10 Solved Problems (IRAC Method) — Land Law

These ten problems are worked in the IRAC method — Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion — the way a KSLU answer sheet expects; the full Question Bank has 40+ more.

Problem 1 — The Government publishes the preliminary notification… (Unit 1)

Problem: The Government publishes the preliminary notification covering A’s land. After that notification, A mortgages the land to a bank for a loan. Has A violated any law?

I — Issue. Whether A, after a preliminary notification has been published over the land, may lawfully mortgage it — and what is the effect of a mortgage created in breach.

R — Rule. 1. Under s. 11(4), RFCTLARR Act 2013, once the preliminary notification is published, no person may make any transaction or create any encumbrance — sale, mortgage, gift, lease or charge — on the notified land until the acquisition is complete. The land “freezes”. 2. If a person wilfully violates the freeze, the Collector is not bound to recognise or make good any loss arising from that dealing; only the Collector may, in special circumstances and on application, exempt the land.

A — Analysis. 1. Name and kill the decoy. A mortgage looks like an ordinary incident of ownership — an owner can normally raise a loan against his own land. The trap is forgetting that the preliminary notification has already suspended that right: the ownership is intact but dealings are frozen from the date of publication. 2. Apply the rule. A’s mortgage is an encumbrance created after the notification, squarely within the s. 11(4) bar. It is therefore in breach of the freeze. A did not obtain the Collector’s exemption, which was the only lawful route to deal with the land. 3. Consequence for the bank. The bank’s charge does not bind the acquisition; the Collector is not obliged to protect the bank’s loss out of the compensation, so the mortgagee gets no claim against the acquisition proceeds.

C — Conclusion. Yes — A has violated s. 11(4). The mortgage is ineffective against the acquisition and gives the bank no enforceable claim on the compensation; A could lawfully have dealt with the land only if the Collector had granted an exemption, which was not obtained. — ## UNIT 2 — RFCTLARR Act 2013 (Part B: Monitoring, the LARR Authority & Compensation)

Problem 2 — B genuinely bought land from S but never got the khata mutated (Unit 3)

Problem: B genuinely bought land from S but never got the khata mutated. S died; S’s heir first got the RTC transferred to himself. B’s heir now applies to mutate the khata by succession. Can B’s heir succeed?

I — Issue. Whether an RTC entry standing in the vendor’s heir’s name defeats an earlier genuine sale, so as to bar the buyer’s heir from succession-mutation.

R — Rule. 1. Under s. 133, KLR Act 1964, an entry in the record of rights carries only a rebuttable presumption of correctness — it is presumed true until the contrary is proved. 2. An RTC / mutation entry reflects possession, not ownership, and gives the holder no title he does not otherwise have (Baburao Birade vs Mallappa Birade, 1967; Major Pakhar Singh vs State of Punjab, 1995). A genuine prior sale transfers ownership regardless of the revenue entry.

A — Analysis. 1. Name and kill the decoy. The RTC now standing in S’s heir’s name looks like proof that the land is his — the planted trap. It is not: under s. 133 that entry is only a presumption, and it is rebutted by B’s genuine purchase. 2. Apply the rule. The valid sale from S to B transferred ownership to B at the time of sale. When S died he had nothing left to pass on, having already sold the land; S’s heir therefore inherited only a fiscal entry, not title. 3. Effect. B’s heir claims through B, the true owner, and is entitled to have the khata mutated. A later mutation by the vendor’s heir cannot override an earlier genuine sale.

C — Conclusion. B’s heir succeeds. The mutation should be recorded in B’s heir’s favour; the RTC entry in S’s-heir’s name is merely fiscal and does not confer title. Any residual dispute over title would go to the civil court, where B’s heir — claiming through a genuine purchaser — equally prevails.

Problem 3 — Agricultural land was granted to G and stands in G’s name in… (Unit 3)

Problem: Agricultural land was granted to G and stands in G’s name in the RTC. G dies. Decades later G’s widow applies for a succession khata; the revenue authority refuses, saying it is “granted” land. Advise.

I — Issue. Whether a succession-mutation (pothi/pauti varasu) of granted agricultural land may be refused merely because the land was “granted”, and whether long delay bars it.

R — Rule. 1. A holder’s rights in granted land are heritable; inheritance is not a “transfer”. Mutation is a fiscal step recording a change of holder (ss. 128–129, KLR Act). 2. The PTCL Act 1978 bars the transfer of granted SC/ST land (sale, gift, etc.), not its inheritance by the grantee’s heirs. Mere delay does not defeat an inheritance mutation.

