10 Solved Problems (IRAC Method) — Environmental Law

These ten problems are worked in the IRAC method — Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion — the way a KSLU answer sheet expects; the full Question Bank has 40+ more.

Problem 1 — A State frames a scheme to deport pavement and slum dwellers… (Unit 2)

Problem: A State frames a scheme to deport pavement and slum dwellers from its cities to their villages to “improve the urban environment”. Advise the dwellers on a constitutional remedy.

I — Issue. Whether a State scheme to deport pavement and slum dwellers, framed as environmental improvement, violates the dwellers’ fundamental rights, and what constitutional remedy they have.

R — Rule. 1. The right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood, because to deprive a person of the means of living is to deprive him of life itself (Olga Tellis vs Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1986). 2. Any eviction must follow a fair procedure, and for the poor it must ordinarily offer alternative accommodation; a writ lies under Article 32 / 226.

A — Analysis. 1. The planted decoy is that the scheme “improves the environment”, making the eviction look lawful and even benevolent. But a genuine environmental purpose cannot by itself override Article 21. 2. Deporting the dwellers destroys the livelihood on which their lives depend, engaging the livelihood limb of Article 21. Because the scheme evicts them without fair procedure or alternative accommodation, it is arbitrary and unconstitutional. The dwellers may move the High Court under Article 226 (or the Supreme Court under Article 32) to quash the scheme and seek rehabilitation.

C — Conclusion. The scheme, as framed, is unconstitutional: it violates the right to livelihood under Article 21. The dwellers’ remedy is a writ under Article 226/32; the State may pursue environmental improvement only through a fair procedure that does not simply cast the poor onto the road.

Problem 2 — ‘A’ runs a licensed stone-crushing unit whose dust injures… (Unit 2)

Problem: ‘A’ runs a licensed stone-crushing unit whose dust injures residents, wildlife and crops. Under which constitutional provision can the residents seek relief?

I — Issue. Whether the residents can obtain relief against a licensed stone-crushing unit whose dust harms their health, and under which constitutional provision.

R — Rule. 1. The right to life under Article 21 includes the right to a clean and healthy environment and to pollution-free air and water (Subhash Kumar vs State of Bihar, 1991). 2. A licence to run an industry does not defeat the Article 21 right — the licence authorises the business, not the harm; the unit can be regulated or restrained by a writ under Article 32 / 226.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the licence, which makes the unit look lawful and immune. But a licence permits the trade, not the injury to residents’ health; it cannot license a violation of Article 21. 2. The dust injuring residents, wildlife and crops is exactly the “slow poisoning by a polluted atmosphere” that violates Article 21. The residents (or a public-spirited person by PIL) may petition the High Court under Article 226 or the Supreme Court under Article 32 for directions to control the dust, or closure if control fails.

C — Conclusion. The residents can seek relief under Article 21 by a writ under Article 226/32. The licence is no defence — the unit must control its dust or be shut down, because a licence to operate is not a licence to poison.

Problem 3 — A municipal corporation, bound to clean streets, drains and… (Unit 2)

Problem: A municipal corporation, bound to clean streets, drains and sewers, fails to do so; waste water collects, mosquitoes breed and disease spreads. Suggest a constitutional remedy for the residents.

I — Issue. Whether the residents have a constitutional remedy when a municipal corporation fails to perform its statutory sanitation duty, leaving conditions hazardous to health.

R — Rule. 1. The right to life under Article 21 includes the right to a healthy environment, which a defaulting public body’s inaction violates. 2. A citizen may enforce a public authority’s statutory sanitation duty by a writ of mandamus under Article 226 / 32 (Municipal Council, Ratlam vs Vardhichand, 1980).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is that this reads as a mere drainage or negligence (tort) complaint. In truth it is a constitutional matter: the corporation’s failure endangers the residents’ health and so their life under Article 21. 2. The corporation is under a statutory duty to clean streets, drains and sewers. Its failure is precisely the default the Supreme Court compelled in Ratlam, where the Court ordered the municipality to build drains and perform its duty. The residents may seek a writ of mandamus directing the corporation to abate the nuisance and provide proper sanitation.

C — Conclusion. The remedy is a constitutional writ of mandamus under Article 226/32 compelling the municipality to perform its sanitation duty. The “ordinary tort” framing is the decoy — the defaulting municipality can be commanded by the court to act.

Problem 4 — A city corporation fails to clean the city and provide… (Unit 2)

Problem: A city corporation fails to clean the city and provide sanitation, pleading that it has no money and staff; residents suffer. Can it take that plea, and what is its duty? Advise.

I — Issue. Whether a municipal corporation can escape its statutory sanitation duty by pleading financial inability, and what remedy the residents have.

