Unit II — Capacity, Free Consent & Legality

“A minor’s agreement is void ab initio.” — Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903)

Capacity to Contract — Section 11

Every person is competent to contract who is (1) of the age of majority — 18 years for every person domiciled in India (Indian Majority Act 1875, as amended in 1999; the old “21 if under a court-appointed guardian” rule is abolished), (2) of sound mind (S.12), and (3) not disqualified by any law (alien enemies, insolvents, convicts, foreign sovereigns).

The Minor’s Agreement & Its Effects

flowchart TD
    A["Minor's agreement"]:::root
    A --> B["VOID ab initio<br/>(Mohori Bibee 1903)"]:::no
    A --> C["No estoppel — even if he<br/>lied about his age"]:::leaf
    A --> D["Cannot be ratified<br/>on majority"]:::leaf
    A --> E["Necessaries recoverable<br/>from his ESTATE (S.68)"]:::leaf
    A --> F["Limited restitution of<br/>identifiable benefits"]:::leaf

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Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) settled that a minor’s agreement is void ab initio — not voidable. Consequences: no estoppel against a minor who misrepresented his age, no ratification on attaining majority, no specific performance; but necessaries supplied to him are recoverable from his property (not personally) under Section 68, and the court may order restitution of identifiable benefits still in his hands (Khan Gul v. Lakha Singh), though it will not enforce a money decree that indirectly enforces the void contract (Leslie v. Sheill). Sound mind (S.12) is judged at the time of contracting — a lucid-interval contract is valid; an agreement by an unsound person is void, with necessaries recoverable from his estate.

Free Consent — Sections 13–22

Consent is consensus ad idem (S.13); it is free (S.14) when not caused by coercion (15), undue influence (16), fraud (17), misrepresentation (18), or mistake (20–22).

Coercion (S.15) — committing or threatening a forbidden act (IPC) to obtain consent. Undue influence (S.16) — a party in a position to dominate the will uses it to gain an unfair advantage (the burden shifts to the dominant party). Fraud (S.17) — a false representation made knowingly/recklessly to deceive; misrepresentation (S.18) — an innocent false statement. Mistake — a bilateral mistake of an essential fact makes the agreement void.

Legality, Void Agreements & Contingent Contracts

An agreement with an unlawful object or consideration (S.23) — forbidden by law, fraudulent, immoral, or opposed to public policy — is void. Specifically void agreements include restraint of marriage (S.26), restraint of trade (S.27 — subject to the sale-of-goodwill exception; Madhub Chunder), restraint of legal proceedings (S.28), uncertain agreements (S.29), and wagering agreements (S.30). A contingent contract (S.31) is one to do or not do something if an uncertain future event happens.

✏️ Sample Solved Problem (IRAC Method)

Problem: A, a minor, falsely represents that he is a major and obtains a loan / buys goods on credit. The lender, on discovering the truth, sues to recover the money. Decide.

I — Issue

Whether a minor who has obtained money/goods by misrepresenting his age can be made liable to repay, and whether he is estopped from pleading minority.

R — Rule

• A minor’s agreement is void ab initio (Mohori Bibee, 1903), so no contractual liability arises.
• No estoppel operates against a minor even where he lied about his age — the protection of minority cannot be defeated by his own misrepresentation (Sadiq Ali Khan v. Jai Kishori).
• But under equity / Section 33, Specific Relief Act, the court may order restitution of money or goods still identifiable in his hands; it will not enforce a money decree that indirectly enforces the void contract (Leslie v. Sheill).

A — Analysis

The decoy is the minor’s lie about his age, which tempts the conclusion that he should be estopped and made to pay. He is not: the policy of protecting minors overrides his misrepresentation, and the agreement remains void. The lender therefore cannot recover the loan as a contractual debt. His only hope is restitution — if the very money or goods are traceable and still in the minor’s possession, the court may order their return; but a money loan that has been spent cannot be recovered, as that would enforce the void contract.

C — Conclusion

The lender cannot recover the sum as a debt — the contract is void and the minor is not estopped (Mohori Bibee; Leslie v. Sheill). At most, identifiable goods/money still in the minor’s hands may be ordered restored under the equitable doctrine of restitution.

📄 The full bundle (₹199) has the complete Unit II — capacity, the minor’s agreement, all five vitiating factors, legality and contingent contracts with blueprints — plus the Question Bank’s model answers to the minor’s-promissory-note, undue-influence and mistake problems. Get Notes + Question Bank — ₹199