10 Solved Problems (IRAC Method) — Muslim Law (Family Law II)

These ten problems are worked in the IRAC method — Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion — the way a KSLU answer sheet expects. They span all five units; the full Question Bank has 40+ more.

Problem 1 — The Fifth Wife (Unit I)

Problem: A Muslim man already having four wives marries a fifth wife. Is the fifth marriage valid?

I — Issue. Is a Muslim man’s fifth simultaneous marriage void (batil), or only irregular (fasid)?

R — Rule. 1. A Sunni Muslim man may lawfully have up to four wives at one time; a fifth simultaneous marriage breaks the number rule and is an unlawful conjunction of number. 2. A defect that is curable and temporary makes a marriage irregular (fasid), not void; only a permanent, absolute bar makes a marriage void. The number-bar is curable, so a fifth marriage is fasid (Topic 10).

A — Analysis. 1. The tempting error is to call the fifth marriage void — it is not. The bar is not permanent, because the man can divorce one of his four existing wives, whereupon the fifth marriage at once becomes valid. 2. Since the defect can be removed in this way, the fifth marriage is irregular (fasid). Its consequences follow the fasid rules — if consummated, the wife takes dower and any children are legitimate, though there is no mutual inheritance until the defect is cured.

C — Conclusion. The fifth marriage is irregular (fasid), not void. If the man divorces one of his four existing wives, the fifth marriage becomes fully valid.

Problem 2 — The Husband Who Converted (Unit I)

Problem: A Muslim husband converts to Hinduism; his wife then marries another man. Is she guilty of bigamy?

I — Issue. Is the wife guilty of bigamy when she remarries after her Muslim husband has converted to Hinduism?

R — Rule. 1. Apostasy by the husband — his renunciation of Islam — dissolves the Muslim marriage instantly, by operation of law and without any decree (Topic 5). 2. The offence of bigamy requires a subsisting prior marriage at the date of the second marriage; if the first marriage has already ended, an essential ingredient of the offence is missing.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is that the husband’s conversion looks like his problem; in law its real effect is to free the wife. The very moment he apostatised, the marriage stood dissolved. 2. When the wife remarried there was therefore no subsisting marriage in existence, so her second marriage cannot be bigamous, however soon after the conversion it took place. 3. Note the contrast with Sarla Mudgal (1995): there a Hindu husband converted to Islam to take a second wife, and his first marriage subsisted, so the second was bigamous. Here a Muslim husband converts out of Islam, which under Muslim law dissolves the marriage — the opposite result.

C — Conclusion. The wife is not guilty of bigamy. Her husband’s apostasy dissolved the marriage at once, so she was a free woman when she remarried.

Problem 3 — Acknowledging the Brother’s Son (Unit II)

Problem: M, childless, acknowledges N — the son of M’s brother — as his legitimate son; M’s wife never objects; on M’s death N claims a share. Advise.

I — Issue. Is M’s acknowledgement of N valid, so that N inherits, where N’s real parentage is known (he is the son of M’s brother)?

R — Rule. 1. Acknowledgement of paternity operates only where the child’s paternity is uncertain; it cannot override a known parentage (Topic 1). 2. The acknowledger must also intend to acknowledge the child as legitimate and the child must be one who could lawfully be his; where the true father is known, no lawful marriage with the child’s mother can be presumed.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the wife’s silence — her failure to object looks like consent. But consent cannot cure a known parentage; acknowledgement is a rule of evidence, not a power to adopt. 2. Here N’s father is known to be M’s brother, so paternity is not uncertain. The very foundation of a valid acknowledgement is missing, and M’s declaration is, in truth, an attempt at adoption, which Muslim law does not recognise.

C — Conclusion. The acknowledgement is invalid. N is not M’s legitimate son and takes no share in M’s estate; the wife’s silence is irrelevant.

Problem 4 — Maintenance After Divorce (Unit II)

Problem: H divorces his wife W; W now needs maintenance. Advise her.

I — Issue. What maintenance can W, a divorced Muslim woman with no means, claim, and against whom?

