10 Solved Problems (IRAC Method) — Constitutional Law I

Ten worked fact-pattern answers spanning all five units, written in the IRAC format (Issue → Rule → Analysis → Conclusion) that KSLU answer sheets expect. Each shows how to spot the “decoy,” apply the leading case, and reach the conclusion.

Problem 1 — Can a foreigner compel the Government to grant citizenship? (Unit I)

Problem: A person came to India in 1938, went abroad on pilgrimage in 1945, was later registered as a foreigner and had his stay repeatedly extended, then refused in 1957. He seeks a direction compelling the Government to grant him citizenship.

I — Issue. Whether a foreigner has an enforceable right to be granted Indian citizenship.

R — Rule. Citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution turns on domicile + one of the residence/birth conditions in Article 5; thereafter it is governed by the Citizenship Act, 1955. Grant of citizenship by registration or naturalisation is discretionary — there is no fundamental or legal right to be granted citizenship.

A — Analysis. The petitioner left India and was treated as a foreigner on a foreign permit; he does not satisfy Article 5, and registration/naturalisation lies in the Government’s discretion. The decoy is the long, repeatedly-extended stay — but mere residence on permits does not ripen into a right to citizenship.

C — Conclusion. He cannot compel the grant. No writ lies to force the Government to confer citizenship; the remedy, if any, is to apply and satisfy the statutory conditions.

Problem 2 — Is a research institute “State” under Article 12? (Unit II)

Problem: An international non-profit research institute terminates an employee, who files a writ under Article 32 claiming the institute is “State” under Article 12. Is the writ maintainable?

I — Issue. Whether the body is “other authority” / an instrumentality of the State under Article 12, so that a writ lies against it.

R — Rule. “State” includes bodies that are instrumentalities or agencies of the State — tested by deep and pervasive State control, government funding, monopoly status and public functions (Ajay Hasia; R.D. Shetty; refined in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. IICB).

A — Analysis. If the institute is government-funded and pervasively controlled, it is “State” and the writ lies; if it is an autonomous private body merely aided or registered, it is not “State.” The decoy is the “international/non-profit” label — status turns on control and function, not the name.

C — Conclusion. The writ is maintainable only if the Ajay Hasia tests are satisfied; a genuinely autonomous private institute is not “State,” and the employee must sue in contract/labour law instead.

Problem 3 — Different tax rates by locality: valid classification? (Unit II — Article 14)

Problem: A State levies entertainment tax at 30% in metros, 20% in other cities and 10% in rural areas (or taxes luxury hotels while exempting modest eating houses). The classification is challenged as discriminatory under Article 14.

I — Issue. Whether differential taxation by locality/class violates the right to equality.

R — Rule. Article 14 permits reasonable classification on the twin test — an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object. In taxation the State has especially wide latitude and may pick and choose districts, objects and rates (East India Tobacco; Twyford Tea).

A — Analysis. Paying capacity and commercial character differ between metros and villages, and between luxury and modest establishments; the differentia is intelligible and the nexus (revenue, equity) is rational. The decoy is “unequal rates = discrimination” — but equal treatment of unequals is not required.

C — Conclusion. The classification is valid; mere inequality of rates founded on a real difference does not offend Article 14.

Problem 4 — Reservation of 68% of seats (Unit III — Articles 15 & 16)

Problem: A Government order reserves 68% of medical/engineering seats for backward classes; a higher-scoring general candidate challenges it.

I — Issue. Whether reservation exceeding 50% is constitutionally valid.

R — Rule. Article 15(4)/16(4) permit reservation for backward classes, but Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) caps total reservation at 50% save in extraordinary circumstances, and requires exclusion of the creamy layer.

A — Analysis. 68% breaches the 50% ceiling, tipping “protective discrimination” into reverse discrimination and defeating equality of opportunity. The decoy is the laudable social object — but the means exceed the constitutional limit, and no extraordinary justification is shown.

C — Conclusion. The reservation is void to the extent it exceeds 50%; the excess must be struck down (Indra Sawhney).

Problem 5 — Refusing to sing the National Anthem (Unit III — Articles 19 & 25)

Problem: A student, on genuine religious belief, refuses to sing the National Anthem but stands respectfully; the school expels him.

I — Issue. Whether expelling a student who respectfully declines to sing the Anthem violates his fundamental rights.

R — Rule. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986) — Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to silence, and Article 25 protects conscience; a genuine belief, respectfully held (standing but not singing), cannot be penalised, there being no disrespect.

A — Analysis. The student stood in respect and did not disrupt — no law compels singing, and forcing him offends free speech and freedom of conscience. The decoy is “national duty” — patriotism cannot be coerced against genuine conscience where respect is shown.

C — Conclusion. The expulsion is unconstitutional; it violates Articles 19(1)(a) and 25 (Bijoe Emmanuel), and the student must be reinstated.

