Principle of Sympathy and Antipathy — Interpretation of Statutes Notes

Principle of Sympathy and Antipathy

Ask most people why an act is wrong and they will say “because I feel it is” — they approve what they like and condemn what they dislike, with no reason beyond the feeling itself. Bentham gave this a name: the principle of sympathy and antipathy, and he thought it the most dangerous of the false principles — because it dresses up mere caprice as a moral standard. It is the main rival he sets against utility.

What is the principle of sympathy and antipathy?

The principle of sympathy and antipathy is the principle which approves or disapproves of actions merely because one feels disposed to approve or disapprove of them — that is, according to one’s sympathy (liking) or antipathy (dislike) — without reference to any external standard such as their effect on happiness.

Its features:

  1. It is really no principle at all. Bentham says it is rather the negation of a principle than a principle: it offers no external ground for judgment — the feeling itself is treated as the reason. It is judgment by sentiment, not by a measurable standard.

  2. It is arbitrary and capricious. Because it rests on feeling, it varies from person to person and gives no consistent, checkable measure of right and wrong. Bentham links it to ipse-dixitism — the “I myself say so” style of judgment, where a person’s mere assertion of approval or disapproval stands in for a reason.

  3. It is dangerous in a legislator. A legislator guided by sympathy and antipathy would punish according to his own likes and dislikes rather than the real mischief of an act — leading to punishments that are excessive where he feels strong antipathy and too lenient where he feels sympathy. It substitutes prejudice for reason and is prone to cruelty.

  4. Why Bentham rejects it. It fails the test of utility: it does not ask whether an act increases or diminishes happiness, only whether one feels for or against it. Bentham dismisses it as no real standard — the very thing utility is meant to replace — though he notes it often coincides with utility by accident (we tend to dislike acts that are in fact harmful).

Relation to the arbitrary principle. The principle of sympathy and antipathy is the leading example of an arbitrary principle (Topic 8) — a principle that judges without a fixed external measure. The two topics are closely linked.

Bentham (sympathy and antipathy): “The principle of sympathy and antipathy is that principle which approves or disapproves of certain actions, not on account of their tending to augment the happiness … but merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them — holding up that approbation or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for itself.”

In Simple Terms: The principle of sympathy and antipathy judges acts by mere feeling — approving what you like, condemning what you dislike, with no reason beyond the feeling. Bentham calls it no real principle at all: it is arbitrary, capricious (“I say so”), and dangerous in a legislator, who would punish by prejudice instead of by the real mischief. He rejects it in favour of utility.

🧩 WORKED EXAMPLE — Punishing by feeling

Facts. A legislator proposes a very harsh punishment for an act he personally finds distasteful, though the act causes little actual harm to others.

Rule. The principle of sympathy and antipathy judges by feeling, not by effect on happiness; it is arbitrary and rejected as a standard for legislation.

Apply. The proposed severity reflects the legislator’s antipathy, not the real mischief of the act; measured by utility (the harm caused vs the pain of punishment), so harsh a penalty produces a net loss of happiness.

Conclusion. The proposal is rejected — punishment must be proportioned to the mischief on the utilitarian calculus, not to the legislator’s likes and dislikes.

flowchart TD
    ROOT["Principle of sympathy & antipathy"]:::root
    ROOT --> A["Approve/disapprove by mere FEELING"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> B["No external standard ('I say so' / ipse-dixitism)"]:::leaf
    A --> C["Arbitrary & capricious"]:::leaf
    B --> C
    C --> D["Dangerous in a legislator (punish by prejudice)"]:::leaf
    D --> E["Rejected in favour of utility"]:::leaf
    classDef root fill:#FFF8DC,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px,color:#000;
    classDef leaf fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
    linkStyle default stroke:#888,stroke-width:1px;

Key Points & Sources

  • It is “rather the negation of a principle” — judgment by feeling, not by an external measure.
  • Linked to ipse-dixitism (“I myself say so”) and to the arbitrary principle (Topic 8).
  • Rejected because it fails the test of utility; the standard exam task is to contrast it with utility.

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