R — Rule. 1. Under section 3 of the MWPRDA 1986, read in Danial Latifi v Union of India (2001), the former husband must make, within the iddat period, a reasonable and fair provision for W’s whole future, plus her mahr and the return of her properties. 2. Under section 4, if she remains unable to maintain herself after iddat, the Magistrate may order her relatives who would inherit from her, or failing them the State Wakf Board, to maintain her; and under Shah Bano / Shabana Bano (2010) she may alternatively claim under section 125 CrPC.

A — Analysis. 1. W may first demand from H a fair future provision + mahr within iddat; the provision is not confined to the iddat days but must secure her future (Danial Latifi). 2. If H’s provision is inadequate or unpaid, W may move under s.125 CrPC; and if H cannot pay and she is still destitute after iddat, s.4 routes her claim to her relatives or the Wakf Board.

C — Conclusion. W is not limited to iddat-days maintenance. She is entitled to a fair provision for her future (with mahr) from H within iddat, retains the s.125 CrPC option, and has a statutory fallback against her relatives or the Wakf Board under s.4.

Problem 5 — The Registered Gift-Deed Without Possession (Unit III)

Problem: A donor executes a registered gift-deed of his house to the donee, but never delivers possession. Is the gift valid?

I — Issue. Is a hiba valid where the gift-deed is duly registered but the donor never delivers possession to the donee?

R — Rule. 1. A hiba is complete only on delivery of possession (qabza); without it the gift is incomplete and void, however formal the deed. Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 leaves Muslim gifts to Muslim law, so registration cannot substitute for delivery. 2. Katheessa Umma v Narayanath Kunhamu (1964) confirms that delivery of possession is essential to complete a hiba.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the registered deed, which looks decisive; it is not, because Muslim law asks a different question — did possession pass? 2. Here declaration and acceptance exist, but possession never passed to the donee, so the third and crucial essential is missing and the gift remains incomplete. The registered deed proves only the donor’s intention, not the completed act of giving, so it cannot save the gift.

C — Conclusion. The gift is incomplete and invalid; the donee takes nothing despite the registered deed. To perfect the gift the donor would have to deliver possession of the house.

Problem 6 — A Bequest to a Stranger Beyond One-Third (Unit III)

Problem: A Mohammedan bequeaths his entire property to a neighbour (a non-heir). Is the will valid?

I — Issue. Is a Muslim’s will bequeathing his entire property to a neighbour (a non-heir) valid?

R — Rule. 1. A bequest to a non-heir (stranger) is valid only up to the bequeathable one-third of the net estate; the excess is valid only if the other heirs consent after the testator’s death (Abdul Manan Khan v Mst. Murtuza Khan (1991)). 2. The rule exists to protect the heirs’ guaranteed Quranic shares, which a will cannot be used to defeat.

A — Analysis. 1. The neighbour is a stranger, so the bequest is automatically good up to one-third; the remaining two-thirds passes to him only if the heirs consent after the testator’s death. 2. If the heirs do not consent, the excess two-thirds fails and devolves on the heirs by intestate succession. The heirs’ consent, to be effective, must be given after the testator’s death; a consent given in his lifetime may be retracted and does not bind them.

C — Conclusion. The will is valid as to one-third of the estate; the other two-thirds fails unless the heirs consent after the testator’s death, in which case it passes to the neighbour, and otherwise goes to the heirs by intestate succession.

Problem 7 — A Sunni Woman’s Heirs (Unit IV)

Problem: A Sunni woman dies leaving her husband, mother and two daughters. Distribute her estate.

I — Issue. How is the estate of a Sunni woman distributed among her husband, mother and two daughters?

R — Rule. 1. As sharers: a husband with children takes 1/4; a mother with children takes 1/6; two or more daughters take 2/3 between them (Topic 1). 2. Where the fixed shares add up to more than one, the doctrine of Aul applies — all shares are proportionately reduced by raising the common denominator.

A — Analysis. 1. The shares are 1/4 + 1/6 + 2/3. On a common denominator of 12: 3/12 + 2/12 + 8/12 = 13/12, which exceeds one. 2. By Aul, the denominator is raised from 12 to 13: husband 3/13, mother 2/13, the two daughters 8/13 between them (4/13 each). There is no residuary (no son), so the reduction falls on all the sharers alike. 3. As a check, the reduced fractions 3/13 + 2/13 + 8/13 sum to exactly 13/13 = 1, confirming the whole estate is distributed. The husband takes 1/4 (not 1/2) and no one takes a residue because there is no son — the very combination that produces over-subscription and triggers Aul.

