10 Solved Problems (IRAC Method) — BNSS (Criminal Law II)

These ten problems are worked in the IRAC method — Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion — the way a KSLU answer sheet expects; the full Question Bank has 40+ more.

Problem 1 — An investigating officer pursues an offender whom he may… (Unit 1)

Problem: An investigating officer pursues an offender whom he may arrest without a warrant. The offender pushes him and escapes, and the officer arrests him just outside his own police-station circle. Is the arrest legal?

I — Issue. Is an arrest made outside the officer’s own police-station limits, in hot pursuit of an offender he was entitled to arrest without warrant, a legal arrest?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.45 BNSS [s.48 CrPC] a police officer may pursue and arrest an offender anywhere in India; territorial police boundaries do not confine the power of pursuit. 2. Under s.35 the officer may arrest without warrant a person concerned in a cognizable offence, and one who obstructs an officer or escapes from custody is himself liable to arrest.

A — Analysis. 1. The officer was lawfully entitled to arrest the offender without a warrant, so the pursuit began from a lawful base. 2. When the offender pushed him and fled, the officer continued in hot pursuit and completed the arrest just beyond his own circle. Section 45 expressly authorises exactly this — the power to arrest follows the offender across police boundaries anywhere in the country. 3. The decoy is that the officer “acted beyond his territorial limits”. But the territorial division of police stations governs the allocation of work, not the validity of an arrest made in pursuit; nothing in the Sanhita voids an arrest for having crossed a station boundary.

C — Conclusion. The arrest is legal. The officer’s power to arrest an offender he was pursuing extended across his station limits under s.45, and the crossing of the boundary neither weakens the arrest nor gives the offender any ground for release.

Problem 2 — An arrested person is produced before the Magistrate after 24… (Unit 1)

Problem: An arrested person is produced before the Magistrate after 24 hours and seeks release on the ground that the delay made his custody illegal. Advise.

I — Issue. Does production beyond 24 hours render the custody illegal in a way that entitles the arrested person to be released?

R — Rule. 1. Section 58 BNSS [s.57 CrPC] and Art. 22(2) forbid detention in police custody beyond 24 hours (excluding journey time) without a Magistrate’s order under s.187. 2. Breach of the rule makes the officer personally liable for illegal detention and can found a habeas corpus petition and a claim for compensation.

A — Analysis. 1. Production after 24 hours plainly breaches s.58; the custody up to the moment of production was unlawful, and the officer answers for it departmentally and in damages. 2. The decoy is the assumption that an illegal detention automatically entitles the accused to walk free. It does not. Once the accused is produced, the Magistrate acquires jurisdiction and may lawfully remand him under s.187; the earlier illegality attaches to the officer’s conduct, not to the Magistrate’s fresh, independent order. 3. The remedy for the breach is therefore against the officer (and for any compensation), not the release of an otherwise validly remanded accused.

C — Conclusion. The detention up to production was illegal and the officer is liable, but the accused is not entitled to release merely on that ground; the subsequent judicial remand is valid and stands.

Problem 3 — A court issues a proclamation against absconder D without… (Unit 1)

Problem: A court issues a proclamation against absconder D without stating the time and place at which he must appear, and then proceeds to sell his movable (non-perishable) property. Is the proclamation and the sale valid?

I — Issue. Is a proclamation that omits the time and place of appearance valid, and may the court immediately sell the absconder’s non-perishable property?

R — Rule. 1. Section 84 BNSS [s.82 CrPC] requires the proclamation to specify a place and time of appearance not less than 30 days away; these particulars are mandatory, and a proclamation lacking them is void. 2. Section 85 [s.83 CrPC] allows immediate sale only of perishable property or livestock; other property may be sold only after six months from the attachment.

A — Analysis. 1. The proclamation here omits the specified time and place and so fails the mandatory requirements of s.84 — it is void, and every step founded on it, including the attachment, collapses with it. 2. Even a valid proclamation could not justify what the court did next. The property is movable and non-perishable, so s.85 forbids its sale for six months; an immediate sale is unlawful independently of the proclamation’s defect. 3. The decoy is that D’s absconding is admitted, making the proceedings look regular. But the absconding does not cure procedural defects — the whole point of the safeguards is to protect even a genuine absconder’s property from arbitrary loss.

C — Conclusion. Both the proclamation and the sale are bad in law: the proclamation is void for omitting the mandatory place and time, and the sale is void for pre-empting the six-month protection on non-perishable property. D’s admitted absconding is no answer to either defect.

