Unit II — Marriage, Matrimonial Remedies & Dowry

“Saptapadi is the essential ceremony; if performed, the marriage is valid — and a second one is bigamy.” — Principle settled in Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra (1965)

Conditions of a Valid Hindu Marriage — Section 5

flowchart TD
    ROOT["Section 5 — Valid Hindu Marriage"]:::root
    ROOT --> A["No Living Spouse<br/>(S.5-i) — Bigamy = Void"]:::cond
    ROOT --> B["Mental Soundness<br/>(S.5-ii) — Unsound = Voidable"]:::cond
    ROOT --> C["Age: 21 (groom)<br/>18 (bride) — S.5-iii"]:::cond
    ROOT --> D["No Prohibited Relationship<br/>(S.5-iv) — Breach = Void"]:::cond
    ROOT --> E["No Sapinda Relation<br/>(S.5-v) — Breach = Void"]:::cond

    classDef root fill:#FFF8DC,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px,color:#000;
    classDef cond fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
    linkStyle default stroke:#888,stroke-width:1px;

In Simple Terms: To marry under Hindu law you must be (1) single — no living spouse, (2) mentally sound, (3) of legal age, (4) not within prohibited degrees of relationship, and (5) not sapindas [relatives within a specified number of generations] of each other.

Void vs Voidable Marriages

Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao (1988) — A second wife in a bigamous marriage is not a “wife” for maintenance under S.125 CrPC; the marriage is void from the start.

Grounds for void marriages (S.11 + S.5): bigamy, sapinda relationship, prohibited degrees. Grounds for voidable marriages (S.12): impotence, mental disorder at the time of marriage, consent by force/fraud (file within 1 year of discovery), and pre-marriage pregnancy by another man (file within 1 year of marriage).

Matrimonial Remedies — Divorce, Section 13

flowchart LR
    A["Hindu Marriage Act 1955 —<br/>No divorce right before 1955"]:::old
    A --> B["S.13(1) — Fault Grounds<br/>Adultery, Cruelty, Desertion (2 yrs),<br/>Conversion, Insanity, Disease"]:::ground
    B --> C["S.13B — Mutual Consent<br/>1 yr separation + agree + cool-off"]:::ground
    C --> D["Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) —<br/>SC recommends 'irretrievable<br/>breakdown' as a ground"]:::milestone

    classDef old fill:#FFE4B5,stroke:#8B4513,color:#000;
    classDef ground fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
    classDef milestone fill:#D8F0D8,stroke:#1B5E20,color:#000;
    linkStyle default stroke:#888,stroke-width:1px;

Before 1955, a Hindu wife had no right to divorce — a husband could abandon her, and she remained tied to him for life. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 changed that by recognising fault-based grounds (adultery, cruelty, desertion, conversion, etc.) and, later, divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B.

Section 13(2) — additional grounds available only to the wife: husband’s pre-Act second marriage where another wife is alive, husband guilty of rape/sodomy/bestiality, a decree/order of maintenance has been passed against the husband and cohabitation has not resumed for a year, or the wife was married before age 15 and repudiated the marriage before turning 18 (the “option of puberty,” S.13(2)(iv)).

Judicial Separation & Restitution of Conjugal Rights

In T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah (1983), the Andhra Pradesh High Court struck down Section 9 (Restitution of Conjugal Rights) as unconstitutional — calling it a “savage and barbarous remedy” that violated a woman’s right to privacy and bodily autonomy. The Supreme Court in Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar (1984) disagreed, upholding the provision as a step toward reconciliation rather than compulsion.

Restitution of Conjugal Rights — Section 9: When either spouse withdraws from the society of the other without reasonable excuse, the aggrieved spouse may petition the district court for a decree directing the withdrawing spouse to return. Essentials: (1) withdrawal from the other’s society, (2) without reasonable cause, (3) failure of voluntary resumption, (4) no legal bar to granting the decree. Effect: if the respondent does not comply for one year, the petitioner may seek divorce under S.13(1A).

Judicial Separation — Section 10: Either spouse may seek a decree of judicial separation on any ground available for divorce under S.13(1) (and, for a wife, also S.13(2)). The marriage continues, but the parties are relieved of the duty to cohabit, and the wife gains the right to live separately and claim maintenance.