A — Analysis. 1. Name and kill the decoy. The framing “it is granted land, so PTCL blocks the entry” invites the transfer-prohibition — the planted trap. But the widow is not acquiring by transfer; she succeeds to G’s holding by operation of law on his death. 2. Apply the rule. Succession is not a prohibited transfer, so the PTCL bar does not apply. The authority has confused “granted land cannot be sold” with “granted land cannot be inherited” — a legal error. 3. Delay. Mere lapse of decades does not bar an inheritance mutation; the widow’s right to succeed does not expire for want of a prompt application.

C — Conclusion. The refusal is wrong. The widow is entitled to the succession khata; the authority must record her as the successor-holder. “Granted” status and delay are no grounds to refuse a mutation by inheritance.

Problem 4 — X buys land at a public auction held by the Tahsildar and… (Unit 3)

Problem: X buys land at a public auction held by the Tahsildar and receives the certificate of sale; the previous owner had not paid an earlier year’s land revenue. Is X liable for that arrear?

I — Issue. Whether X, the purchaser at a revenue auction, is personally liable for the previous owner’s unpaid land revenue.

R — Rule. 1. Land revenue is a paramount first charge on the land itself (s. 158, KLR Act), recovered by attaching and auctioning the land (ss. 165, 169). 2. The certified purchaser takes the property freed from prior encumbrances and claims (s. 182), the arrears being met out of the sale proceeds (s. 181). The purchaser gets a free and absolute title (Channabasavegowda vs Rangegowda, 1951).

A — Analysis. 1. Name and kill the decoy. “X is now the owner, so X inherits the dues” is the planted trap. Ownership by revenue auction is the opposite of a private sale: its very purpose is to realise the arrears out of the land, so the sale cleanses the land rather than carrying the dues over. 2. Apply the rule. The unpaid revenue was a charge on the land, and the auction was held to recover it. On confirmation and the certificate of sale, X takes a clean title under s. 182; the old arrears are discharged from the sale proceeds (s. 181), not tacked onto X. 3. What X does owe. X is, of course, liable for land revenue accruing after his purchase.

C — Conclusion. X is not liable for the previous owner’s arrears. The first-charge principle (s. 158) combined with the clean-title rule (s. 182) means the auction extinguishes the old dues against the land; X owns it free of them.

Problem 5 — The Deputy Commissioner, under s (Unit 3)

Problem: The Deputy Commissioner, under s. 72, reserves the grazing on free pasturage land to the cattle of only two villages. Surrounding villages challenge the order as violating Arts. 14 and 21. Will they succeed?

I — Issue. Whether a Deputy Commissioner’s order under s. 72 reserving pasturage to two villages’ cattle is invalid as violating Article 14 (equality) and Article 21 (life/livelihood).

R — Rule. 1. Section 72, KLR Act confers on the Deputy Commissioner a statutory power to regulate the use of assigned pasturage — which cattle, of which villages, may graze and on what terms. 2. Article 14 forbids not classification but unreasonable classification; a classification is valid if it rests on an intelligible differentia bearing a rational nexus to the object (State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952). Village common land is held and regulated for the community’s benefit (Jagpal Singh vs State of Punjab, 2011).

A — Analysis. 1. Name and kill the decoy. The Art. 14/21 framing invites a pure fundamental-rights answer — the planted trap. The correct approach is administrative-law reasonableness: the DC is exercising a valid statutory power (s. 72), not acting arbitrarily. 2. Apply the rule. Reserving a limited common to the two villages that traditionally and proximately depend on it is a reasonable classification — the differentia (which villages the common historically serves and adjoins) has a rational nexus to the object (preventing over-grazing and preserving the pasture). It is not hostile discrimination under Art. 14, and regulating a shared common does not by itself destroy livelihood under Art. 21. 3. Limit. The order would fall only if the excluded villages showed it was mala fide or wholly irrational, which is not made out.

C — Conclusion. The surrounding villages will fail. The DC has statutory authority under s. 72, and reserving the pasturage to the two dependent villages is a reasonable classification, not arbitrary discrimination — so the order stands. — ## UNIT 4 — Karnataka SC/ST (PTCL) Act 1978 & Karnataka Land Reforms Act 1961

Problem 6 — Grantee G, a Scheduled Caste person, was granted agricultural… (Unit 4)

Problem: Grantee G, a Scheduled Caste person, was granted agricultural land; G sold it to a third party and died the same year. G’s children now want the land back. Can they succeed?

