The General Assembly — Public International Law Notes

The General Assembly

In 1950 the Security Council was paralysed. The Korean War had begun, and the Soviet veto meant the Council could take no further action. So the General Assembly did something bold: it passed the Uniting for Peace resolution (1950), declaring that when the Council is deadlocked by a veto and fails in its duty, the Assembly may step in and recommend collective measures — even the use of force. That resolution is the Assembly’s great answer to the veto, and it is the line that earns the top marks whenever the GA is asked about.

What the General Assembly is, and what it can (and cannot) do

The General Assembly (GA) is the plenary, “town-meeting” organ of the UN — the one body in which every member State sits and has a vote. It is the UN’s deliberative heart: it can discuss anything within the Charter, debate it, and pass resolutions. But there is one limitation you must state at the outset, because it decides most questions: with a few housekeeping exceptions, the Assembly’s resolutions are recommendations only — they do not bind members the way a Security Council decision does.

A. Composition (Articles 9–10)

All members of the UN are members of the General Assembly. Each member may send up to five representatives, but each member State has only one vote — the sovereign-equality principle in action, so that a micro-State and a great power count alike.

B. Voting (Article 18)

Important questions are decided by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting — e.g. recommendations on peace and security, election of non-permanent SC members, admission/suspension/expulsion of members, budgetary questions.
Other questions are decided by a simple majority.

C. Functions and powers

Learn them as a labelled cluster — the examiner rewards the categories:

Deliberative — to discuss any question within the scope of the Charter and make recommendations (Arts. 10–14), including the maintenance of peace and security (but it must refer to the SC any matter needing enforcement action — Art. 11).
Supervisory — it receives and considers annual reports from the Security Council and the other organs (Art. 15).
Financial — it considers and approves the budget of the UN, and apportions the expenses among members (Art. 17). This is a genuine power of decision, not a mere recommendation.
Elective — it elects the ten non-permanent members of the SC, the members of ECOSOC, and — together with the SC voting separately — the fifteen judges of the ICJ; it admits members and appoints the Secretary-General on the SC’s recommendation.
Constituent / supervisory of the Charter — it participates in amending the Charter (Art. 108).

🔑 The Assembly’s resolutions are, in general, RECOMMENDATIONS ONLY — they carry great moral and political weight, but they do not legally bind members. The two exceptions where the GA truly decides are its internal/budgetary matters (Art. 17) and the admission/suspension/expulsion of members (on the SC’s recommendation).

⚠️ DON’T CONFUSE — General Assembly powers vs Security Council powers

The General Assembly is everyone, one vote each, but it can generally only recommend — its resolutions on peace and security are not binding, and it must hand any matter needing enforcement to the Council (Art. 11). The Security Council is only fifteen members, but its decisions bind all members (Art. 25) and it alone may authorise sanctions or force under Chapter VII. So: wide membership + weak power (GA) versus narrow membership + strong power (SC). Do not write that “the General Assembly can order sanctions” or “impose binding measures” — it cannot; only the Council can. The GA’s one route into enforcement is the Uniting for Peace resolution (1950), and even then it only recommends.

Article 18(1)–(2), UN Charter (1945): “Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.”

Article 17(1)–(2), UN Charter (1945): “The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.”

In Simple Terms: The General Assembly is the UN’s parliament-shaped debating chamber — every State is in it, every State gets one vote, and big questions need a two-thirds majority. It can talk about anything and recommend action, elect the other organs’ members, and it genuinely controls the money (it approves the budget). But on peace and security it can usually only recommend, not command — and when the Council is frozen by a veto, its Uniting for Peace device lets it recommend collective measures itself.

🧩 WORKED EXAMPLE — a GA resolution “orders” a State to withdraw

Facts. The General Assembly passes, by a large majority, a resolution “directing” State A to withdraw its troops from State B. A ignores it and argues the resolution has no legal force.

Rule. GA resolutions on peace and security are recommendations (Arts. 10–11); they do not bind members. Binding enforcement is the Security Council’s function alone (Arts. 25, 39–42).

Apply. The decoy is the strong word “directing” and the large majority — it sounds mandatory. But no majority converts a GA recommendation into a binding order; only the SC can decide in the Art. 25 sense. A is not legally bound by the GA text, though it carries political weight.

Conclusion. The resolution is a recommendation, not a command; the matter would have to go to the Security Council for any binding or enforcement measure.

flowchart TD
    A["General Assembly<br/>(all members, one vote — Arts. 9-10)"]
    A --> B["Voting (Art. 18):<br/>important Qs = 2/3;<br/>other Qs = simple majority"]
    A --> C["Deliberative — discuss & recommend (Arts. 10-14)"]
    A --> D["Financial — approve budget (Art. 17) [binding]"]
    A --> E["Elective — non-permanent SC, ECOSOC,<br/>ICJ judges (with SC), Sec-Gen"]
    A --> F["Uniting for Peace (1950):<br/>acts when SC is vetoed — still recommends"]
    classDef box fill:#e8f0fe,stroke:#333,color:#111;
    class A,B,C,D,E,F box;

Case Laws

Certain Expenses of the United Nations (1962, ICJ, Advisory Opinion) — expenditure on peacekeeping operations authorised by the GA are “expenses of the Organization” under Art. 17(2), which members are bound to bear; upheld the GA’s budgetary authority.
Reparation for Injuries (1949, ICJ, Advisory Opinion) — supports the standing of the UN, acting through its organs including the GA, as an international legal person.

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