Key Definitions under RTI Act 2005 — Section 2

Landmark Case: Central Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011) 8 SCC 1 — The Supreme Court gave the broadest possible reading to “information” under Section 2(f), holding that evaluated answer scripts are “information” that must be disclosed, rejecting the argument that the examiner’s relationship creates any privilege.

Why Definitions Matter

The RTI Act’s definitions section — Section 2 — is the gateway to the entire statute. The definition of “information” determines what can be sought. The definition of “public authority” determines who must answer. The definition of “right to information” spells out how far the right extends. Getting these right in an exam answer is the foundation of a good RTI answer.

Section 2(f) — “Information”

“Information means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force.”

This definition is deliberately wide. There is almost no category of material a public authority holds that falls outside it. Even a physical sample (such as a medicine sample), an audio recording, or a computer file is “information.” If a public authority can access something from a private body under any other law, that too is “information” for RTI purposes.

Section 2(j) — “Right to Information”

The Act breaks the right down into four practical components:

graph LR
    A["Right to Information\nSection 2(j)"] --> B["1. Inspect\nDocuments, records\nand works"]
    A --> C["2. Take notes\nExtracts and certified\ncopies of documents"]
    A --> D["3. Certified samples\nOf material\ne.g. medicine, food sample"]
    A --> E["4. Electronic form\nUSB, CD, email\nor printouts"]

This means the right is not limited to receiving a written reply. A citizen may walk into the government office and physically inspect files, take notes, or obtain a physical sample of material held by a public authority.

Section 2(h) — “Public Authority”

Covered in detail in the Public Authority page. The key point for definitions: a public authority includes not just bodies created directly by law but also bodies substantially financed by government and NGOs substantially funded by government.

All Key Definitions — Section 2 Quick Reference

Section 2(e) — Competent Authority

graph TD
    A["COMPETENT AUTHORITY\nSection 2(e)"] --> B["Speaker of Lok Sabha\nfor Lok Sabha"]
    A --> C["Chairman of Rajya Sabha\nfor Rajya Sabha"]
    A --> D["Speaker of State Assembly\nfor State Assembly"]
    A --> E["Chief Justice of India\nfor Supreme Court"]
    A --> F["Chief Justice of High Court\nfor that High Court"]
    A --> G["President of India\nfor other Central authorities"]
    A --> H["Governor of State\nfor other State authorities"]

The competent authority has the power to make rules under the Act for the body they head. This ensures each constitutional body can tailor its RTI compliance procedures.

Sample Problem (KSLU-style)

Problem: Vikram files an RTI application to a Central Government department asking for all e-mails exchanged between the Secretary and a private contractor regarding a government project. The PIO says e-mails are not “records” and cannot be supplied. Is the PIO correct?

Answer (IRAC):

• Issue: Whether e-mails between a government officer and a private contractor constitute “information” disclosable under the RTI Act 2005.
• Rule: Section 2(f) defines information to include “records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form.” The word “e-mails” is expressly listed.
• Analysis: The PIO’s argument that e-mails are not “records” is directly contradicted by the plain language of Section 2(f), which expressly lists e-mails as a category of information. The fact that the e-mails are in electronic form is also irrelevant — Section 2(f) covers “data material held in any electronic form.” Additionally, Section 2(i) defines “record” broadly to include machine-readable records. There is no basis for the PIO’s refusal.
• Conclusion: The PIO is incorrect. The e-mails are “information” under Section 2(f) and must be provided subject only to legitimate exemptions under Section 8. Vikram should file a First Appeal citing the express terms of Section 2(f).