R — Rule. 1. The right to a healthy environment under Article 21 obliges a municipality to perform its sanitation duty, enforceable by mandamus. 2. A municipality’s financial inability is no defence to that duty (Municipal Council, Ratlam vs Vardhichand, 1980); the court will compel it to act and to find the resources.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the plea that “no money” excuses the default, making the failure look unavoidable. The Supreme Court squarely rejected this in Ratlam: a statutory duty to protect public health cannot be defeated by a plea of poverty or want of staff. 2. The corporation’s failure endangers the residents’ health and so their Article 21 right. It cannot hide behind its budget; it must reorder its priorities and perform the duty. The residents may seek a writ of mandamus directing it to do so within a time frame.

C — Conclusion. The corporation cannot take the “no money” plea. Its duty is enforceable, and the residents’ remedy is a writ of mandamus under Article 226/32. Financial inability is the planted decoy that Ratlam has firmly shut out.

Problem 5 — A fertilizer plant discharges sludge into the soil and water… (Unit 2)

Problem: A fertilizer plant discharges sludge into the soil and water of a village, spreading disease among the residents. Suggest the remedies available under the Constitution.

I — Issue. Whether the villagers have a constitutional remedy against a fertilizer plant whose sludge poisons their soil and water and spreads disease.

R — Rule. 1. The right to life under Article 21 includes the right to pollution-free water and air (Subhash Kumar vs State of Bihar, 1991); a citizen may move the court to stop pollution. 2. The court may issue writs under Article 32 / 226 directing control, closure and compensation, and apply polluter-pays to make the industry fund restoration.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is that this looks like an ordinary common-law nuisance claim between neighbours. Framed constitutionally, it is a violation of the villagers’ Article 21 right to a healthy environment by industrial pollution. 2. The sludge poisoning soil and water and spreading disease directly threatens the villagers’ health and life. They (or a public-spirited petitioner by PIL) may seek a writ directing the plant to stop the discharge, install treatment, or close, and to pay compensation and the cost of restoring the environment under the polluter-pays principle.

C — Conclusion. The villagers’ remedy is a constitutional writ under Article 21 (Article 226/32) for directions, closure and compensation, with the plant made to bear the restoration cost. The “mere private nuisance” reading is the decoy — this is a constitutional environmental wrong.

Problem 6 — A sugar factory stores 8,000 tonnes of molasses in a mud tank… (Unit 3)

Problem: A sugar factory stores 8,000 tonnes of molasses in a mud tank near a neighbour’s land; rodents burrow into it, the tank collapses and floods the land, ruining the crop. Can the neighbour claim compensation?

I — Issue. Whether the factory is liable for the crop damage caused when the molasses escaped, and whether the rodents’ burrowing excuses it.

R — Rule. 1. Under Rylands vs Fletcher (1868), a person who for his own purposes brings onto his land and keeps there a dangerous thing likely to do mischief if it escapes is strictly liable — without proof of fault — if it escapes and causes damage. The three essentials are a dangerous thing, an escape, and a non-natural use of land. 2. The rule allows exceptions — act of God, act of a stranger, plaintiff’s default or consent, and statutory authority — but each must be genuinely made out.

A — Analysis. 1. All three essentials are present: 8,000 tonnes of molasses in bulk is a dangerous thing, storing it in a mere mud tank is a non-natural use, and it escaped onto the neighbour’s land. 2. The planted decoy is that the rodents caused the escape, dressing it as an “act of God” or “act of a stranger”. This fails: rats burrowing into a food-based store are a foreseeable, ordinary hazard, not an unforeseeable event; a prudent occupier should have built a tank that resists them. The exception does not apply.

C — Conclusion. The factory is strictly liable under Rylands vs Fletcher; the neighbour recovers compensation for the ruined paddy and sugarcane. The “rodents did it” fact is a decoy that does not meet the strict test for an exception.

Problem 7 — A person builds a new baking oven with a tall chimney (Unit 3)

Problem: A person builds a new baking oven with a tall chimney; a neighbour, fearing the smoke and smell once the bakery opens, seeks an injunction to restrain it before it starts. Will he succeed?

I — Issue. Whether an injunction lies to restrain a lawful business before it has begun, on the neighbour’s fear that it will cause a nuisance.

R — Rule. 1. A private nuisance is an unlawful, substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land; the remedy is damages or an injunction. 2. A quia timet injunction [Latin: “because he fears”] restrains a feared future nuisance, but the court grants it only on proof of an imminent and substantial threat of harm; a mere apprehension that a lawful business might one day cause a nuisance is not enough.

A — Analysis. 1. The nuisance has not yet happened — the bakery has not even opened, and there is no evidence of actual, substantial interference. 2. The neighbour offers only apprehension. That is the planted decoy: a quia timet injunction cannot rest on fear that a lawful trade may become a nuisance; the harm must be shown to be imminent and substantial.