I — Issue. Whether the children of a deceased SC grantee can recover granted land that the grantee sold in breach of the grant condition, despite the completed sale, his death and the lapse of time.

R — Rule. 1. Under s. 4(1), PTCL Act 1978, a transfer of granted land in breach of the grant’s no-alienation condition is null and void — the buyer acquires no right, title or interest ever. 2. Under s. 5, the Assistant Commissioner may resume the land (evicting the holder after hearing him) and restore it to the “original grantee or his legal heir”; s. 5(3) presumes a stranger in possession holds under a void transfer. Inheritance is not a barred transfer (s. 3(1)(e)).

A — Analysis. 1. Name and kill the decoy. A completed sale + the grantee’s death + long delay make the heirs look shut out — the planted trap. They are not: a void sale conveys no title however complete it looks, voidness does not fade with time, and succession is expressly protected. 2. Apply the rule. The land is “granted land” and G’s sale is a “transfer” breaking the grant condition, so it is void — the buyer holds nothing. G’s children, as legal heirs, are exactly whom s. 5(b) says the land must be restored to; s. 5(3) presumes the buyer’s possession is under a void transfer. 3. The delay caveat. The Act fixes no limitation, but relief must be sought within a reasonable time (Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi, 2018); if the claim is not stale it succeeds.

C — Conclusion. The children can succeed. The Assistant Commissioner should declare the sale void, resume the land, and restore it to G’s heirs — provided the application is not defeated by inordinate, unexplained delay.

Problem 7 — P bought agricultural land from vendor V years ago and holds… (Unit 4)

Problem: P bought agricultural land from vendor V years ago and holds the khata/RTC in P’s name; P is now warned that V had belonged to the SC category, so the title looks risky. Advise P.

I — Issue. Whether P’s title is good and marketable where the land he bought is traceable to an SC/ST grantee, given his clean RTC and long possession.

R — Rule. 1. If the land is “granted land” (State land given to an SC/ST person), the PTCL Act follows it into whosever hands it passes. A transfer in breach of the grant condition is void under s. 4(1) — the purchaser gets no title — and the Assistant Commissioner may resume and restore it under s. 5 (s. 5(3) presumes a non-grantee holder took under a void transfer). 2. A clean RTC entry only raises a rebuttable fiscal presumption; it confers no title where the underlying transfer is void.

A — Analysis. 1. Name and kill the decoy. P’s clean RTC and long undisturbed possession look like good title — the planted trap. But if the land is granted SC/ST land sold in breach, the sale is void; a fiscal entry cannot cure a void transfer, and s. 5(3) actually presumes P’s possession is under a void transfer. 2. The decisive facts. Advise P that the risk turns on two questions: (i) was the land in fact granted to V as an SC person? and (ii) was the sale to P within the grant’s prohibition period (commonly 15 years)? If yes to both, P’s title is void and liable to resumption. If the sale was after the prohibition period expired and the grant did not bar alienation forever, the transfer is not void (Guntaiah vs Hambamma, 2005), and P’s title holds. 3. Delay. Even if it is granted land, resumption must be sought within a reasonable time (Nekkanti), so very stale claims against P may be barred by laches.

C — Conclusion. P’s title is precarious, not automatically safe. If the land was granted to an SC grantee and sold to P within the prohibition period, the sale is void and P can be dispossessed on resumption; only if the sale post-dated the prohibition period (or the claim is stale) is P’s title secure. The marketability warning is well founded and P should verify the grant’s terms before treating the title as clear.

Problem 8 — A landlord serves notice on a tenant to pay arrears within… (Unit 4)

Problem: A landlord serves notice on a tenant to pay arrears within the notice period; the tenant does not pay, and the landlord sues for eviction; during the case the tenant pleads readiness and willingness to pay. Decide.

I — Issue. Whether a tenant who defaulted in paying arrears and let the notice period expire must be evicted, when he pleads readiness and willingness to pay during the eviction proceeding.

R — Rule. 1. Under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, non-payment of rent for two consecutive years is a ground for eviction (s. 25) — but only after three months’ written notice stating the ground. 2. The Act builds in relief against forfeiture: the Tahsildar must not order possession if, during the pendency of the proceeding, the tenant pays the arrears for the two years together with costs within the time fixed.