Problem 4 — An Assistant Sessions Judge convicts the accused and… (Unit 1)

Problem: An Assistant Sessions Judge convicts the accused and sentences him to 7 years’ rigorous imprisonment. The accused contends the judge had no power to pass such a sentence. Decide.

I — Issue. Does an Assistant Sessions Judge have the power to sentence an accused to 7 years’ RI?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.23(2) BNSS [s.28(3) CrPC], an Assistant Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law except a sentence of death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term exceeding 10 years. 2. A court may pass only the sentence its class is empowered to pass; an excess is illegal (State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, 1953).

A — Analysis. 1. The sentence imposed is 7 years’ RI. This is neither death nor life imprisonment, and it is well below the 10-year ceiling fixed by s.23(2). 2. The sentence therefore falls squarely within the Assistant Sessions Judge’s competence. 3. The decoy is the junior-sounding title “Assistant”, which tempts the guess that such a judge cannot pass a long term. In fact only sentences above 10 years (and death or life) are beyond his reach — a CJM, by contrast, is capped at 7 years and a JMFC at 3.

C — Conclusion. The sentence of 7 years’ RI is valid; it is within the Assistant Sessions Judge’s power under s.23(2), the accused’s objection being founded only on the misleading seniority of the post’s name.

Problem 5 — A sees B beaten by a group (Unit 2)

Problem: A sees B beaten by a group; the next day A (a stranger, not the victim) files a complaint naming the persons. Can the court take cognizance?

I — Issue. Can a Magistrate take cognizance of an offence on the complaint of a stranger who is not the victim?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.210 BNSS [s.190 CrPC], a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence on a complaint of facts constituting it, made by any person. 2. Cognizance is taken of the offence, not the offender; the identity or interest of the complainant is generally irrelevant, except for the complaint-only offences of ss.215–222.

A — Analysis. 1. The offence alleged is assault / causing hurt, which is not one of the complaint-only offences reserved for a specified complainant. 2. Because cognizance is of the offence, A’s status as a stranger rather than the victim does not bar the court; anyone may set the criminal law in motion for such an offence. 3. The decoy is the assumption that only the victim (B) may complain. That is true only for defamation, marriage offences and public-justice offences — not for assault. 4. The Magistrate will, of course, examine A on oath under s.223 and satisfy himself there is sufficient ground before issuing process.

C — Conclusion. The Magistrate may take cognizance on A’s complaint. Cognizance is of the offence, not the offender, and assault is not a complaint-only offence, so a stranger’s complaint is competent.

Problem: Police recommend discharge of a high officer; the Magistrate discharges him without hearing the complainant and without reasons. Is this proper?

I — Issue. May a Magistrate accept a police report recommending discharge and drop the case without hearing the informant and without recording reasons?

R — Rule. 1. On a negative police report, the Magistrate is not bound by the police opinion; he must apply his own mind to the material. 2. He must give the informant/complainant notice and an opportunity to be heard before accepting a closure, and must record reasons for his decision (the same reasoning that underlies s.226).

A — Analysis. 1. The Magistrate here simply accepted the police recommendation to discharge a high officer, without independent application of mind. 2. He failed to give the complainant a hearing on the negative report and recorded no reasons — both mandatory safeguards designed to prevent the quiet burial of a genuine case, especially against an influential accused. 3. The decoy is that the Magistrate was “only accepting the police report” — but accepting a closure is itself a judicial act requiring notice and reasons.

C — Conclusion. The discharge is improper and liable to be set aside. The Magistrate must give the complainant notice, apply his own mind to the material, and record reasons before accepting or rejecting the negative report.

Problem 7 — At one trial the accused is convicted of three offences… (Unit 3)

Problem: At one trial the accused is convicted of three offences carrying 3, 2 and 5 years. Can the sentences run consecutively?

I — Issue. Where an accused is convicted at one trial of three offences carrying 3, 2 and 5 years, do the sentences run consecutively as a matter of course?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.25 BNSS [s.31 CrPC], where a person is convicted at one trial of several offences, the court may impose the several sentences; they run consecutively only if the court so directs, and the court may instead direct that they run concurrently. 2. The aggregate of consecutive sentences a Magistrate may impose is capped (not exceeding twice his single-offence competence, and, in a Magistrate’s court, not exceeding fourteen years).

A — Analysis. 1. The three terms do not stack automatically. If the court directs concurrent running, the accused serves only the longest — 5 years. 2. If the court directs consecutive running, the terms are served one after another (3 + 2 + 5), subject to the statutory aggregate cap where a Magistrate passes them. 3. The decoy is the assumption that consecutive running is automatic and the terms simply add up to ten years. Section 25 requires an express direction, and where the offences arise from a single transaction the courts lean towards concurrent running (Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Assistant Collector of Customs, 1988).

