duty to act judicially — and, after Kraipak, fairly.

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    ROOT --> C["Arts 323A / 323B<br/>constitutional basis"]:::leaf
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🧩 WORKED EXAMPLE — Court or tribunal, and does natural justice apply?

Facts. A statutory Human Rights Court / commission is empowered to “order an investigation” and to decide certain complaints, following a simplified procedure.

Rule. A body set up by statute to decide disputes affecting rights is a tribunal exercising a quasi-judicial function, and is bound by natural justice even though its procedure is informal.

Apply. The body decides matters affecting individuals’ rights on evidence — that is adjudication. Informal procedure does not free it from the duty to act judicially; it must give notice and a hearing.

Conclusion. It is a tribunal, not a mere department, and natural justice governs it. An order passed without hearing the affected person is liable to be quashed.

Case Laws

A.K. Kraipak v Union of India (1969) — duty to act fairly extends to administrative action; natural justice is not confined to “courts”.
Bharat Bank v Employees of Bharat Bank (1950) — an industrial tribunal, though not a court, discharges quasi-judicial functions.
L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) — tribunals under Arts 323A/323B are subject to the High Courts’ judicial review; they supplement, not supplant, the courts.
S.P. Sampath Kumar v Union of India (1987) — administrative tribunals are valid substitutes for High Courts in service matters, provided independence is safeguarded.

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