Salient Features of the Indian Constitution — Federalism & Basic Structure — KSLU Notes

Salient Features of the Indian Constitution

When the Constituent Assembly finished in 1949, they had produced the longest written constitution in the world — and they were unapologetic about it. Dr Ambedkar’s answer to critics who called it bulky: a constitution for a country as vast and diverse as India could not afford to leave gaps that a clever government might exploit. Every feature below is a deliberate choice, usually borrowed from somewhere and tuned for Indian conditions.

What makes it distinctive

Think of the Constitution as a house built from borrowed plans but for an Indian family: the parliamentary rooms from Britain, the rights wing from the USA, the directive principles from Ireland, emergency plumbing from Germany. The salient features are the rooms of that house.

Lengthiest written constitution — a single, exhaustively detailed document (originally 395 Articles, 8 Schedules; now far more), covering not just the Union but the states and even administrative detail.
Drawn from many sources — parliamentary system and rule of law (UK), Fundamental Rights and judicial review (USA), Directive Principles (Ireland), emergency provisions (Germany), the idea of a Union (Canada).
Parliamentary form of government — the real executive (the Council of Ministers) is drawn from and answerable to the legislature, not separately elected; the President is a constitutional head. India chose responsibility over the stability of a fixed-term presidency.
Blend of rigidity and flexibility — the three amendment routes of Art 368 (simple majority / special majority / special majority + state ratification), so the document bends where it should and holds firm where it must.
Federal system with a unitary (centralising) bias — a dual polity with a division of powers, but tilted towards a strong Centre (see the quasi-federal discussion below).
Fundamental Rights (Part III), Directive Principles (Part IV) and Fundamental Duties (Part IV-A) — a justiciable charter of rights, plus non-justiciable goals of governance, plus citizens’ duties.
Independent and integrated judiciary — a single hierarchy topped by the Supreme Court, insulated from executive control, with the power of judicial review.
Secular State — the State has no religion of its own and treats all faiths equally (Arts 25-28).
Single citizenship — every Indian is a citizen of India alone, not separately of a state (unlike the USA).
Universal adult suffrage — every adult citizen votes, regardless of wealth, gender, caste or literacy.
Emergency provisions — the Constitution can temporarily turn unitary in a crisis (Arts 352, 356, 360).

Federal or Unitary? — the quasi-federal question

This is the essay the examiner loves. The honest answer is both, by design. Federal features (marks of a genuine federation):

Dual government — a Union government and state governments, each with its own sphere.
Division of powers — the Seventh Schedule splits subjects into the Union List, State List and Concurrent List.
Written and supreme Constitution — the source both levels draw from.
Independent judiciary — to umpire Centre-state disputes.

Unitary / centralising features (the tilt towards the Centre):

Strong Centre — the Union List is longest and the Centre prevails on the Concurrent List.
Single Constitution and single citizenship — states cannot secede or frame their own constitutions.
Emergency provisions — during an emergency the federal structure effectively becomes unitary.
Integrated judiciary, all-India services, Governor appointed by the Centre — administrative threads running from the Centre into the states.

💡 EXAM TIP — the phrase that scores on “federal or unitary”

The trap. Listing features and stopping, without a verdict.

What to write. Conclude with the labels the examiner is listening for: Prof. K.C. Wheare called it “quasi-federal”; Dr Ambedkar said it is “federal in form but unitary in spirit”; and in S.R. Bommai (1994) the Supreme Court held that federalism is part of the basic structure.

Why it scores. A definite conclusion backed by two jurists and a case is exactly the “comment/critically examine” the question asks for.

🧩 WORKED EXAMPLE — is India “federal”?

Facts. A student argues India is not federal because the Centre can dismiss a state government under Art 356.

Rule. A federation is tested by dual government + division of powers + supreme written constitution + independent judiciary — not by the absence of any central control.

Apply. India has all four federal marks, so it is federal; the strong Centre and emergency powers are a bias, not a denial of federalism.

