Unit II — State, Article 13 & Right to Equality

“The State should not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws.” — Article 14

“State” under Article 12

Fundamental Rights are guarantees against the State — so if a government-funded body could violate rights and escape because it is not a “ministry,” the rights would be hollow. Article 12 therefore defines “the State” broadly to include the Government and Parliament of the Union, the Government and Legislature of each State, all local authorities, and “other authorities” within India or under the control of the Government of India.

“Other authorities” is the elastic phrase the courts keep widening:

flowchart TD
    A["'Other authorities' — Art. 12"]:::root
    A --> B["Rajasthan SEB (1967)<br/>statutory public bodies"]:::leaf
    A --> C["Ajay Hasia (1981)<br/>instrumentality / agency test"]:::leaf
    A --> D["Pradeep Kumar Biswas (2002)<br/>deep & pervasive control"]:::leaf
    A --> E["Zee Telefilms (2005)<br/>LIMIT: BCCI not State"]:::lim

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    classDef leaf fill:#E6F3FF,stroke:#1E3A8A,color:#000;
    classDef lim fill:#FFE6E6,stroke:#8A1E1E,color:#000;
    linkStyle default stroke:#888,stroke-width:1px;

The instrumentality/agency test (Ajay Hasia) asks whether a body is so controlled, financed and used by government — discharging public functions — that it is really an arm of the State. Pradeep Kumar Biswas refined this to deep and pervasive control; Zee Telefilms set the limit (the BCCI discharges public functions but is not “State”).

Article 13 — Void Laws, Severability, Eclipse & Judicial Review

A constitution that declares rights but cannot strike down the laws that violate them is a paper tiger. Article 13 gives rights their teeth — and the courts the sword of judicial review.

Art. 13(1): pre-constitutional laws inconsistent with Part III are void to the extent of the inconsistency.
Art. 13(2): the State shall not make any post-constitutional law abridging the fundamental rights; any such law is void.

Two doctrines temper this:

Doctrine of Severability — only the offending part of a law is struck down if it can be separated, leaving the valid remainder in force (A.K. Gopalan; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla).
Doctrine of Eclipse — a pre-constitutional law that conflicts with Part III is not dead but dormant (eclipsed); if the conflicting right is later removed (e.g., by amendment), the law revives (Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P., 1955). For post-constitutional laws, the courts have treated such breaches as void from inception (though eclipse has been extended to non-citizens’ situations).

Judicial review — the power of the courts to test laws and executive action against the Constitution — flows from Art. 13 (and Arts. 32/226) and is itself part of the basic structure.

Right to Equality — Article 14

Article 14 guarantees “equality before the law” (a negative concept, of British origin — no one is above the law) and “equal protection of the laws” (a positive concept, of American origin — like should be treated alike).

Equality does not mean identical treatment for all. The State may classify — but only by reasonable classification, which must satisfy a twin test: (i) the classification rests on an intelligible differentia, and (ii) that differentia has a rational nexus to the object of the law. Beyond classification, the modern reading adds that arbitrariness itself violates Art. 14 — “equality is antithetical to arbitrariness” (E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1974; Maneka Gandhi, 1978).

Cases: Air India v. Nargesh Meerza (1981) — discriminatory service rules struck down; E.P. Royappa / Maneka Gandhi — the arbitrariness doctrine; Indra Sawhney (1992) — equality of opportunity in public employment.

✏️ Sample Solved Problem (IRAC Method)

Problem: Air India’s service rules terminate an air hostess on attaining a certain age, or within four years of service, or on first pregnancy, whichever is earlier, with extension left to the Managing Director’s discretion. Mrs. “N” challenges the rule under Article 14.

I — Issue

Whether the termination-on-pregnancy / age conditions and the unguided discretion to extend service violate the right to equality under Article 14.

R — Rule

Art. 14 forbids arbitrary State action and permits classification only on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the law’s object.
Conferring unguided, uncanalised discretion on an authority is itself arbitrary and void.
These are the facts of Air India v. Nargesh Meerza (1981).

A — Analysis

Terminating an air hostess on her first pregnancy has no rational nexus to the efficient running of an airline — it is “manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary,” callous and an affront to dignity. Likewise, leaving extension of service entirely to the Managing Director’s unfettered discretion, with no guiding standard, invites arbitrariness. The decoy is the apparently neutral “service rule” dressed as classification; but a classification that is arbitrary in substance fails the twin test.

C — Conclusion

The pregnancy-termination clause and the unguided-discretion clause are arbitrary and violate Article 14 (the age limit, being rational, may stand) — exactly as held in Nargesh Meerza. Mrs. “N” succeeds.

📄 The full bundle (₹199) has the complete Unit II — Article 12’s full instrumentality line, Article 13 doctrines, and Article 14 with all blueprints — plus the Question Bank’s model answers to the tax-classification and air-hostess problems and every Unit II essay. Get Notes + Question Bank — ₹199