Case laws: Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha (1984) — S.9 is constitutional, a step toward reconciliation; Bipinchandra v. Prabhavati (1957) — desertion requires both animus deserendi (intention to desert) and factum deserdendi (the physical act of leaving).

Maintenance and Alimony

Kulbhushan v. Raj Kumari (1970) — the Supreme Court held that a Hindu wife’s right to maintenance is a personal obligation of her husband flowing from the marriage bond itself — not merely a claim against his property.

flowchart TD
    ROOT["Maintenance under HAMA 1956"]:::root
    ROOT --> A["S.18 — Wife's maintenance<br/>from Husband (lifetime)"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> B["S.18(2) — Separate residence +<br/>maintenance (desertion, cruelty,<br/>bigamy, conversion)"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> C["S.19 — Widowed daughter-in-law<br/>from father-in-law's estate"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> D["S.20 — Children & aged parents<br/>from Hindu's income"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> E["S.25 HMA — Permanent alimony<br/>after divorce decree"]:::leaf

    classDef root fill:#FFF8DC,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px,color:#000;
    classDef leaf fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
    linkStyle default stroke:#888,stroke-width:1px;

Section 18(1), HAMA 1956: “…a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime.”

Section 18(2) lets a wife live separately and claim maintenance if the husband: deserts her without cause, treats her with cruelty, has another wife living, keeps a concubine, has converted out of Hinduism, or for any other justifying cause. She loses the right (S.18(3)) if she becomes unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion. Section 25, HMA 1955 empowers the court to grant permanent alimony at the time of, or any time after, passing a matrimonial decree — the amount is discretionary, based on each party’s income, property and conduct (Bhagwan Dutt v. Kamla Devi, 1975). Section 20, HAMA makes every Hindu liable to maintain his/her legitimate and illegitimate children and aged or infirm parents.

The S.19 vs S.20 trap: Section 19 gives a widowed daughter-in-law a claim against her father-in-law’s estate, payable out of her late husband’s share — not a claim against the father-in-law personally, and not against her own father. Section 20 is a completely different right — a child’s duty to maintain aged parents. Mixing the two up is the single most common mistake in this unit’s problem questions (see the worked fact-pattern below).

🚨 FACT-PATTERN RISK ALERT (Widow’s Maintenance)

Scenario: ‘A’ is a widow. She sues her own father and her father-in-law separately for maintenance. Decide.

• Issue: Against whom can a Hindu widow claim maintenance — her own father, or her father-in-law?
• Rule: S.19, HAMA 1956 — a widowed daughter-in-law is entitled to maintenance from her father-in-law, payable out of her deceased husband’s share in his estate. Her own father owes her no such statutory duty (unless she separately qualifies as an aged/infirm dependent daughter under S.20 — not the fact here).
• Analysis: ‘A’s claim properly lies against her father-in-law’s estate under S.19; her suit against her own father is misconceived, since no provision imposes a maintenance obligation on a father toward his married/widowed daughter once she has her own matrimonial home. Decoy: students often assume “blood relation = liability” — Hindu maintenance law is need- and relationship-specific, not generally familial.
• Conclusion: ‘A’ succeeds only against her father-in-law’s estate (S.19); the claim against her own father fails.

Case laws: Kulbhushan v. Raj Kumari (1970); Jagdish Jugtawat v. Manju Lata (2002) — a daughter’s right to maintenance from parents lasts till marriage, while a widowed daughter-in-law’s right runs against the father-in-law’s estate; Bhagwan Dutt v. Kamla Devi (1975) — permanent alimony is discretionary, based on both parties’ income.

