Unit III — Speaker, Anti-Defection & the Judiciary

“The Speaker is the guardian of the rights and privileges of the House.” — settled constitutional convention

The Speaker — Powers, Functions & Privileges

The Speaker of the Lok Sabha (and of a State Assembly) is the impartial umpire of the House: presiding and keeping order, applying the rules of procedure, certifying Money Bills (Art. 110(3) — a conclusive certificate), deciding anti-defection cases, and exercising a casting vote in a tie. To act independently of the party that elected him, the Speaker enjoys special privileges and a secure office (removable only by a resolution on 14 days’ notice).

In Simple Terms: the Speaker is the referee — neutral, rule-bound, protected — so the House can function fairly regardless of party.

The Anti-Defection Law — Tenth Schedule

Added by the 52nd Amendment (1985) to curb the “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram” culture of floor-crossing.

flowchart TD
    A["Disqualification for defection<br/>(Tenth Schedule)"]:::root
    A --> B["Voluntarily giving up<br/>party membership"]:::leaf
    A --> C["Voting / abstaining against<br/>the party whip (no condonation<br/>in 15 days)"]:::leaf
    A --> D["Exception: MERGER —<br/>two-thirds of the party<br/>genuinely merge"]:::ok
    A --> E["Decided by the Speaker;<br/>subject to judicial review<br/>(Kihoto Hollohan)"]:::leaf

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    classDef leaf fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
    classDef ok fill:#E6FFE6,stroke:#1E8A3A,color:#000;
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A member is disqualified for (i) voluntarily giving up party membership or (ii) voting/abstaining against the party whip (unless condoned within 15 days). The sole surviving exception is a genuine merger (two-thirds of the legislature party). Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) upheld the Schedule but held the Speaker’s decision is subject to judicial review; Nabam Rebia (2016) and later rulings curbed delay and partisan use.

The Judiciary — Supreme Court & High Courts

Judges are appointed by the President but effectively chosen by the collegium (judges selecting judges) — a system the Court has guarded as essential to independence, striking down the NJAC in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India (2015). The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction spans original (Art. 131 — Centre–State disputes; Art. 32 — fundamental rights), appellate (Arts. 132–136, including the discretionary special leave under Art. 136) and advisory (Art. 143). High Courts hold writ jurisdiction (Art. 226) and superintendence (Art. 227); transfer of a High Court judge is permissible only in the public interest, never as punishment.

✏️ Sample Solved Problem (IRAC Method)

Problem: A High Court judge whose judgments displease the Government is transferred to a distant High Court, apparently as a punishment. The transfer is challenged. Decide.

I — Issue

Whether a High Court judge may be transferred as a measure of punishment, and on what condition a transfer under Article 222 is valid.

R — Rule

Article 222 lets the President transfer a High Court judge on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India (in practice, the collegium).
The settled principle (S.P. Gupta, 1981; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn., 1993/2015): a transfer must be made in the public interest and never as a punishment, because judicial independence is part of the basic structure; a transfer must have the consent/consultation of the collegium, not the will of the executive.

A — Analysis

The decoy is the bare power to transfer — Article 222 does allow transfers, which tempts the conclusion that any transfer is valid. But a transfer driven by the Government’s displeasure with a judge’s decisions, dressed up as routine, is punitive and strikes at the independence of the judiciary. Such a transfer lacks the only legitimate basis — public interest on the collegium’s recommendation — and is mala fide.

C — Conclusion

The transfer is invalid. A High Court judge can be transferred only in the public interest on the collegium’s recommendation, not as punishment for unwelcome judgments; the challenge succeeds.

📄 The full bundle (₹199) has the complete Unit III — the Speaker, the full Tenth Schedule, and the judiciary (collegium, NJAC, all heads of jurisdiction) with blueprints — plus the Question Bank’s model answers to the Speaker’s-privilege-warrant habeas corpus problem and the judge-transfer problem. Get Notes + Question Bank — ₹199