Conclusion. India is quasi-federal — federal in structure with a unitary tilt, and federalism itself is basic structure (Bommai).

Dr B.R. Ambedkar (Constituent Assembly): “The Constitution is a Federal Constitution inasmuch as it establishes a dual polity… federal in form but unitary in spirit.”

In Simple Terms: on the surface India shares power between Centre and states like any federation, but the design leans towards a strong Centre — especially in a crisis.

flowchart TD
    IN["Indian Constitution — QUASI-FEDERAL"]
    IN --> F["Federal marks"]
    IN --> U["Unitary tilt"]
    F --> F1["Dual government"]
    F --> F2["Division of powers (7th Schedule)"]
    F --> F3["Supreme written Constitution"]
    F --> F4["Independent judiciary"]
    U --> U1["Strong Centre"]
    U --> U2["Single citizenship & Constitution"]
    U --> U3["Emergency provisions"]
    U --> U4["Governor, all-India services"]

Case Laws

[C-2] S.R. Bommai v Union of India (1994) — federalism is part of the basic structure; Art 356 cannot be used to dismiss state governments arbitrarily.
State of West Bengal v Union of India (1963) — India is not a “true” federation of the classical type; the Centre holds a paramount position.
[C-1] Kesavananda Bharati (1973) — the federal character cannot be destroyed even by amendment (basic structure).

The Basic Structure Doctrine

Foundational background — the mechanics of amendment (Article 368) belong to Constitutional Law II, but the doctrine is taught here because it underpins almost every later Fundamental-Rights answer (judicial review, the FR–DPSP balance and secularism are all “basic features”).

Can Parliament amend any part of the Constitution — even abolish democracy, delete judicial review, or wipe out the Fundamental Rights altogether? If the answer were “yes”, the Constitution could be quietly dismantled by a temporary majority. The Supreme Court’s answer is a firm no: there is an unamendable “basic structure” that no amendment may destroy.

The unamendable core

A. The tug-of-war over Article 368. Article 368 gives Parliament the power to amend the Constitution. How far does it reach? The Court’s view swung back and forth:

In Shankari Prasad v Union of India (1951) and Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan (1965) the Court held that Parliament could amend even the Fundamental Rights.
In Golak Nath v State of Punjab (1967) it reversed course and held that Fundamental Rights could not be amended at all.
In Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) a 13-judge Bench struck the final balance: Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution, including the Fundamental Rights, but cannot alter or destroy its “basic structure”.

B. What is in the “basic structure”? The Court has deliberately kept the list open-ended and illustrative, filling it in case by case. Recognised features include the supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, the separation of powers, judicial review, federalism, secularism, the democratic and republican form of government, free and fair elections, the independence of the judiciary, and the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.

C. The doctrine in action. Later benches applied the test again and again:

Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain (1975) (free and fair elections); Minerva Mills v Union of India (1980) (limited amending power and the FR–DPSP balance); S.R. Bommai v Union of India (1994) (secularism and federalism); L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) (judicial review); and I.R. Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu (2007) (even laws placed in the Ninth Schedule can be tested against the basic structure).

Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973): the amending power under Article 368 “does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.”

In Simple Terms: Parliament may repair and remodel the house, but it cannot knock down the load-bearing walls that make it this Constitution.

flowchart TD
    P["Parliament's amending power (Article 368)"]
    P --> Y["May amend ANY part — including Fundamental Rights"]
    P --> N["But CANNOT damage the BASIC STRUCTURE"]
    N --> E1["Supremacy of the Constitution; rule of law"]
    N --> E2["Judicial review; independence of judiciary"]
    N --> E3["Federalism; secularism; democracy"]
    N --> E4["FR–DPSP balance; free & fair elections"]

Case Laws

Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) — created the doctrine: Parliament may amend any part but not destroy the basic structure.
Minerva Mills v Union of India (1980) — limited amending power and the FR–DPSP balance are themselves part of the basic structure.
S.R. Bommai v Union of India (1994) — secularism and federalism are basic features.

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