C — Conclusion. Consecutive running is not automatic. The sentences run consecutively only if the court so directs; absent such a direction, or where the court directs concurrency, the accused serves the longest term (5 years) — and any consecutive aggregate is subject to the s.25 cap.

Problem 8 — A and B are sentenced to imprisonment and fine (Unit 3)

Problem: A and B are sentenced to imprisonment and fine; both appeal; B dies pending the appeal. B’s near relative wants to set aside B’s conviction and recover the fine. Can he continue the appeal?

I — Issue. Does an appeal abate absolutely on the death of the appellant, or may a near relative continue it where the sentence included a fine?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.435 BNSS [s.394 CrPC], every appeal abates on the death of the accused-appellant — except an appeal against a sentence of fine, which survives because the fine is a charge on the deceased’s estate. 2. For an appeal against a conviction carrying imprisonment or death, a near relative may apply within thirty days for leave to continue it.

A — Analysis. 1. B’s sentence included both imprisonment and a fine. The imprisonment-related appeal would ordinarily abate on death — but a near relative may seek leave to continue it under the proviso. 2. Crucially, insofar as the appeal challenges the fine, it does not abate at all: the fine burdens B’s estate, and setting aside the conviction would relieve the estate of it. 3. The decoy is the assumption that death absolutely abates the appeal. Section 435 expressly preserves the appeal against a fine and permits a near relative to continue the rest with leave.

C — Conclusion. The appeal does not wholly abate. B’s near relative may continue it — as of right insofar as it attacks the fine (a charge on the estate), and with leave insofar as it attacks the conviction and imprisonment.

Problem 9 — A Sessions Court convicts A but does not announce the… (Unit 4)

Problem: A Sessions Court convicts A but does not announce the sentence, and the judge then ceases to hold office. Is the judgment complete?

I — Issue. Is a judgment complete where the court convicts A but never pronounces the sentence, and the judge then ceases to hold office?

R — Rule. 1. Under s.392 BNSS [s.353 CrPC], a judgment is complete only when pronounced in open court, and the sentence is an essential part of it (s.393). 2. An unpronounced judgment is a nullity, and a successor judge cannot simply sign and pronounce a predecessor’s unpronounced conviction (Surendra Singh v. State of U.P., 1954).

A — Analysis. 1. Here the sentence was never pronounced, so the judgment lacks an essential component and is incomplete; a conviction without a pronounced sentence has no legal life. 2. Because the judge has ceased to hold office, he cannot now pronounce it, and the successor cannot merely sign and deliver the predecessor’s unpronounced conviction as his own. 3. The decoy is that the conviction “looks final”. It is not — pronouncement in open court, including of the sentence, is what gives a judgment effect.

C — Conclusion. The judgment is not complete. As the sentence was never pronounced and the judge has demitted office, the matter must be reheard on sentence (and, if necessary, concluded afresh); a successor cannot complete the predecessor’s unpronounced judgment.

Problem 10 — A person sentenced to death over two years ago seeks… (Unit 4)

Problem: A person sentenced to death over two years ago seeks commutation to life on the ground of the delay in executing the sentence. Decide.

I — Issue. Does delay in executing a death sentence entitle the convict to commutation to life?

R — Rule. 1. Inordinate and unexplained delay in executing a death sentence can be a ground to commute it to life imprisonment (Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, 1988; Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, 2014). 2. But the delay must be prolonged and unexplained — not merely some lapse of time — and the court examines whose fault the delay was.

A — Analysis. 1. The convict relies on a delay of “over two years”. Delay is a recognised ground, but it is not automatic: the court must find the delay inordinate and unexplained, and attributable to the State rather than the convict’s own repeated petitions. 2. If the two years’ delay is shown to be inordinate and unexplained, commutation follows; if the time was consumed by the convict’s own appeals and mercy petitions, or is not shown to be excessive, the death sentence stands. 3. The decoy is treating any delay as automatically fatal to the sentence.

C — Conclusion. Commutation follows only if the delay is shown to be inordinate and unexplained (Triveniben, 1988). A bare “two years” is not, by itself, a ground; the court must assess the length, cause and responsibility for the delay before commuting.

📄 Full BNSS (Criminal Law II) notes + Question Bank (₹199) — the complete study notes plus 40+ more solved problems and 16-mark essay blueprints. Get the bundle · All BNSS (Criminal Law II) topics · Past Questions