C — Conclusion. The neighbour will not succeed on the facts as framed. His remedy arises only if and when the bakery, once operating, actually causes a substantial nuisance — then he may sue for damages or an injunction.

Problem 8 — ‘X’ is found in possession of chinkara skins meant for sale,… (Unit 4)

Problem: ‘X’ is found in possession of chinkara skins meant for sale, without a licence (the skins being described as “lion-shaped”). Decide his liability.

I — Issue. Whether possessing chinkara skins meant for sale, without a licence, is an offence under the WLPA, and whether the “lion-shaped” description matters.

R — Rule. 1. Under the WLPA, every hunted wild animal and animal article is the property of the Government (s. 39); a possessor must declare it (s. 40); no one may be a dealer in animal articles without a licence (s. 44); and none may buy from an unlicensed dealer (s. 49). 2. The chinkara is a protected (Schedule I) animal, and the offence turns on the animal, not the article’s shape or description (Pyarelal vs State, 1995).

A — Analysis. 1. The planted decoy is the “lion-shaped” description — a red herring inviting the argument that the article is not a protected-animal skin. It fails: the skins are chinkara, a protected animal, whatever shape they are cut into. 2. ‘X’ holds protected-animal articles meant for sale with no dealer licence — squarely an offence under ss. 44 and 49, aggravated by his failure to declare under s. 40.

C — Conclusion. ‘X’ is guilty of the trade offence under the WLPA; the chinkara articles vest in the Government (s. 39), and he is liable to the penalty under s. 51. The “lion-shaped” description is a decoy that does not save him.

Problem 9 — ‘X’ is in possession of snake skins and crocodile (or tiger)… (Unit 4)

Problem: ‘X’ is in possession of snake skins and crocodile (or tiger) skins that he wants to export, with no valid licence. Under which provisions is he guilty? Decide.

I — Issue. Under which provisions ‘X’ is guilty for holding snake and crocodile/tiger skins for export without a valid licence.

R — Rule. 1. Trade in wild-animal articles requires a dealer licence (s. 44); hunted animals and their articles are Government property (s. 39) and must be declared (s. 40); purchase from an unlicensed dealer is barred (s. 49). 2. Chapter V-A imposes a total ban on trade in articles from Schedule I and Part II of Schedule II animals (snake, crocodile and tiger are protected), so no licence for such trade can even be granted.

A — Analysis. 1. The planted decoy is that export is a mere commercial/customs-licence matter. It is not: the skins are protected-animal articles, and trading or exporting them without a WLPA licence — indeed, where Chapter V-A applies, at all — is an offence. 2. ‘X’ holds protected skins for export with no valid licence, breaching ss. 44 and 49 (and the Chapter V-A ban where the animal is Schedule I). Where the article is tiger skin, the offence is graver still, tiger being a Schedule I animal.

C — Conclusion. ‘X’ is guilty under ss. 39, 40, 44 and 49 (read with the Chapter V-A total ban), punishable under s. 51; the skins vest in the Government. An export or commercial licence is no defence to the WLPA offence.

Problem 10 — An industry runs shrimp culture in a coastal area, turning… (Unit 5)

Problem: An industry runs shrimp culture in a coastal area, turning the soil and drinking water saline and harming local flora and fauna. Suggest the remedies available under the law.

I — Issue. Whether intensive shrimp culture on the coast, causing salination and ecological harm, is a lawful coastal industry, and what remedies the affected residents have.

R — Rule. 1. The CRZ Notification, 1991 (issued under s. 3 of the EPA) prohibits new industry and hazardous activity within 500 m of the High Tide Line; an industry is exempt only if it genuinely needs the foreshore. 2. In S. Jagannath vs Union of India (1997) the Supreme Court held modern coastal shrimp aquaculture per se hazardous and prohibited within the CRZ, ordered such farms demolished, and applied the precautionary and polluter-pays principles.

A — Analysis. 1. The planted decoy is that shrimp farming looks like a legitimate coastal agri-business that belongs by the sea. It is not: shrimp aquaculture does not need the foreshore (brackish water can be piped inland), so it enjoys no exemption and, sited in the CRZ, is prohibited. 2. The salination of soil and drinking water and the harm to flora and fauna trigger the precautionary principle, and under polluter-pays the owner must pay both the villagers’ losses and the cost of restoring the coast.

C — Conclusion. The aquaculture is barred by the CRZ Notification and S. Jagannath — not a lawful coastal industry. The remedy is an order closing/demolishing the farm, plus compensation and environmental restoration under polluter-pays; an authority under EPA s. 3(3) may be constituted to police the coast. Residents may move the High Court/NGT or the coastal authority.

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