Unit V — Emergency, Interpretation & Amendment
“Parliament may amend any provision of the Constitution, but it cannot destroy its basic structure.” — principle of Kesavananda Bharati (1973)
Emergency Provisions
flowchart TD
A["Three Emergencies"]:::root
A --> B["National (Art. 352)<br/>war / external aggression /<br/>armed rebellion"]:::leaf
A --> C["President's Rule (Art. 356)<br/>failure of constitutional<br/>machinery in a State"]:::leaf
A --> D["Financial (Art. 360)<br/>threat to financial<br/>stability / credit"]:::leaf
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classDef leaf fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
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- National Emergency (Art. 352) — on war, external aggression or armed rebellion; the federal system turns unitary, Parliament may legislate on State subjects, and Article 19 is suspended (Art. 358) with other rights suspendable by order (Art. 359).
- President’s Rule (Art. 356) — on the failure of constitutional machinery in a State; the State government is dismissed and administration passes to the Centre.
- Financial Emergency (Art. 360) — on a threat to India’s financial stability.
After the 1975 abuses, the 44th Amendment (1978) tightened the grounds (replacing “internal disturbance” with “armed rebellion,” requiring written Cabinet advice) and made Articles 20 and 21 unsuspendable even during an Emergency. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) subjected Art. 356 proclamations to judicial review and held the floor of the House — not the Governor’s report — to be the test of majority.
Constitutional Interpretation
Courts read the Constitution as a living instrument through settled doctrines: harmonious construction (reconcile clashing provisions), pith and substance (judge a law by its true nature, not incidental encroachment), severability (strike only the bad part), eclipse (an inconsistent pre-Constitution law is dormant, not dead), colourable legislation (“what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly”), and purposive interpretation to keep the document alive to changing times.
Amendment & the Basic Structure Doctrine
Article 368 lets Parliament amend the Constitution by a special majority (and, for federal provisions, ratification by half the States).
The arc of the cases:
- Shankari Prasad (1951) & Sajjan Singh (1965): Parliament could amend even fundamental rights.
- Golak Nath (1967): fundamental rights are beyond the amending power.
- Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973): the landmark synthesis — Parliament may amend any provision but cannot damage or destroy the “basic structure” of the Constitution.
- Minerva Mills (1980) and Waman Rao (1981): applied and confirmed the doctrine; judicial review and the FR–DPSP balance are part of the basic structure.
Basic features held inviolable include the supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, judicial review, federalism, secularism, democracy, separation of powers, and free and fair elections.
The Schedules are the Constitution’s twelve detailed appendices (the Seventh — division of powers; the Tenth — anti-defection). The NCRWC (Venkatachaliah Commission, 2000–02) reviewed the working of the Constitution, expressly preserving the basic structure.
✏️ Sample Solved Problem (IRAC Method)
Problem: On the Governor’s recommendation, President’s Rule is imposed on a State and its Ministry dismissed without giving the Chief Minister and Council of Ministers an opportunity to prove their majority on the floor of the House. The Chief Minister challenges it. Decide.
I — Issue
Whether President’s Rule under Article 356 is valid when imposed on the Governor’s report alone, without testing the Ministry’s majority on the floor of the House.
R — Rule
- Article 356 allows President’s Rule where the State government cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution — but the proclamation is justiciable.
- S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994): the floor of the House is the only legitimate test of a government’s majority — not the Governor’s subjective assessment; a proclamation on extraneous or mala fide grounds, denying a floor test, is liable to be struck down, and the assembly can even be revived.
A — Analysis
The decoy is the Governor’s report, which tempts the view that the Centre may act on it. Bommai squarely rejects that: majority is to be proved on the floor, and dismissing a Ministry without that opportunity is constitutionally impermissible. The Centre’s satisfaction under Art. 356 is reviewable, and a refusal to allow a floor test points to mala fides or irrelevant considerations.
C — Conclusion
The imposition is invalid. Under S.R. Bommai, the Chief Minister was entitled to a floor test; President’s Rule imposed without it is unconstitutional and may be set aside (with the dismissed Ministry/assembly liable to be restored).
📄 The full bundle (₹199) has the complete Unit V — all three emergencies, the interpretation doctrines, and Article 368 with the full basic-structure line of cases and blueprints — plus the Question Bank’s model answers to the single-State-emergency and President’s-Rule problems. Get Notes + Question Bank — ₹199