A — Analysis. 1. Name and kill the decoy. The tenant’s default plus the expired notice make eviction look automatic — the planted trap. It is not: the statute keeps the door open until the proceeding ends. 2. Apply the rule. Because the eviction proceeding is still pending and the tenant has pleaded readiness and willingness and is able to clear the arrears with costs, the Tahsildar should give him that opportunity rather than evict. The Act favours the tiller who is willing to pay over the landlord seeking forfeiture. 3. Condition. The protection is not unconditional — the tenant must actually pay the arrears for the two years plus costs within the time the Tahsildar fixes; if he fails, eviction follows.

C — Conclusion. Eviction should be refused provided the tenant pays the arrears and costs within the time allowed. Having pleaded readiness and willingness during the pending proceeding, the defaulting-but-willing tenant is protected by the Act’s relief against forfeiture; the tenancy survives. — ## UNIT 5 — RERA: The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

Problem 9 — A couple, through a real estate agent, pay a Rs (Unit 5)

Problem: A couple, through a real estate agent, pay a Rs. 5 lakh advance to a developer for a site near the airport; even after two years the developer does not execute the sale deed. Advise.

I — Issue. What remedy the buyers have where a developer, two years after taking an advance, has neither executed the sale deed nor given possession — and whether the remedy lies in a civil suit or under RERA.

R — Rule. 1. Under s. 13, RERA, a promoter may not take an advance above 10% without a registered agreement for sale fixing the possession date. 2. Under s. 18, on the promoter’s failure to give possession by the agreed date, the allottee may withdraw and recover the entire amount with interest and compensation, or stay and claim interest for every month of delay (Karnataka: SBI MCLR + 2%, Rule 16). The remedy is a complaint to the Authority / adjudicating officer, and s. 79 bars the civil court (M/s Newtech, 2021).

A — Analysis. 1. Name and kill the decoy. The facts look like an ordinary breach of contract calling for a civil suit to recover money — the planted trap. But s. 79 ousts the civil court, and RERA supplies a faster, stronger remedy — refund with interest, not merely damages to be proved. 2. Apply the rule. The developer has failed to perform for two years, triggering s. 18: the couple may withdraw and demand their Rs. 5 lakh back with interest and compensation, or insist on the site and claim delay-interest. If the Rs. 5 lakh exceeded 10% with no registered agreement, that is a further s. 13 breach. 3. The agent. The registered agent who handled the deal is also answerable under ss. 9–10 if he misrepresented or dealt improperly.

C — Conclusion. Advise the couple to complain under RERA to the Authority / adjudicating officer and claim refund of the Rs. 5 lakh with interest under s. 18 (or delay-interest if they keep the site) — not to file an ordinary civil suit, which s. 79 bars.

Problem 10 — An allottee buys a site relying on the sanctioned layout plan… (Unit 5)

Problem: An allottee buys a site relying on the sanctioned layout plan and pays an advance; the promoter later makes a major deviation from the plan. The allottee wants to rescind and recover his money. Decide.

I — Issue. Whether an allottee who relied on the sanctioned layout plan may rescind and recover his advance where the promoter makes a major deviation from that plan without his consent.

R — Rule. 1. Under s. 14, RERA, the promoter must develop the project strictly per the sanctioned plans; he cannot alter a booked unit without that allottee’s consent, nor alter the building/common-area plans without the written consent of two-thirds of the allottees. Minor architectural changes are permitted on intimation, but a major deviation is not. 2. Read with s. 18, a breach entitling the allottee to withdraw lets him recover the entire amount with interest, by complaint to the Authority.

A — Analysis. 1. Name and kill the decoy. “Advance already paid / site already chosen” suggests the buyer is bound to accept whatever is built — the planted trap. The dividing line under s. 14 is consent: a major deviation made without the allottee’s consent is a breach the buyer need not tolerate. 2. Apply the rule. The change is a major deviation, not a permitted minor adjustment, and was made without the allottee’s consent — a clear breach of s. 14. Because the allottee relied on the sanctioned plan and no longer gets what he bargained for, he may rescind and recover his advance with interest under s. 18.

C — Conclusion. The allottee wins: the unconsented major deviation breaches s. 14, and he may rescind and recover his money with interest under s. 18 by complaining to the Authority — the advance already paid does not bind him to accept a materially different project. — End of Land Law Question Bank — 100-mark pattern.

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