Problem 6 — Compelling specimen handwriting & fingerprints (Unit IV — Article 20(3))

Problem: A magistrate orders that an accused’s specimen handwriting and fingerprints be taken against his will; he pleads Article 20(3) (right against self-incrimination).

I — Issue. Whether compelling specimen handwriting/fingerprints violates the protection against self-incrimination.

R — Rule. Article 20(3) bars only testimonial compulsion — being “a witness” against oneself. State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961) held that giving specimen handwriting, fingerprints or physical/material evidence is not “to be a witness”, as it conveys no personal knowledge.

A — Analysis. Specimens are identification material, not a communication of guilt; taking them does not extract a self-incriminating statement. The decoy is that it is “evidence against him” — but Article 20(3) protects only testimonial self-incrimination.

C — Conclusion. The order is valid; compelling specimen handwriting and fingerprints does not violate Article 20(3) (Kathi Kalu Oghad).

Problem 7 — Departmental inquiry then criminal prosecution: double jeopardy? (Unit IV — Article 20(2))

Problem: An officer is dismissed after a departmental inquiry and is then criminally prosecuted on the same facts; he pleads double jeopardy.

I — Issue. Whether a criminal prosecution following a departmental inquiry on the same facts is barred by Article 20(2).

R — Rule. Article 20(2) bars a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence — but only where the first was a prosecution before a court or judicial tribunal (Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay; S.A. Venkataraman). A departmental inquiry is not a “prosecution.”

A — Analysis. The dismissal was administrative, not a prosecution before a court, so the earlier proceeding does not attract the bar; the criminal trial is the first prosecution. The decoy is “same facts, punished twice” — but Article 20(2) needs a prior judicial prosecution.

C — Conclusion. The plea fails; the criminal prosecution is not barred by Article 20(2), a departmental inquiry not being a prosecution before a court.

Problem 8 — Refusing/cancelling a passport (Unit IV — Article 21)

Problem: Passport authorities refuse or cancel the passport of a citizen who wishes to travel abroad. Can they be compelled to issue it, or is the cancellation valid?

I — Issue. Whether the right to travel abroad is protected by Article 21, and what procedure the State must follow to curtail it.

R — Rule. The right to travel abroad is part of “personal liberty” under Article 21 (Satwant Singh Sawhney; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978). It can be curtailed only by a procedure that is fair, just and reasonable, which includes the right to be heard.

A — Analysis. A refusal/cancellation without giving reasons or an opportunity to be heard is arbitrary and fails the Maneka Gandhi test; “procedure established by law” now means due procedure. The decoy is executive discretion over passports — discretion must still be exercised fairly.

C — Conclusion. An arbitrary refusal is invalid; the citizen can compel a fair hearing and reasons. A cancellation is valid only if made under a fair, just and reasonable procedure (Maneka Gandhi).

Problem 9 — Government-nominated governing body for a minority institution (Unit V — Article 30)

Problem: A minority-run educational institution is directed by the Government to constitute a governing body whose members are nominated by the Government. Is the direction valid?

I — Issue. Whether the State can impose a government-nominated governing body on a minority institution.

R — Rule. Article 30(1) gives religious and linguistic minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions. The State may impose reasonable regulation for academic standards, but not measures that destroy the minority’s right of administration (St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat; T.M.A. Pai Foundation).

A — Analysis. Handing control of the governing body to government nominees strikes at the core of “administer,” displacing the minority’s own management — that is not regulation but a takeover of administration. The decoy is “regulation in the public interest” — regulation is permissible, destruction of administration is not.

C — Conclusion. The direction is invalid; it violates Article 30(1) by depriving the minority institution of its right to administer.

Problem 10 — Must one approach the High Court (Art. 226) before the Supreme Court (Art. 32)? (Unit V — Writs)

Problem: The Supreme Court suggests that citizens should first approach the High Court under Article 226 before coming to it under Article 32. Is this a valid curtailment of the Fundamental Right?

I — Issue. Whether requiring recourse to Article 226 first curtails the fundamental right under Article 32.

R — Rule. Article 32 is itself a fundamental right — “the heart and soul of the Constitution” (Ambedkar) — and the Supreme Court cannot refuse relief where a fundamental right is infringed (Romesh Thappar). But as a matter of judicial policy / self-imposed discretion, the Court may ordinarily require the High Court (Art. 226) to be approached first, since Art. 226 is wider.

A — Analysis. A binding rule forcing Art. 226 first would curtail the guaranteed right under Art. 32; but a discretionary practice encouraging it does not extinguish the right — the door of Art. 32 stays open for genuine fundamental-rights violations. The decoy is treating a prudential practice as a bar.

C — Conclusion. As a rule of convenience it is valid; as a mandatory bar it would be unconstitutional. Article 32 cannot be taken away, though the Court may, in its discretion, relegate a petitioner to Article 226 first.

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