Dowry Prohibition

Despite the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, the National Crime Records Bureau reported over 7,000 dowry deaths a year through the 2010s — which is why Sections 498A and 304B IPC had to be added as criminal-law reinforcements to the civil prohibition.

flowchart TD
    ROOT["Dowry Prohibition Framework"]:::root
    ROOT --> A["Dowry Prohibition Act 1961<br/>S.3: Giving/Taking → 5 yrs<br/>S.4: Demanding → 6 months-2 yrs<br/>S.6: Return in 3 months"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> B["IPC S.498A<br/>Cruelty/dowry harassment<br/>→ 3 years imprisonment"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> C["IPC S.304B<br/>Dowry death within 7 yrs<br/>→ 7 years to life"]:::leaf
    ROOT --> D["Stridhan<br/>(NOT dowry — voluntary<br/>gift to wife, her absolute property)"]:::distinct

    classDef root fill:#FFF8DC,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px,color:#000;
    classDef leaf fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
    classDef distinct fill:#E6FFE6,stroke:#1E8A3A,color:#000;
    linkStyle default stroke:#888,stroke-width:1px;

Section 2, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: “‘Dowry’ means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given… by one party to a marriage to the other, or by the parents of either party… at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage.”

Key provisions: S.3 — giving/taking dowry: minimum 5 years’ imprisonment plus fine of ₹15,000 or the value of the dowry, whichever is higher; S.4 — demanding dowry: 6 months to 2 years plus fine up to ₹10,000; S.6 — dowry received must be handed over to the wife (or her heirs) within 3 months of the marriage, failing which up to 2 years’ imprisonment; S.8B — the offence is cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable. S.498A IPC punishes cruelty by the husband or his relatives (up to 3 years); S.304B IPC creates a presumption of dowry death — and shifts the burden onto the husband — where a married woman dies an unnatural death within 7 years of marriage and dowry-harassment is shown (punishment: 7 years to life).

The Stridhan distinction (a favourite trap): Stridhan is a voluntary gift that becomes the wife’s absolute property; dowry is coerced or demanded and is illegal. Confusing the two — e.g., calling wedding jewellery “dowry” simply because it changed hands at the wedding — is exactly the kind of category error examiners plant decoys around.

Case laws: Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar (1985) — Stridhan belongs absolutely to the wife; retention by in-laws is criminal breach of trust under S.405 IPC; Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1998) — the S.304B presumption is rebuttable, but the burden shifts to the accused once dowry-harassment before death is shown; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) — Supreme Court guidelines curbing arbitrary arrests under S.498A, requiring magistrates to apply their mind before remand.

✏️ Sample Solved Problem (IRAC Method)

Problem: ‘H’ and ‘W’ are married. ‘H’ leaves the matrimonial home in January 2022 without informing ‘W’ and does not return. ‘W’ files for divorce in March 2024, citing desertion. ‘H’ claims he left because ‘W’ was the one who drove him out. Decide.

I — Issue

Whether ‘H’ has deserted ‘W’ within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ib), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

R — Rule

• Section 13(1)(ib), HMA 1955 — desertion means abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent for a continuous period of two years immediately preceding the petition, without reasonable cause and without consent
• The doctrine of “constructive desertion” — a spouse who, by conduct, drives the other partner out of the home is treated as the deserting party, even though it was the other spouse who physically left

A — Analysis

‘H’ left the matrimonial home in January 2022; ‘W’s petition is filed in March 2024 — that is well over the statutory two-year continuous period, and on its face the elements of desertion (animus deserendi and factum of separation) appear satisfied. However, ‘H’s defence raises constructive desertion: if ‘W’s own conduct made it impossible for ‘H’ to continue living in the home, the law treats ‘W’, not ‘H’, as the deserting spouse. The burden now shifts — ‘H’ must prove that ‘W’s conduct was so grave and weighty that it left him with no reasonable option but to leave. Decoy: the two-year clock runs from the date ‘H’ actually left the home (January 2022), not from the date the petition is filed — a frequent trap in problem questions.

C — Conclusion

If ‘H’ fails to discharge the burden of proving constructive desertion by ‘W’, ‘W’s petition for divorce on the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) succeeds. If ‘H’ succeeds in proving constructive desertion, the finding of “who deserted whom” reverses, and ‘W’s petition on this specific ground would fail (though other reliefs may remain open to her).

📄 The full PDF bundle has more problems for Unit II — including the Saptapadi-bigamy-and-minority scenario, the testamentary-guardian’s-unauthorised-sale problem, full case-law tables for every topic above, and 16-mark essay blueprints for marriage, divorce, restitution, maintenance and dowry. Get the bundle — ₹149