Remoteness of Damage — The Wagon Mound

A wrongdoer does not answer for every consequence of his act, however bizarre — only for harm that is not too remote. The law draws a line where responsibility ends.

The Two Tests

flowchart TD
    A["Is the damage TOO REMOTE?"]:::root
    A --> B["Directness test — Re Polemis (1921)<br/>liable for ALL direct consequences,<br/>foreseeable or not (now rejected)"]:::old
    A --> C["Foreseeability test — The Wagon Mound (1961)<br/>liable only for REASONABLY FORESEEABLE<br/>consequences (the modern rule)"]:::new

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• Re Polemis (1921) — the old directness test: a defendant was liable for all consequences directly flowing from his wrongful act, whether or not they were foreseeable.
• Overseas Tankship v. Morts Dock — The Wagon Mound (1961) — replaced it with the modern reasonable-foreseeability test: a defendant is liable only for consequences that a reasonable person could have foreseen. (Oil negligently spilled in a harbour caught fire in an unforeseeable way — held too remote.)

The Chain of Causation

A novus actus interveniens — a new, independent, intervening cause — may break the chain and relieve the original wrongdoer. But an intervening act done instinctively, in the agony of the moment, in self-preservation does not break the chain.

✏️ Sample Solved Problem (IRAC Method)

Problem: A throws a lighted squib into a crowded market; it lands near B, who flings it away to save himself; it lands near C, who does the same; it finally explodes in D’s face and blinds him. Who is liable to D?

I — Issue

Whether A, who threw the squib, is liable for D’s injury, or whether the intervening acts of B and C broke the chain of causation.

R — Rule

A wrongdoer is liable for harm that is the natural and probable consequence of his act; intervening acts done in the agony of the moment, in reasonable self-preservation, do not amount to a novus actus interveniens. Scott v. Shepherd (1773) — the “lighted squib” case — held the original thrower liable, the intermediate tossings being instinctive, protective reactions.

A — Analysis

The decoy is that B and C each physically threw the squib that finally injured D. But neither acted as a free agent — each flung it away reflexively to save himself from A’s dangerous act, and such instinctive self-protective acts are treated as a continuation of A’s original wrong, not new independent causes. A’s act of throwing a lighted squib into a crowd set the whole sequence in motion and made D’s injury its natural and probable result.

C — Conclusion

A is liable to D. The reflexive acts of B and C in self-preservation did not break the chain of causation; the original wrongdoer answers for the foreseeable result of throwing a lighted squib into a crowd (Scott v. Shepherd).

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