C — Conclusion. By the doctrine of Aul, the estate divides: husband 3/13, mother 2/13, and each daughter 4/13 (8/13 together). This is the classic Aul illustration.

Problem 8 — Distributing a Hanafi’s Estate (Unit IV)

Problem: A Hanafi dies leaving a wife, a daughter and a son. Distribute the estate.

I — Issue. How is the estate distributed among a wife, a daughter and a son?

R — Rule. 1. A wife with children takes 1/8 as a sharer (Topic 1). 2. The son converts the daughter into a residuary; together they take the residue in the ratio 2:1.

A — Analysis. 1. The wife takes 1/8, leaving a residue of 7/8. 2. The residue (7/8) is divided between son and daughter 2:1: the son takes two-thirds of 7/8 = 14/24 (7/12) and the daughter one-third = 7/24. 3. As a check, 3/24 (wife) + 14/24 (son) + 7/24 (daughter) = 24/24 = 1. The wife takes 1/8, not 1/4, precisely because children survive; and because a son is present there is no sharer’s portion for the daughter — she takes only through the residue, at half the son’s rate, so no question of Aul arises. The order of distribution is observed throughout — funeral expenses, debts and any legacies (up to one-third) come out first, and only the net estate is divided in these fractions.

C — Conclusion. The estate divides: wife 3/24 (1/8), son 14/24 (7/12), and daughter 7/24 — the son taking twice the daughter’s share out of the residue.

Problem 9 — An Indian Christian Dies Intestate (Unit IV)

Problem: An Indian Christian dies intestate leaving two sons and his father. Distribute the estate.

I — Issue. On the intestacy of an Indian Christian leaving two sons and his father, does the father take a share?

R — Rule. 1. Under the ISA (ss.31–49), lineal descendants exclude the intestate’s father and other kindred; the descendants take the whole estate. 2. Children take equally, sons and daughters alike (Topic 4).

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is the surviving father, who tempts a share — but the Act excludes him where children survive. 2. The two sons, being lineal descendants, take the whole estate equally between them. 3. There being no spouse, the descendants take the whole estate (the one-third/two-thirds split applies only where a widow or widower also survives). With two sons and no other qualifying heir, the estate divides into two equal halves. This exclusion of the father surprises students used to parents inheriting, but it is the settled ISA rule: lineal descendants take in priority to ascendants and kindred. The father would take a share only if the intestate had died leaving no lineal descendant at all, in which case the kindred would inherit.

C — Conclusion. Each son takes one-half of the estate; the father takes nothing, being excluded by the lineal descendants.

Problem 10 — A Will Revoked by a Later Marriage (Unit V)

Problem: R (a Christian) bequeaths his whole property to X, then marries X; R dies six months later. R’s parents claim shares while X relies on the will. Advise.

I — Issue. Does R’s subsequent marriage to X strengthen X’s claim under the will, or does it revoke the will?

R — Rule. 1. Under section 69 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, every will is revoked by the marriage of its maker (except a will made in exercise of a power of appointment). The rule applies to those the Act governs — here a Christian testator (Topic 3). 2. Once a will is revoked it has no effect; the estate then passes by intestate succession under the ISA.

A — Analysis. 1. The decoy is that the marriage looks as though it strengthens X’s position — she is now the widow and the sole beneficiary named. In law it does the opposite: R made the will and then married X, and that marriage revoked the will under s.69. 2. The will being revoked, nothing passes under it; R is treated as having died intestate. His estate therefore devolves by the ISA’s intestacy rules, under which his widow (X) and his parents take the shares the Act allots — so the parents do have a valid claim, and X cannot take the whole estate under the will.

C — Conclusion. X cannot take under the will, which was revoked by R’s subsequent marriage (s.69). R died intestate; the estate passes by intestate succession, so R’s parents are entitled to their shares alongside the widow, and X takes only her intestate share, not the whole property.

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